Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Enforcement

2021 ◽  
pp. 313-386
Author(s):  
Jan Wouters ◽  
Michal Ovádek
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Enforcement

This chapter assesses the role of fundamental rights in EU competition enforcement. EU competition policy comprises a number of limbs, each with its own peculiarities and rules but together contributing to the objective of protecting (relatively) undistorted competition in the Union's internal market. The key reason why EU competition policy is an interesting and important case study from the point of view of fundamental rights application is enforcement. Unlike in other areas, the EU, in particular the European Commission, wields considerable powers when it comes to the protection of undistorted competition in the internal market. Although the extent of the enforcement powers and their potential impact on fundamental rights differs between the various aspects of competition policy, the field as a whole embodies supranational authority as almost none other. This is so despite the fact that in enforcing competition law the Commission cooperates closely with national competition authorities (NCAs) as part of the European Competition Network (ECN) and that the majority of decisions applying EU antitrust rules are taken by the NCAs.

2. The Competition Law and Institutions of the European Union

2019 ◽  
pp. 75-96
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
The Public ◽  
Directorate General ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Eu

This chapter sketches the history and functions of the EU and its institutions in order to set the EU competition rules in context. It then describes the competition provisions themselves and outlines the way in which the rules are applied and enforced, including the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 under Regulation 1/2003, the control of mergers with a European dimension under Regulation 139/2004, public enforcement by the national competition authorities of the Member States, and the role of private enforcement. It discusses the position and powers of the European Commission, particularly the role of the Competition Directorate General (DG Comp); the powers of the EU Courts; the significance of fundamental rights and the general principles of EU law in competition cases; the application of competition rules to particular sectors of the economy; and the application of the EU rules to the EEA.

scholarly journals Pecuniary penalties imposed on undertakings within the EU competition policy

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 96-101
Author(s):  
D. S. Castilhos ◽  
D. R. Alves
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Eu

The European internal market allows people and businesses to circulate freely in the 28 member states. The possibility of companies to compete equally and fairly is guaranteed by European Union (EU) competition policy. These rules encourage companies to be more efficient. The present study provides an overview of the discussion of relevant issues with these objectives: describing the creation and development of EU’s competition policy and characterise the importance of the role played by the European Commission in this area in addition to examining the imposition of pecuniary sanctions on companies. Is at issue the application of the rules in the Treaty on the functioning of the EU and Regulation No 1/2003? In conclusion, it was verified that the system adopted by the EU shows some fragility in the defence of the fundamental rights of companies.Keywords: Competition policy, European Union.

scholarly journals The Interaction Between Public and Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law: a Case Study of the Swedish Booking Cases

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 55-70
Author(s):  
Katharina Voss ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement

This article studies the private enforcement conducted in Visita v Booking from the perspective of the interaction between public and private enforcement of competition law. This case concerned the question whether the narrow MFN clauses maintained by Booking were contrary to Article 101 TFEU and could therefore be prohibited by a Swedish court. The focus of this article is placed on the assessment carried out by the Swedish courts to determine whether the MFN clauses were restrictive of competition by effect and on the standard of proof attached to the claimant in this regard. With regard to the interaction between public and private enforcement, Visita v. Booking is viewed as an illustration of the increased complexity of competition policy, in particular were novel practices are at issue

10. An Introduction to EU Competition Policy and Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter discusses EU competition law. It covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Article 101 TFEU; Article 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Article 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Arts 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law, state aid; and EU merger control.

13. An introduction to EU competition policy and law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Merger Policy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Eu

This chapter provides an introduction to Competition Policy and law in the European Union (EU). It covers the principal rules of EU competition law, namely Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and also considers the enforcement of the competition law regime and merger policy and regulation in the EU.

Karl Haushofer as a “Pioneer” of National Socialist Cultural Diplomacy in Fascist Italy

2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (03) ◽  
pp. 424-449
Author(s):  
Nicola Bassoni
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Cultural Diplomacy ◽  
Global Dimension ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
National Socialist ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
History Of ◽  
Political Model

AbstractThe relevant historiography has largely overlooked the role of Karl Haushofer as a cultural-political actor in National Socialist-Fascist relations. From 1924 to 1944, the German geopolitician dealt extensively with Italy, with an eye to both its geopolitical role in Europe and to the political system of Benito Mussolini's regime. On behalf of Rudolf Hess, he began visiting Italy during the 1930s, aiming to overcome ideological and political misunderstandings between Rome and Berlin. He established a network of contacts with Italian scholars and politicians, passed information back to the so-called deputy Führer, and attempted to influence official German policy toward Italy. He eventually promoted the development of an Italian geopolitics, and, in so doing, achieved one of the most significant cultural-political transfers from National Socialist Germany to fascist Italy. This article analyzes the contacts between Haushofer and Italy, both his political activities and his geopolitical theories. It is a case study of a history of contradictions: a man committed to Pan-Germanist culture and to the defense of German minorities abroad, Haushofer also attempted to improve relations between Berlin and Rome. Moreover, he considered the Axis from a geopolitical point of view—as a realization of the European imperial idea—and from a trilateral perspective, i.e., he viewed Japan not only as an ally, but also as a cultural and political model. The reconstruction of Haushofer's relations with Italy is, therefore, an opportunity to rethink the antinomies, as well as the global dimension, of the National Socialist-Fascist alliance.

The New Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 721-740 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Müller
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Courts ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Council Regulation ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Antitrust Regulation ◽  
Direct Applicability ◽  
European Competition Law

AbstractThe new Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty, which came into force on 1 May 2004, brings fundamental changes in the application of European competition law. It replaces the Antitrust-Regulation No. 17 which has been in force for more than 40 years. Regulation No. 1/2003 establishes a system of direct applicability of Article 81(3) EC-Treaty, which abandons the requirement of notification as a key element of the old system under Regulation No. 17. Under the new scheme set up by Regulation No. 1/2003 Article 81(3) will be directly applicable. This enables national competition authorities and national courts to apply Article 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty in their entirety, including paragraph 3 of Article 81. Although the new regulation is to be considered as an important step in strengthening and reinforcing European competition policy, in particular in view of the enlargement of the European Union, the numerous changes involve uncertainties which call for adjustment. The following article gives an overview of the new enforcement system for Articles 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty, set up by Regulation No. 1/2003.

scholarly journals Priority Setting as A Double-Edged Sword: How Modernization Strengthened the Role of Public Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-487
Author(s):  
Or Brook
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Priority Setting ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Common View ◽  
The Public ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Detrimental Impact

Abstract This article questions the common view that the modernization of EU competition law has removed public policy considerations from the public enforcement of Article 101 TFEU. Based on a large quantitative and qualitative database including all of the Commission’s and five national competition authorities’ enforcement actions (N ≈ 1,700), it maintains that modernization has merely shifted the consideration of public policy from the substantive scope of Article 101(3) TFEU to procedural priority setting decisions. Instead of engaging in a complex balancing of competition and public policy considerations, the competition authorities have simply refrained from pursuing cases against anticompetitive agreements that raise public policy questions or settled those cases by accepting negotiated remedies. This outcome, the article claims, is a double-edged sword. The Commission’s attempt to narrow down the scope of Article 101(3) as part of modernization has not eliminated the role of public policy in the enforcement. Rather, undertakings can reasonably assume that restrictions of competition that produce some public policy objectives will not be enforced, even if they do not meet the conditions for an exception. These discretionary nonenforcement decisions have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness, uniformity, and legal certainty of EU competition law enforcement. JEL: K21, K230

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