Sovereign Debt and Structural Reforms
2019 ◽
Vol 109
(12)
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pp. 4220-4259
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Keyword(s):
We construct a dynamic theory of sovereign debt and structural reforms with limited enforcement and moral hazard. A sovereign country in recession wishes to smooth consumption. It can also undertake costly reforms to speed up recovery. The sovereign can renege on contracts by suffering a stochastic cost. The constrained optimal allocation (COA) prescribes imperfect insurance with non-monotonic dynamics for consumption and effort. The COA is decentralized by a competitive equilibrium with markets for renegotiable GDP-linked one-period debt. The equilibrium features debt overhang: reform effort decreases in a high debt range. We also consider environments with less complete markets. (JEL D82, E21, E23, E32, F34, H63)
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2009 ◽
Vol 76
(1)
◽
pp. 1-31
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