scholarly journals Barbados’ 2018–19 Sovereign Debt Restructuring–A Sea Change?

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (34) ◽  
Author(s):  
Myrvin Anthony ◽  
Gregorio Impavido ◽  
Bert van Selm

This paper examines the causes, processes, and outcomes of Barbados’ 2018–19 sovereign debt restructuring—its first ever. The restructuring was comprehensive, featuring several rarely used approaches, including the restructuring of treasury bills, and the use of a retrofitted collective action mechanism. The debt restructuring has helped to set Barbados’ public debt on a clear downward trajectory. A sustained reform effort, maintaining high primary surpluses and ambitious structural reforms, will be needed to gradually reduce public debt from about 160 percent of GDP before the restructuring to the country’s 60 percent debt-to-GDP target.

Author(s):  
Yilmaz Akyüz

This chapter argues that the conventional approach to the management and resolution of external financial crises in emerging economies is inefficient and inequitable and needs to be reformed. Such reforms need to account for increased complexities arising from deepened integration, notably the difficulties in differentiating between external and domestic debt in terms of their holders, currency denomination, and governing laws. Effective debt resolution mechanisms would be needed to bail-in creditors whether the crisis is one of liquidity or solvency, or due to private or sovereign debt, or locally or internationally issued external debt, particularly since crises caused by excessive private borrowing lead to large increases in public debt. Debt workouts should include temporary standstills, protection against creditor litigation, lending into arrears and debt restructuring and combine statutory and voluntary elements, including collective action clauses, duly reformed to avoid the kind of predicaments encountered during the Argentinian restructuring.


Policy Papers ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (13) ◽  
Author(s):  

This paper identifies contractual reforms designed to address collective action problems in sovereign debt restructuring. Since any decisions regarding the design of contractual provisions will need to be made by the sovereign issuer and its creditors, it is recognized that the Fund’s primary role will be to facilitate agreement on the design and use of these provisions.


Significance The stock of EM debt has multiplied since 2000, accompanied by legal difficulties for borrowers falling into distress. Some economists are calling for a complete overhaul of the system to handle sovereign debt crises, including the creation of an independent international organisation to manage it. Impacts By eroding tax bases and raising domestic and external debt repayment costs, COVID-19 will have a lasting impact on EM output. Together with collapsing exports, the fiscal blow from the crisis could trigger a wave of distressed governments to default on their debts. EM’s limited recourse to fiscal and monetary expansion could result in a lost decade for hundreds of millions of already poor people.


Author(s):  
Hayk Kupelyants

Chapter 7 presents a taxonomy of challenges to the outcomes of sovereign debt restructuring, i.e. in what cases private creditors may argue that the restructurings was abusive, oppressive or otherwise invalid and has to be eviscerated accordingly. The starting point here is that the afflicted minority bondholder may challenge the abusive application of collective action clauses, at least in actions couched against the majority of bondholders that put the collective action clauses to use. The source of that power is the obligation of the majority to exercise its broad powers in good faith for the benefit of all bondholders and not to oppress minority bondholders. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the various iterations of this idea in respect of different collective action clauses.


Policy Papers ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 (35) ◽  
Author(s):  

his paper reviews the recent application of the Fund’s policies and practices on sovereign debt restructuring. Specifically, the paper: • recaps in a holistic manner the various policies and practices that underpin the Fund's legal and policy framework for sovereign debt restructuring, including on debt sustainability, market access, financing assurances, arrears, private sector involvement (PSI), official sector involvement (OSI), and the use of legal instruments; • reviews how this framework has been applied in the context of Fund-supported programs and highlights the issues that have emerged in light of recent experience with debt restructuring; and • describes recent initiatives in various fora aimed at promoting orderly sovereign debt restructuring, highlighting differences with the Fund’s existing framework. Based on this stocktaking, the paper identifies issues that could be considered in further depth in follow-up work by staff to assess whether the Fund’s framework for debt restructuring should be adapted: • first, debt restructurings have often been too little and too late, thus failing to re-establish debt sustainability and market access in a durable way. Overcoming these problems likely requires action on several fronts, including (i) increased rigor and transparency of debt sustainability and market access assessments, (ii) exploring ways to prevent the use of Fund resources to simply bail out private creditors, and (iii) measures to alleviate the costs associated with restructurings; • second, while creditor participation has been adequate in recent restructurings, the current contractual, market-based approach to debt restructuring is becoming less potent in overcoming collective action problems, especially in pre-default cases. In response, consideration could be given to making the contractual framework more effective, including through the introduction of more robust aggregation clauses into international sovereign bonds bearing in mind the inter-creditor equity issues that such an approach may raise. The Fund may also consider ways to condition use of its financing more tightly to the resolution of collective action problems; • third, the growing role and changing composition of official lending call for a clearer framework for official sector involvement, especially with regard to non-Paris Club creditors, for which the modality for securing program financing commitments could be tightened; and • fourth, although the collaborative, good-faith approach to resolving external private arrears embedded in the lending into arrears (LIA) policy remains the most promising way to regain market access post-default, a review of the effectiveness of the LIA policy is in order in light of recent experience and the increased complexity of the creditor base. Consideration could also be given to extending the LIA policy to official arrears.


2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (12) ◽  
pp. 4220-4259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Müller ◽  
Kjetil Storesletten ◽  
Fabrizio Zilibotti

We construct a dynamic theory of sovereign debt and structural reforms with limited enforcement and moral hazard. A sovereign country in recession wishes to smooth consumption. It can also undertake costly reforms to speed up recovery. The sovereign can renege on contracts by suffering a stochastic cost. The constrained optimal allocation (COA) prescribes imperfect insurance with non-monotonic dynamics for consumption and effort. The COA is decentralized by a competitive equilibrium with markets for renegotiable GDP-linked one-period debt. The equilibrium features debt overhang: reform effort decreases in a high debt range. We also consider environments with less complete markets. (JEL D82, E21, E23, E32, F34, H63)


2020 ◽  
Vol 2/2020 (14) ◽  
pp. 47-67
Author(s):  
Tamon Asonuma ◽  
◽  
Michael G. Papaioannou ◽  
Eriko Togo ◽  
Bert van Selm ◽  
...  

This paper examines the causes, process, and outcome of Belize’s 2016–17 sovereign debt restructuring – its third episode in last 10 years. As was the case in the earlier two restructurings, in 2006–07 and in 2012–13, the 2016–17 debt restructuring was executed through collaborative engagement with creditors outside an IMF-supported program. While providing liquidity relief and partially addressing long-term debt sustainability concerns, the restructuring will need to be underpinned by ambitious fiscal consolidation and growth-enhancing structural reforms to secure durable gains and avoid future debt distress situations.


Author(s):  
Kupelyants Hayk

Chapter 7 presents a taxonomy of challenges to the outcomes of sovereign debt restructuring, i.e. in what cases private creditors may argue that the restructurings was abusive, oppressive or otherwise invalid and has to be eviscerated accordingly. The starting point here is that the afflicted minority bondholder may challenge the abusive application of collective action clauses, at least in actions couched against the majority of bondholders that put the collective action clauses to use. The source of that power is the obligation of the majority to exercise its broad powers in good faith for the benefit of all bondholders and not to oppress minority bondholders. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the various iterations of this idea in respect of different collective action clauses.


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