scholarly journals Formal inferences and their relationships to knowledge acquisition: mental models and semantic links

Author(s):  
Miguel López Astorga ◽  
Leyla Danae Torres-Bravo

The mental model theory is an approach with clear psychological, linguistic, and cognitive consequences. This paper delves into some of the epistemological conclusions that can be drawn from it. In particular, it addresses the process why knowledge acquisition can modify the inferences people tend to make. That process is described by means of an example based on a well-known logical schema related to the conditional: Modus Tollendo Tollens.

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henri de Jongste

Abstract This paper investigates how a mental-model theory of communication can explain differences in humorous texts and how aesthetic criteria to evaluate humour are dependent on the way mental models are exploited. Humour is defined as the deliberate manipulation by speakers of their private mental models of situations in order to create public mental models which contain one or more incongruities. Recipients can re-construct this manipulation process and thereby evaluate its nature and its quality. Humorous texts can be distinguished in terms of ownership of the manipulated mental model, the relationship between the speakers’ private and their public (humorous) mental model, as well as the speed required in the humorous mental model construction. Possible aesthetic criteria are the quality of the mental model manipulation, the pressure under which the humorously manipulated mental models have been constructed and the quality of the presentation of humorous mental models.


1995 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 671-687 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Christoph Klauer ◽  
Klaus Oberauer

Johnson-Laird, Byrne, and Schaeken (1992) present a theory of propositional reasoning by mental models. The present study provides a comprehensive test of the predictions of that theory for the difficulty of simple disjunctive and conditional inferences. The results are largely consistent with the complex pattern of predictions. They are discussed in the light of recently proposed modifications of the original theory.


2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Baptiste van der Henst

Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991; 1993) present a theory of human deductive reasoning based on the notion of mental models. Unfortunately, the theory is incomplete. The present commentary argues that pragmatic considerations, particularly of the type discussed in Sperber and Wilson (1995), can complement the theory.


Topoi ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip N. Johnson-Laird ◽  
Ruth M. J. Byrne ◽  
Vittorio Girotto

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (11) ◽  
pp. 2103-2116
Author(s):  
Laura Jane Kelly ◽  
Sangeet Khemlani ◽  
P. N. Johnson-Laird

A set of assertions is consistent provided they can all be true at the same time. Naive individuals could prove consistency using the formal rules of a logical calculus, but it calls for them to fail to prove the negation of one assertion from the remainder in the set. An alternative procedure is for them to use an intuitive system (System 1) to construct a mental model of all the assertions. The task should be easy in this case. However, some sets of consistent assertions have no intuitive models and call for a deliberative system (System 2) to construct an alternative model. Formal rules and mental models therefore make different predictions. We report three experiments that tested their respective merits. The participants assessed the consistency of temporal descriptions based on statements using “during” and “before.” They were more accurate for consistent problems with intuitive models than for those that called for deliberative models. There was no robust difference in accuracy between consistent and inconsistent problems. The results therefore corroborated the model theory.


2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-331
Author(s):  
Pierre Barrouillet ◽  
Henry Markovits

As stressed by Perruchet & Vinter, the SOC model echoes Johnson-Laird's mental model theory. Indeed, the latter rejects rule-based processing and assumes that reasoning is achieved through the manipulation of conscious representations. However, the mental model theory as well as its modified versions resorts to the abstraction of complex schemas and some form of implicit logic that seems incompatible with the SOC approach.


Lege Artis ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 336-378
Author(s):  
Natalia Strelchenko

Abstract The study focuses on the cognitive-communicative characteristics of echo questions in English conversational discourse. Drawing on van Dijk's sociocognitive (mental model) theory and cognitive discourse analysis, the paper suggests viewing echo questions as a means of building/updating a mental context model of a communicative situation. As discourse comprehension presupposes building its coherent mental model, echo questions resolving misunderstanding are regarded as an instrument for increasing coherence in conversational discourse. Based on the mental model theory, the study offers a typology of misunderstandings corrected by echo questions.


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