Skanska: are jurisdiction challenges now an impossible undertaking?

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-103
Author(s):  
Andrew Leitch

Claimants in private damages actions following on from European Commission cartel decisions are often faced with a choice of jurisdiction in which to pursue their claims. However, seising jurisdiction in the national court of a desired Member State can require the claim to be pursued against an anchor defendant that is not an addressee of a Commission decision. This may, in the English courts, give rise to various disputes as to the role of that non-addressee defendant in the cartel and, accordingly, whether a claim can in fact be sustained as against that defendant. The Court of Justice's recent judgment in Vantaan Kaupunki v Skanska Industrial Solutions potentially relieves claimants from the burden of having to establish that the non-addressee defendant participated in, or implemented, the cartel in order to sustain a claim against it, by holding that it is entire undertakings that are liable for compensation in private damages actions. The Skanska judgment harmonizes the scope of liability under the public and private spheres of EU competition law enforcement and has potentially significant ramifications for competition litigation in the English courts.

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 846-877
Author(s):  
Maria Ioannidou

Abstract Over the years, regulators have sought to improve the effectiveness of both private and public competition law enforcement. In EU competition law, recent debates have concerned damages actions for competition law violations and the empowerment of national competition authorities. These debates are often premised on a clear dichotomy between public and private competition law enforcement, each pursuing a distinct set of aims. This article employs a novel holistic approach, which is informed by the theories of responsive regulation and restorative justice, and argues in favour of a ‘responsive’ remodelling of competition law enforcement. Such a ‘responsive’ remodelling advocates flexibility in enforcement mechanisms, with the consensual participation of the affected stakeholders and the adoption of remedies to restore the inflicted harm. The article discusses the current system and its respective aims and problems, and highlights an emerging hybridisation of remedies. Building on this emerging practice, it then constructs the ‘responsive’ remodelling benchmark for effective compliance. It discusses how this benchmark can inform competition law enforcement and it considers its potential to increase compliance, countenance various legitimacy and accountability concerns, increase consumers’ access to markets and bring benefits to the affected parties.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Mária T. Patakyová

Abstract Digitalisation is a challenge from the regulatory point of view. Competition law, as a special type of regulation, is no exception to this. The article explores the risks of digitalisation, especially the ones related to the enhanced use of pricing algorithms. In theory, pricing algorithms are not easily assessed from the perspective of competition law, let alone its application in practice. The prohibition of anticompetitive agreements (pursuant to Article 101 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) is applied with certain difficulty to agreements created by using pricing algorithms. This is an unfortunate situation, as horizontal agreements represent one of the worst infringements of EU competition law, including price cartels or bid rigging. Apart from presenting a theoretical background, the article dives into the practice of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) in order to assess which practical issues the AMO might face when applying the theoretical concepts. In sum, the article asks from a theoretical perspective which issues of competition law have been introduced (or deepened) by the enhanced digitalisation, looking in particular to pricing algorithms. On top of that, the article explores the issues which may be encountered in practice, taking the Slovak jurisdiction as the example. The willingness and feasibility of the AMO to enforce digital issues such as pricing algorithms is assessed based on the previous acts of the AMO as well as the new Act on Protection of Competition, adopted by the Slovak parliament on 11 May 2021.


Author(s):  
Frederic Jenny

Abstract The paper analyzes the challenges faced by competition authorities with respect to the digital sector. Borrowing insights from the business policy literature and from the economic literature, the paper first analyzes the specificities of digital firms (multi-sided platforms and ecosystems) with respect to their development and competitive strategies. Building on this foundation the paper explores some of the challenges of applying traditional competition analysis to competition in the business sector. We then discuss a number of issues relevant to competition law enforcement in the digital sector starting with the role of data, competition within ecosystems and between ecosystems, consumer biases, and the role of gatekeepers. We conclude with a research agenda for economists and competition authorities.


Author(s):  
Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip

This chapter explains the term ‘vertical agreements’ and what it covers. It addresses a number of general issues that are relevant to the EU competition law treatment of vertical agreements in general. It describes the implementation and the (public and private) enforcement of Article 101 TFEU before and after the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. The chapter provides the historical background of both Regulation 330/2010 and Regulation 461/2010. In particular, it devotes specific attention to the nature and legal and practical consequences of soft EU competition law (in the form of notices, guidelines, etc) as opposed to hard EU competition law (provisions of primary and secondary EU law).


Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco

This chapter explains the contents and goals of the Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive 2014/104/EU), the corollary of the EU’s policy towards the promotion and facilitation of private enforcement of competition law. It first traces the evolution in EU competition law enforcement and policy that led to the adoption of the Directive before considering the goals of the Directive in more detail, namely to provide rules for the effective compensation of victims of antitrust infringements and to harmonize some rules concerning damages claims. It then examines the Directive’s legal basis under EU Law as well as substantive provisions, including those relating to compensatory principles, quantification of harm, and consensual dispute resolution. The chapter goes on to highlight neglected issues, limitations, and inherent biases regarding the scope and nature of the Directive’s rules and concludes with an analysis of issues arising from implementation of the Directive in Member States.


Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi

‘What is the optimal level of enforcement?’ focuses on competition law enforcement. All competition jurisdictions acknowledge the central and crucial role of economic analysis in shaping competition prosecution. Greater economic understanding has improved the structure of competition law through legal presumptions and thresholds, enforcement guidelines, and a greater understanding of the gravity and consequences of anti-competitive activities. Indeed, there has been an ever-increasing ‘economization’ of antitrust, as more jurisdictions rely on economic analysis to determine whether intervention is needed. When markets work well, competition enforcers are better off adopting a ‘laissez-faire’ approach (leaving the market to take its own course). Distinguishing pro-competitive activities from anti-competitive activities poses a challenge.


Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This chapter examines the role of industrial policy in developing countries. On the one hand, industrial policy is arguably the antithesis of competition law and policy. Industrial policy substitutes government planning for competition and is vehemently opposed if not maligned by adherents of free market economics. Industrial policy as practiced in some countries such as Japan and Korea have entailed government-organized cartels and the grooming of national champions, both of which are direct affronts to the notion of competition. On the other hand, to the defenders of industrial policy, it has successfully lifted a number of Asian countries out of poverty and turned them into industrial and technological powerhouses. However, even the extent to which the success of these economies can be attributed to industrial policy is highly contested. There are hence two layers to the controversy. The first is whether industrial policy worked at all. The second is even if it did, whether a growth strategy relying on competition is superior to industrial policy, and if not, how competition law enforcement should accommodate industrial policy.


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