scholarly journals Software Toolkit for HFE-based Multivariate Schemes

Author(s):  
Jean-Charles Faugère ◽  
Ludovic Perret ◽  
Jocelyn Ryckeghem

In 2017, NIST shook the cryptographic world by starting a process for standardizing post-quantum cryptography. Sixty-four submissions have been considered for the first round of the on-going NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) process. Multivariate cryptography is a classical post-quantum candidate that turns to be the most represented in the signature category. At this stage of the process, it is of primary importance to investigate efficient implementations of the candidates. This article presents MQsoft, an efficient library which permits to implement HFE-based multivariate schemes submitted to the NIST PQC process such as GeMSS, Gui and DualModeMS. The library is implemented in C targeting Intel 64-bit processors and using avx2 set instructions. We present performance results for our library and its application to GeMSS, Gui and DualModeMS. In particular, we optimize several crucial parts for these schemes. These include root finding for HFE polynomials and evaluation of multivariate quadratic systems in F2. We propose a new method which accelerates root finding for specific HFE polynomials by a factor of two. For GeMSS and Gui, we obtain a speed-up of a factor between 2 and 19 for the keypair generation, between 1.2 and 2.5 for the signature generation, and between 1.6 and 2 for the verifying process. We have also improved the arithmetic in F2n by a factor of 4 compared to the NTL library. Moreover, a large part of our implementation is protected against timing attacks.

IEEE Access ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
P. Nannipieri ◽  
S. Di Matteo ◽  
L. Zulberti ◽  
F. Albicocchi ◽  
S. Saponara ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Denisa O. C. Greconici ◽  
Matthias J. Kannwischer ◽  
Daan Sprenkels

We present implementations of the lattice-based digital signature scheme Dilithium for ARM Cortex-M3 and ARM Cortex-M4. Dilithium is one of the three signature finalists of the NIST post-quantum cryptography competition. As our Cortex-M4 target, we use the popular STM32F407-DISCOVERY development board. Compared to the previous speed records on the Cortex-M4 by Ravi, Gupta, Chattopadhyay, and Bhasin we speed up the key operations NTT and NTT−1 by 20% which together with other optimizations results in speedups of 7%, 15%, and 9% for Dilithium3 key generation, signing, and verification respectively. We also present the first constant-time Dilithium implementation on the Cortex-M3 and use the Arduino Due for benchmarks. For Dilithium3, we achieve on average 2 562 kilocycles for key generation, 10 667 kilocycles for signing, and 2 321 kilocycles for verification.Additionally, we present stack consumption optimizations applying to both our Cortex- M3 and Cortex-M4 implementation. Due to the iterative nature of the Dilithium signing algorithm, there is no optimal way to achieve the best speed and lowest stack consumption at the same time. We present three different strategies for the signing procedure which allow trading more stack and flash memory for faster speed or viceversa. Our implementation of Dilithium3 with the smallest memory footprint uses less than 12kB. As an additional output of this work, we present the first Cortex-M3 implementations of the key-encapsulation schemes NewHope and Kyber.


Author(s):  
Alejandro Cohen ◽  
Rafael G. L. DrOliveira ◽  
Salman Salamatian ◽  
Muriel Medard

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Taiber ◽  

Quantum computing is considered the “next big thing” when it comes to solving computational problems impossible to tackle using conventional computers. However, a major concern is that quantum computers could be used to crack current cryptographic schemes designed to withstand traditional cyberattacks. This threat also impacts future automated vehicles as they become embedded in a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) ecosystem. In this scenario, encrypted data is transmitted between a complex network of cloud-based data servers, vehicle-based data servers, and vehicle sensors and controllers. While the vehicle hardware ages, the software enabling V2X interactions will be updated multiple times. It is essential to make the V2X ecosystem quantum-safe through use of “post-quantum cryptography” as well other applicable quantum technologies. This SAE EDGE™ Research Report considers the following three areas to be unsettled questions in the V2X ecosystem: How soon will quantum computing pose a threat to connected and automated vehicle technologies? What steps and measures are needed to make a V2X ecosystem “quantum-safe?” What standardization is needed to ensure that quantum technologies do not pose an unacceptable risk from an automotive cybersecurity perspective?


Author(s):  
Johanna Sepulveda ◽  
Dominik Winkler ◽  
Daniel Sepulveda ◽  
Mario Cupelli ◽  
Radek Olexa

Nature ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 549 (7671) ◽  
pp. 188-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Bernstein ◽  
Tanja Lange

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