Banking Union and Brexit: the challenge of geography

2019 ◽  
pp. 87-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Schammo
Keyword(s):  
Banking Union

Discretionary Accruals in Italian Private Firms and Non-Linear Bank Loan Granting

2017 ◽  
pp. 83-99
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Mafrolla ◽  
Viola Nobili
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Bank Loans ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
European Banking Union

This paper investigates whether and at what extent private firms reduce the quality of their accruals in order to signal a better portrait to the bank and obtain new or larger bank loans. We measure earnings discretionary accruals of a sample of Italian private firms, testing whether new and larger bank loans are associated with a higher (lower) quality of earnings in borrowers' financial reporting. We study bank loan levels and changes and how they impact discretionary accruals and found that, surprisingly, private firms' discretionary accruals are systematically positively affected by an increase in bank loans, although they are negatively affected by the credit worthiness rating assigned to the borrowers. We find that the monitoring role of the banking system with regard to the adoption of discretionary accruals is effective only when the loan is very large. This paper may have implications for policy-makers as it contributes to the understanding of the shortcomings of the banking regulatory system. This is an extremely relevant issue since the excessive amount of non-performing loans held by Italian banks recently threatened the stability of the European Banking Union as a whole.

European Banking Union C: Cross-Border ResolutionnFortis Group

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosalind Z. Wiggins ◽  
Natalia Tente ◽  
Andrew Metrick
Keyword(s):  
Banking Union ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
European Banking

European Banking Union

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel A. Epstein
Keyword(s):  
Bank Lending ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Bank Failures ◽  
Bank Supervision ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
International Pressure ◽  
Banking Market ◽  
National Economic ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Communist Countries

If post-communist countries realized marketized bank–state ties through transition and international pressure to privatize their banks with foreign capital, western Eurozone states have more recently come under pressure to follow suit. European Banking Union centralized bank supervision and introduced a single resolution board at the expense of national authority. Thus under banking union, national regulatory and supervisory forbearance was curbed; barriers to banking market entry were no longer the purview of national authorities; disproportionate bank lending to one’s own sovereign would be discouraged; and bank bondholders, creditors and depositors—i.e. market actors—paid the price for bank failures first, before governments and taxpayers. While European Banking Union put the euro on stronger foundations, it also curbed national economic policy discretion and limited tools for adjustment. Taking Italy, Portugal, Spain and Germany as examples, this chapter explains why and in what policy areas Eurozone states’ sovereignty clashed with banking union.

Cannons over the EU legal order: The decision of the BVerfG (5 May 2020) in the Weiss case

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-142
Author(s):  
Filippo Annunziata
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Changes Over Time ◽  
Over Time ◽  
The Eu

The Weiss affair, culminating in the BVerfG ruling of 5 May 2020 ( Weiss II), marks a break-up point in the long-standing dialogue between the BVerfG and the CJEU. The judges in Karlsruhe refused to follow the decision rendered by the CJEU in a preliminary ruling ( Weiss I) and ordered EU institutions to provide further clarifications on the proportionality assessment of the Public Sector Purchase Programme. This paper claims that the principles applied by the BVerfG in Weiss I are quite similar to those employed in the Gauweiler and Landeskreditbank-Banking Union cases. Considering that background, it will be argued that the construction of the principles employed by the BVerfG for the judicial review of EU acts did not undergo dramatic changes over time. The different outcome of Weiss II is due to the fact that, according to the BVerfG, insufficient elements of explanation and justification were provided by the ECB and the CJEU. Therefore, the central problem of Weiss II ends up being a procedural question of allegedly insufficient statements of reasons. From Gauweiler to Weiss II, one also sees the development of the standards for the judicial review of the ECB’s decisions, in the fields of both monetary policy and banking supervision.

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