Thoughts and Suggestions on Carrying out "Site Restoration +" Model in Soil Pollution Control in China

2021 ◽  
Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
X.N. Li ◽  
W.T. Jiao ◽  
R.B. Xiao ◽  
W.P. Chen ◽  
A.C. Chang

It was not until the 1980s that China’s policy makers became aware of the detrimental impacts on urban health from soil pollution as a result of industrial waste emissions. For the past three decades, the Chinese government has strived to prevent and control industrial pollution. Setting appropriate environmental policies is the key to mitigating the legacy of industrial waste emissions accumulated for three decades. In this paper, we review the development process by outlining the evolution of the policies and the resulting legal infrastructure in terms of acts, regulations, ordinances, and standards. Deficiencies of the existing policies are identified. In the early stages, environmental policies were fragmented, consisting of single-purpose laws that are narrowly focused. With time, these policies gradually evolved to become better integrated and comprehensive management plans. However, the laws emphasize contaminated site restoration instead of preventing soil pollution. The legal framework shows that the policies that are in place often lack clear mandates because the authorizations are piggybacked on environmental acts and regulations that do not directly address issues of soil pollution. Furthermore, implementation plans are impractical due to outdated soil quality standards, unclear soil cleanup goals, unenforceable liability and supervision mechanisms, limited funding, lack of transparency and public outreach, and the unreliable financial and technical capabilities of the remediation industries.


2020 ◽  
Vol 383 ◽  
pp. 121139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Ibrahim ◽  
Madona Labaki ◽  
Jean-Marc Giraudon ◽  
Jean-François Lamonier

2003 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-84
Author(s):  
Hideto Yoshida

2016 ◽  
Vol 50 (24) ◽  
pp. 13181-13183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Changsheng Qu ◽  
Wei Shi ◽  
Jing Guo ◽  
Binbin Fang ◽  
Shui Wang ◽  
...  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document