Regulatory Holidays in Utilities Regulation and EU Competition Law : A Case Study on the Role of Efficiency Considerations in Economic Law

2014 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Economic Law ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Utilities Regulation

scholarly journals The Interaction Between Public and Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law: a Case Study of the Swedish Booking Cases

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 55-70
Author(s):  
Katharina Voss ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement

This article studies the private enforcement conducted in Visita v Booking from the perspective of the interaction between public and private enforcement of competition law. This case concerned the question whether the narrow MFN clauses maintained by Booking were contrary to Article 101 TFEU and could therefore be prohibited by a Swedish court. The focus of this article is placed on the assessment carried out by the Swedish courts to determine whether the MFN clauses were restrictive of competition by effect and on the standard of proof attached to the claimant in this regard. With regard to the interaction between public and private enforcement, Visita v. Booking is viewed as an illustration of the increased complexity of competition policy, in particular were novel practices are at issue

Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Enforcement

2021 ◽  
pp. 313-386
Author(s):  
Jan Wouters ◽  
Michal Ovádek
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Enforcement

This chapter assesses the role of fundamental rights in EU competition enforcement. EU competition policy comprises a number of limbs, each with its own peculiarities and rules but together contributing to the objective of protecting (relatively) undistorted competition in the Union's internal market. The key reason why EU competition policy is an interesting and important case study from the point of view of fundamental rights application is enforcement. Unlike in other areas, the EU, in particular the European Commission, wields considerable powers when it comes to the protection of undistorted competition in the internal market. Although the extent of the enforcement powers and their potential impact on fundamental rights differs between the various aspects of competition policy, the field as a whole embodies supranational authority as almost none other. This is so despite the fact that in enforcing competition law the Commission cooperates closely with national competition authorities (NCAs) as part of the European Competition Network (ECN) and that the majority of decisions applying EU antitrust rules are taken by the NCAs.

scholarly journals Priority Setting as A Double-Edged Sword: How Modernization Strengthened the Role of Public Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-487
Author(s):  
Or Brook
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Priority Setting ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Common View ◽  
The Public ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Detrimental Impact

Abstract This article questions the common view that the modernization of EU competition law has removed public policy considerations from the public enforcement of Article 101 TFEU. Based on a large quantitative and qualitative database including all of the Commission’s and five national competition authorities’ enforcement actions (N ≈ 1,700), it maintains that modernization has merely shifted the consideration of public policy from the substantive scope of Article 101(3) TFEU to procedural priority setting decisions. Instead of engaging in a complex balancing of competition and public policy considerations, the competition authorities have simply refrained from pursuing cases against anticompetitive agreements that raise public policy questions or settled those cases by accepting negotiated remedies. This outcome, the article claims, is a double-edged sword. The Commission’s attempt to narrow down the scope of Article 101(3) as part of modernization has not eliminated the role of public policy in the enforcement. Rather, undertakings can reasonably assume that restrictions of competition that produce some public policy objectives will not be enforced, even if they do not meet the conditions for an exception. These discretionary nonenforcement decisions have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness, uniformity, and legal certainty of EU competition law enforcement. JEL: K21, K230

Skanska: are jurisdiction challenges now an impossible undertaking?

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-103
Author(s):  
Andrew Leitch
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Member State ◽  
National Court ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Industrial Solutions

Claimants in private damages actions following on from European Commission cartel decisions are often faced with a choice of jurisdiction in which to pursue their claims. However, seising jurisdiction in the national court of a desired Member State can require the claim to be pursued against an anchor defendant that is not an addressee of a Commission decision. This may, in the English courts, give rise to various disputes as to the role of that non-addressee defendant in the cartel and, accordingly, whether a claim can in fact be sustained as against that defendant. The Court of Justice's recent judgment in Vantaan Kaupunki v Skanska Industrial Solutions potentially relieves claimants from the burden of having to establish that the non-addressee defendant participated in, or implemented, the cartel in order to sustain a claim against it, by holding that it is entire undertakings that are liable for compensation in private damages actions. The Skanska judgment harmonizes the scope of liability under the public and private spheres of EU competition law enforcement and has potentially significant ramifications for competition litigation in the English courts.

scholarly journals Stumbling Towards the UK’s New Administrative Settlement: A Study of Competition Law Enforcement After Brexit

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 233-251
Author(s):  
Joe TOMLINSON ◽  
Liza LOVDAHL GORMSEN
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Key Dimensions ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Substantive Law ◽  
The Eu

AbstractWhile there has been much talk of the role of parliaments and courts in the Brexit process, far less—indeed very little—has been said about the challenges facing the largest part of the UK government: the administrative branch. Whatever results from the UK’s negotiations with the EU, Brexit will likely necessitate wide-ranging and fast-paced administrative reform in the UK. In this article, we use a detailed case study of a particular part of administration—the Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’)—to highlight the nature and extent of the challenges facing administrative agencies. This case study is demonstrative as, while there is an extant UK competition administration structure, competition law and its enforcement are highly Europeanised. We propose that the challenges facing administrative bodies in the UK—including the CMA—can be understood as possessing three key dimensions: internal organisation issues; external coordination issues; and substantive legal issues. We argue that, in many instances, these three dimensions will be in tension which each other. That is to say, the reality of reforming administration post-Brexit will involve trade-offs between questions of internal organisation, external coordination, and substantive law.

Part II The Member State Reports on Transposition of the Directive, 3 Belgium

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cauffman Caroline
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Parent Company ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Economic Law ◽  
Collective Redress ◽  
Access To Documents

This chapter examines the transposition of the Antitrust Damages Directive in Belgium. It first considers the transposition procedure, noting Belgium’s Act of 6 June 2017 inserting a Title 3 ‘The action for damages for infringements of competition law’ into Book XVII of the Code of Economic Law, and the role of the Belgian Competition Authority. It then provides an overview of the substantive and temporal scope of the new rules of Book XVII, Title 3 of the Code of Economic Law before discussing terminological differences between the Directive and its transposition. It also explains how the transposition of the Directive facilitates access to documents, and goes on to analyse the effect of decisions of competition authorities, time-barring deadlines, solidary liability, passing-on of overcharges, presumption and quantification of damage by cartels or other antitrust infringements, consensual dispute resolution, collective redress for infringements of competition law, and parent company liability.

The Role of Private Enforcement within EU Competition Law

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 143-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Hard Core ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Right

AbstractPrivate enforcement is an increasingly prominent element of EU competition law. The forthcoming Directive on damages actions aims to strengthen and, to a degree, harmonise procedures for private competition litigation, while recent case law of the Court of Justice reaffirms the centrality of the right to claim compensation for losses stemming from breach of the competition rules. Moreover, this right has been presented as an essentially unitary one, whereby any victim of any type of competition infringement has, in principle, the right to claim damages. This chapter reviews the evolving framework, and considers, specifically, the role for private enforcement within the overall system of EU competition law. Taking into account the Commission’s efforts to facilitate and increase private enforcement, the emerging EU public enforcement framework, as well as the substantive EU competition rules more generally, this chapter argues that, contrary to the rhetoric, private enforcement is a mechanism best adapted, and arguably most appropriate, for use only in the context of hard-core cartels. It is further suggested that the gap between rhetoric and reality is not problematic as such, yet difficulties may arise insofar as these divergences conflict with the principle of effectiveness.

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