scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: A Case study of Karachi Stock Market

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 6-9
Author(s):  
Ghulam Mustafa ◽  
Abid Rasheed ◽  
Anum Khalid
Author(s):  
Humera Khatab ◽  
Maryam Masood ◽  
Khalid Zaman ◽  
Sundas Saleem ◽  
Bilal Saeed

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (4-3) ◽  
pp. 279-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Anderson ◽  
Parveen P. Gupta ◽  
Andrey Zagorchev

We investigate the impact of continuous measures of the financial system and investor protection on the corporate governance-performance relationship. We find that shareholder suits rights/stock market capitalization (disclosure rights/stock market capitalization) has monotonic (non-monotonic) relation with firm performance and that high-levels of stock market capitalization and investor protection generate valuation synergies. Besides interactions of financial and legal systems with corporate governance, market- (bank-) orientation and development and stronger (weaker) investor protection along with better (worse) corporate governance are associated with higher (lower) valuations. A country’s migration to a developed stock market with enhanced investor protection is related to better corporate governance and firm performance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1, Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 222-224
Author(s):  
Paolo Tenuta ◽  
Alexander Kostyuk

Corporate governance is a system designed to improve corporate performance through supervision of management performance to ensure accountability to stakeholders based on a regulatory framework. Board of directors as a field of research becomes a major point for intersection of many other issues of corporate governance, such as financial reporting, firm performance, earnings management, stock market, and reaching even well-established fields of research such as accounting and finance. Most of the papers published in this issue (volume 18, issue 1, special issue) of the Corporate Ownership and Control journal are linked to the board of directors’ issues directly or indirectly.


Competition ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 189-201
Author(s):  
Fabien Foureault

This chapter tries to identify the conditions under which a fourth party can tame competition in order to achieve cooperation. It relies on an in-depth case study of a multinational corporation acquired by a private equity firm through leveraged buy-out during the 2000s. It is shown that the private equity firm wanted to foster collaboration among competing operating units to increase firm performance but that it failed, despite the interest of many middle managers. The main reason was that top managers of these operating units, facing the great recession, strategically impeded cooperation because they thought that the private equity firm could break up the corporation in the near future, a belief inscribed in the ‘moral economy’ of managerialism. It is concluded that competition may be more easily reversed in firms with different types of owners or in other sectors where self-interested behaviour is less institutionalized.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-76
Author(s):  
Gagan Kukreja ◽  
Sanjay Gupta ◽  
Meena Bhatia

This case study investigates multiple issues related to corporate governance, regulations, auditing and financial reporting of Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited (IL&FS). Combinations of these issues resulted in default in payment obligations by IL&FS in August 2018 originated from the agency problem. It posed a substantial systematic risk to the whole financial system of India. This case study highlights the severe drawback of concentration of decision-making and unprofessional work ethics at the senior management level. Further, the case study also provides the opportunity to discuss the inappropriate regulations and governance practices which cause a severe problem in long-standing and prominent organizations like IL&FS. Research Questions: (a) Discuss the vital role of corporate governance in major corporations and the reasons behind governance failures. (b) How did asset–liability mismatch create liquidity problems in a company which deals with long-term projects? (c) How does lack of a proper and unified regulatory framework for Non-Banking Financial Corporation (NBFC) harm investors’ interest? Link to Theory: This case study provides an opportunity to learn the role of corporate governance in NBFC. This case demonstrates the problems arisen because of agency problem and conflict of interest among real-world stakeholders. The case study also highlights the importance of assets–liabilities management in a strategically important organization like IL&FS. Phenomenon Studied: This case study attempts to understand the potential problems that occurred in IL&FS from the failure of good governance, lack of unified regulations for NBFCs and non-adherence of professional responsibilities by the external auditors. Case Context: The case study explores the vital role of the infrastructure development and financing companies in developing economies like India and how it may affect other vital entities of the financial system. Further, it demonstrates how unethical practices at senior management and lack of unified regulations can harm the organization. Findings: The research study found senior management’s potential involvement in unethical practices while managing the company. The financial statements did not reflect the true and fair picture of the entity, which misled investors and other stakeholders. It created chaos in the stock market, resulting in a loss to shareholders. The government set up a new board to restore the confidence of the stock market. Further, the government started to address the problems that arose. Discussions: The case of IL&FS by default, at first glance, looks like a case of asset–liability mismatch due to the lack of supervisory roles of the board and senior management’s massive regulatory failure. It is shocking how under the nose of regulators like Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) a default of this scale could take place. How could IL&FS group grow unchecked into a massive 348 entity. It appeared that regulators, marquee shareholders (banks and institutions), and the board of directors failed in their fiduciary obligation to regulate and supervise IL&FS.


CFA Digest ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 16-18
Author(s):  
Frank T. Magiera

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