Political Economy and International Investment Law: The Conclusion of IIAs by Developing Countries during the Twentieth Century

Author(s):  
Tobias A. Lehmann
2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 353-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Thuo Gathii

AbstractThis article discusses the role war has played in shaping the rules of international investment law from the late nineteenth century. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the move towards institutions, such as arbitration forums, and rules as an alternative to the use of force gave new impetus to the growth of international commercial law and related institutions. These rules and institutions represented the hope that the use of force would be eclipsed as States moved forward towards more cooperative, consensual and non-coercive mechanisms of dispute settlement. Capital-importing states in Latin America however became acutely aware that these institutions and rules did not completely erase the coercive and uneven relations they had with capital-exporting states. In era after era of reformism from the Calvo era, to the NIEO and to the era in opposition to neo-liberal economic governance, capital-importing States have continued to resist and sometimes adapt to the coercive realities of the rules of international investment law. The article begins by tracing the origin of the Drago doctrine as a response to the practice of European states that engaged in aggression and conquest against militarily and economically weaker Latin American states as a means of collecting debts owed to their citizens. It then shows that while the denouement of forcible measures to resolve contract debt was overstated by early twentieth century international lawyers, international law nevertheless provided avenues for dispute settlement outside the use of force in international commercial relations. Thus while protecting commerce from the scourge of war was a primary inspiration for the post-Second World War international economic order, the author shows how war has nevertheless continued to be an animating factor for former colonies particularly with regard to their State responsibility for war damage in the context of foreign investment.


Author(s):  
Andrea Leiter

Abstract This article engages with the history of international investment law in the first half of the twentieth century. It traces how international lawyers inscribed their vision of an international legal order protecting private property of Western companies against attempts at nationalization in the wake of socialist revolutions and the decolonization of large parts of the world. The article focuses on the role of ‘general principles of law as recognized by civilized nations’ as building blocks for an international legal order today called international investment law. Rather than describing a direct line between contemporary standards of protection and the invocation of general principles, the article develops conditions of possibility for the emergent field of international investment law. These conditions are located both in arbitral practice, as well as in international legal scholarship of the early twentieth century. Based on the analysis of such arbitrations over disputes resulting from concession agreements and scholarly writings in the interwar period, the contribution draws out the modes of authorization upon which the legal claims advanced by international lawyers rested. At the heart of the vision were ideas of ‘modernity’, ‘civilization’, ‘equity’, and ‘justice’ that enabled a hierarchization of difference, locating Western claims to legality above rivalling claims of socialist and ‘newly independent’ states. These ideas ultimately constituted the paradox of a ‘modern law of nature’ that claimed timeless universality while authorizing the ordering of foreign property in line with Western conceptions of modernity.


Author(s):  
Graham Mayeda

SummaryThis article argues for a change in the normative assumptions of international law so as to attenuate the historical marginalization of developing countries. It describes a form of collective responsibility called “cooperative cosmopolitanism” that requires individuals and states to take responsibility for harms to those beyond their borders. Cooperative cosmopolitanism entails obligations shared by all that are realized collectively and cooperatively. Taking a phenomenological approach and relying on examples of areas of international law (especially international investment law) that have a disproportionately negative impact on developing countries, the article suggests five ways in which international law should evolve in order to take better account of our cosmopolitan obligations: (1) widening the ambit of international law beyond state-based issues; (2) de-emphasizing state practice andopinio jurisas criteria for creating international law; (3) recognizing an increased role for equity in international law; (4) broadening state responsibility to include harms caused by their nationals abroad; and (5) articulating a cosmopolitan understanding of the responsibility to protect foreign nationals.


2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Mayeda

This article explores whether international investment agreements (IIAs) have the potential to impede democratic expression and, as a result, hinder sustainable development. The author first demonstrates that democracy plays an essential role in the promotion of sustainable development and provides a normative (rather than procedural) definition of democracy. The three ways in which IIAs can limit democracy are then addressed. First, they can limit the policy space of developing countries. This is demonstrated through an analysis of how types of provisions commonly found in IIAs can negatively affect policy flexibility. Second, democracy can be indirectly limited through the decisions of international investment tribunals which give little deference to the decisions of domestic democratic forums. Third, democracy can be undermined if foreign investors are not accountable to any democratic government. In this regard, it is necessary for IIAs to impose obligations on home states and investors to ensure that investors behave in socially responsible ways. The article concludes with suggestions for ways in which developing countries can structure IIAs to support democracy rather than detract from it.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 596-611
Author(s):  
Nitish Monebhurrun

With international investment law as the background to this study, the present article examines how the full protection and security standard can be construed from the perspective of developing states hosting foreign investments. The research delves into classical public international law to argue that the diligentia quam in suis rule can be used as a means of interpretation to strike a balance between foreign investors’ and developing states’ interests when construing the full protection and security standard. The rule provides that any expected due diligence from the state party is necessarily of a subjective nature. This means that developing host states must deploy their best efforts to offer maximum protection to foreign investors not on an in abstracto basis but as per their local means and capacity. Accordingly, the standard is presented as an adaptable and flexible one which moulds its contours as per the level of development of the host state. Such flexibility does not imply condoning states’ abuse and negligence. The article explains how the diligentia quam in suis rule enables a conciliation between the full protection and security standard and the host state's level of development while rationalising the standard's application to developing nations.


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