Debtor Rehabilitation and the Asset-Partitioning Effect of Security Trusts: The Korean Supreme Court’s Position Revisited

Author(s):  
Ying-Chieh Wu
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
pp. 199-232
Author(s):  
Henry Hansmann ◽  
Reinier Kraakman ◽  
Richard Squire

This chapter analyzes ancient Rome’s law of business entities from the perspective of asset partitioning, the delimiting of creditor collection rights based on the distinction between business assets and personal assets. Asset partitioning, which is an essential legal attribute of modern business forms such as the partnership and the business corporation, reduces borrowing costs by simplifying credit-risk assessment and expediting insolvency proceedings. The chapter finds that ancient Roman business arrangements, such as the societas and the slave-run business endowed by the slaveowner with a peculium, did not give business creditors the first claim to business assets, making these forms of organization non-entities according to the criterion of asset partitioning. It appears that the only true legal entity used to form profit-seeking firms was the societas publicanorum, which roughly resembled the modern limited partnership. But use of that form was generally confined to firms that provided public services under contract with the state. Moreover, the societas publicanorum was essentially a creature of the Republic, and was largely abandoned during the Empire. Although Rome had a complex economy and sophisticated commercial law, and was familiar with most of the types of asset partitioning seen in modern legal systems, it ultimately failed to develop legal entities for general use in commerce. Apparent reasons include the Roman aristocracy’s disparagement of commerce, the emperors’ wariness of strong organizations outside the state, and the society’s continuing reliance on the family—a durable and complex legal entity in its own right—to handle many commercial needs.


2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 775-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynn A Stout

Legal experts traditionally distinguish corporations from unincorporated business forms by focusing on such corporate characteristics as limited shareholder liability, centralised management, perpetual life, and freely transferred shares. While this approach has value, this essay argues that the nature of the corporation can be better understood by focusing on a fifth, often-overlooked, characteristic of corporations: their capacity to “lock in” equity investors’ initial capital contributions by making it far more difficult for those investors to subsequently withdraw assets from the firm. Like a tar pit, a corporation is much easier for equity investors to get into, than to get out of. An emerging school of theorists has begun to explore the implications of this idea for corporate law and practice. The idea is still novel enough to lack a uniformly- accepted label—in addition to the phrase “capital lock-in,” scholars have described this aspect of incorporation as “affirmative asset partitioning,” “the absence of a repurchase condition,” and “asset separation from shareholders.” Whatever label one chooses, the idea shows great promise for illuminating a variety of thorny problems that have long troubled corporate scholars and practitioners. In illustration, this essay considers how the idea of capital lock-in sheds light on three corporate mysteries in the United States: the sui generis nature of corporate directors’ fiduciary duties; the rise of the large modern service partnership; and lawmakers’ enthusiasm for meddling with corporate governance rules.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharon Belenzon ◽  
Honggi Lee ◽  
Andrea Patacconi

Author(s):  
Henry Hansmann ◽  
Richard Squire

This chapter analyzes the economic consequences of external and internal asset partitioning, and it considers implications of this analysis for creditor remedies. External partitioning refers to the legal boundaries between business firms and their equity investors, while internal partitioning refers to the legal boundaries within corporate groups. The chapter begins by cataloguing the benefits and costs of corporate partitioning; it then employs this catalogue to analyze the relative economics of external and internal partitioning. Non-partitioning functions of subsidiaries are also identified. The chapter then considers whether cost-benefit analysis predicts how courts actually apply de-partitioning remedies, with particular emphasis on veil piercing and enterprise liability. The chapter concludes by arguing that courts should employ the distinction between external and internal partitioning when applying creditor remedies that disregard corporate partitions, and it identifies factors—in addition to whether a partition is internal or external—that courts should consider when deciding whether to de-partition.


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