scholarly journals Formation of grand coalition when consciousness of intragroup competition is activated.

1992 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
pp. 357-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiroyuki Yamaguchi
Author(s):  
Marco Morini ◽  
Matthew Loveless

Abstract Over the last two decades, the formation of grand coalitions has grown in the European Union (EU), even in countries with no previous political experience with them. Alongside a significant rise in both new and radical parties, grand coalitions signal the increasing fragmentation of contemporary European politics. We, therefore, investigate the electoral performance of both mainstream and new parties entering and leaving grand coalitions. We find that mainstream parties do not appear to enter grand coalitions after negative election results. They are, however, punished in the following elections, albeit not as heavily as previous findings have shown. This post-grand coalition electoral penalty is true for both major and minor grand coalition members. These findings contribute to the literature on party competition and provide insights into the choices mainstream parties' have been making in response to recent and rapid changes in the electoral landscape of the EU.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-167
Author(s):  
Natalia Supyan ◽  
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Caparrós ◽  
Jean-Christophe Péreau

AbstractThis paper analyzes North-South negotiations over climate change abatement. We consider that northern countries have an incentive to negotiate over a transfer to the southern countries in exchange for their abatement efforts rather than reducing their emissions at home. We study the incentives for northern and southern countries to form negotiation-coalitions at each side of the bargaining table and the impact of these negotiation-coalitions on the final outcome. We show that the incentives can be separated into direct efficiency gains, as fixed costs savings, and indirect bargaining power gains. Depending on the relative values of these gains, we determine the equilibrium of the game. We also show that bargaining power gains encourage southern countries to negotiate separately while they encourage northern countries to unite, and that this hinders the formation of the grand coalition.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 665-673 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine E. Sheppard ◽  
Richard Inger ◽  
Robbie A. McDonald ◽  
Sam Barker ◽  
Andrew L. Jackson ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 802-824
Author(s):  
Joachim Behnke

The reform of the electoral law in 2013 introduced adjustment seats that compensate for surplus mandates, resulting in the Bundestag increasing in size . The new electoral law passed by the Grand Coalition in October 2020 will not provide an effective cure to this problem . The “usual suspects” that have been proposed as possible remedies, especially reducing the number of constituencies, but also accounting for list mandates with surplus mandates and capping “excess” direct mandates, all imply problematic effects . Against this background, forms of rank‑oriented personalized proportional electoral systems, which adhere to the logic of Baden‑Wuerttemberg’s state electoral system, seem to be promising reform perspectives . They preserve the element of the personal vote and could even strengthen this . Not only can they guarantee that the Bundestag will not exceed its regular size, but they also secure proportionality between the parties at the federal level as well as proportionality between the several state lists of one party .


2019 ◽  
pp. 161-172
Author(s):  
Andreas M. Wüst
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 41-80
Author(s):  
Wolfgang C. Müller

Grand coalition government of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) had been the hallmark of post-war Austria but the historic ‘grand coalition’ formula seems exhausted. The rationale for maintaining this cooperation vanished, electoral changes undermined the former duopoly of these parties, and party system changes brought new players into the game. Yet at the government level alternatives involving the Freedom Party (FPÖ) have proved unstable as in each case an FPÖ event brought down the government or prevented its renewal. The chapter shows how routine formateur-led processes of coalition formation resulting in anticipated outcomes contrast with a few instances which significantly deviate. Coalition governance is characterized by the use of an elaborated set of rules and instruments and great continuity over time and different types of coalition. Accordingly, the underlying principle of coalition politics has been the ‘coalition compromise’ model, with government policies to be largely agreed between the coalition partners. In practice, ministerial discretion tends to shift government policy output towards the model of ‘constrained ministerial government’. Most coalitions terminated early because of inter-party conflict.


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