Choosing Information, Selecting Truth: The Roman Congregations, the Benedictine Declaration, and the Establishment of Religious Plurality

The Benedictine declaration (1741) affirmed that, in the Low Countries, marriages between Protestants or mixed marriages contracted without the formalities prescribed by the Tametsi were valid. The content, form, and time of the Benedectina illustrate the Catholic Church”s intention to reconcile its aspirations for a monopoly on doctrinal truth and universal jurisdiction with limited enforcement capability. Without issuing a general prohibition, for about 150 years Roman congregations collected information on this flexible practice, searching for solutions on a case-by-case basis. This information became a valuable resource for the purposes of normative production.

A Bio-Economic Analysis of the Liberian Coastal Fisheries

Many coastal fisheries are subject to harvesting externalities due to inadequate regulations compounded by limited enforcement. Coastal fisheries in Liberia consist of a fleet of dugout canoes (Kru) primarily targeting demersal finfish, larger open wooden boats propelled with outboard engines targeting small inshore pelagics (Fanti), and a small number of industrial trawlers employing midwater and bottom trawls targeting finfish and shrimp. This paper develops a bio-economic model for the coastal fisheries in Liberia and employs the model to identify economic optimal fishing effort and harvesting trajectories for the different coastal fleets. The results show under harvesting and disinvestments in the coastal fisheries in Liberia. In 2010 the Government of Liberia declared a six nautical mile inshore exclusion zone accessible only to small-scale fisheries (SSF), which was accompanied by increased enforcement. The coastal fleets in 2016 were profitable but the distribution of profits was tilted to the small-scale fleets. The government needs to evaluate what policy options are available to fully utilize the fisheries potential for different species complexes while at the same time reduce the risk of conflict and overharvesting. There appears to be a need for investment in new technologies, which can only take place if fishing in Liberia will remain profitable.

Anticompetitive Agreements

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 examine the targets of competition law. Key questions: Why is the conduct considered harmful? How is it pursued—for example, which remedies are used? What are the incentives and obstacles in pursuing the conduct? Where is enforcement likely—global patterns? Chapter 5 answers these questions for the two types of anticompetitive agreements. The first type includes horizontal agreements—that is, agreements between competitors. These are the most commonly pursued and heavily penalized violations in the world. Where such an agreement influences a market, it necessarily restrains competition, reducing efficiency, harming consumer welfare, impinging on economic freedom, and interfering with economic development. All competition laws target them, but they also allow justifications such as the need for cooperation in research, and competition laws vary significantly in the extent to which they allow such justifications. Vertical restraints—for example, between a manufacturer and a distributor—have a very different profile. They include, for example, agreements to fix consumer prices and to divide markets. Economists call for case-based analysis to determine their effects, and often such effects are difficult to prove, so competition laws in which economic analysis is central typically face limited enforcement against them. Many other competition laws contain specific rules condemning them.

The Effects of Enforcement on Corporate Environmental Performance: The Role of Perceived Fairness

Several empirical studies explore the effects of regulatory enforcement on environmental behavior and performance. Within this literature, extremely little empirical research examines the role of fairness, which we interpret broadly to include multiple dimensions, e. g. similar treatment of similarly situated regulated entities. Our study empirically examines the effect of perceived enforcement fairness on the extent of compliance with wastewater limits imposed on chemical manufacturing facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act. Our study also explores the influence of perceived fairness on the effectiveness of enforcement efforts – government inspections and enforcement actions – at inducing better compliance. For our analysis, we use a subjective measure of the degree of “fair treatment” of regulated facilities by environmental regulators, as perceived by facilities and reported as survey responses. Results reveal that a more (perceived) fair enforcement approach raises compliance, but only under limited enforcement conditions; in most instances, perceived more fair enforcement lowers compliance. As important, results show that greater perceived fairness improves the effectiveness of federal inspections and informal enforcement, but undermines the effectiveness of state inspections and formal non-penalty enforcement.

Sovereign Debt and Structural Reforms

We construct a dynamic theory of sovereign debt and structural reforms with limited enforcement and moral hazard. A sovereign country in recession wishes to smooth consumption. It can also undertake costly reforms to speed up recovery. The sovereign can renege on contracts by suffering a stochastic cost. The constrained optimal allocation (COA) prescribes imperfect insurance with non-monotonic dynamics for consumption and effort. The COA is decentralized by a competitive equilibrium with markets for renegotiable GDP-linked one-period debt. The equilibrium features debt overhang: reform effort decreases in a high debt range. We also consider environments with less complete markets. (JEL D82, E21, E23, E32, F34, H63)

Enforcers beyond Borders: Transnational NGOs and the Enforcement of International Law

Scholars have studied international NGOs as advocates and service providers, but have neglected their importance in autonomously enforcing international law. We have two basic aims: first to establish the nature and significance of transnational NGO enforcement, and second to explore the factors behind its rise. NGO enforcement comprises a spectrum of practices, from indirect (e.g., monitoring and investigation), to direct enforcement (e.g., prosecution and interdiction). We explain NGO enforcement by an increased demand for the enforcement of international law, and factors that have lowered the cost of supply for non-state enforcement. Increased demand for enforcement reflects the growing gap between the increased legalization of international politics and states’ limited enforcement capacity. On the supply side, the diffusion of new technologies and greater access to new legal remedies facilitate increased non-state enforcement. We evidence these claims via case studies from the environmental and anti-corruption sectors.

Changing Levels of Job Satisfaction among Local Environmental Enforcement Officials in China

As a result of multiple waves of administrative reforms in the past three decades, China's civil service has become more professionalized. Yet public employees appear to have become increasingly dissatisfied in recent years. Based on questionnaire surveys and interviews with environmental enforcement officials in a southern city, this paper traces changes in the job satisfaction levels of these officials between 2000 and 2014. It shows that satisfaction with the extrinsic rewards received and overall job satisfaction declined during this period. These downward trends partly reflected the increasingly challenging institutional environments faced by the officials: rising political and societal demands, inadequate fiscal and personnel resources, and limited enforcement authority. In addition, as the officials became more highly educated and professionalized, mission match became a stronger antecedent of job satisfaction. These findings suggest the importance of meeting the motivational needs of a more professionalized workforce.