scholarly journals Effect of Corporate Governance on Cash Holding: The Role of Product Market Competition

2018 ◽  
pp. 39-57
Author(s):  
Idrees Ali Shah Et al.,

Corporate cash holding is among the fundamental areas in corporate finance. Recently, corporate cash holding has gained critical attention due to the dynamic business environment. Both practitioners and academicians have focused on the firms’ cash holding decisions in the recent era. The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of corporate governance on cash holding and to check the role of product market competition on corporate governance and cash holding relationship. The research investigated that whether product market competition plays substitution role for corporate governance in a relationship with cash holding. Substitution effect argument claims that external market discipline is enough to resolve agency problem between managers and shareholders even firm level governance is weak. For this study, unbalanced panel data of 196 companies from the year 2006 to 2014 is selected. All models include time dummies and industry fixed effect with standard error cluster to the firm. The results show that corporate governance has a significant negative effect on corporate cash holding which supports flexibility hypotheses. Moreover, product market competition has substitution role for corporate governance in relationship with corporate cash holding.

2020 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2093679
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Rakestraw

International research has firmly established that a substitute relationship exists between corporate governance and product market competition on firm value. In this study, I reexamine this substitution effect in an international setting, allowing the relation to vary with investor protection. As hypothesized, I find that investors place a higher value on the substitution effect of corporate governance and product market competition in countries where the legal and regulatory mechanisms to protect investors are weak. This finding suggests that country-level investor protection has a moderating role in affecting the substitution between product market competition and corporate governance on firm value. These results, which are robust to several sensitivity tests and alternative specifications, are consistent with an equity agency cost benefit, resulting from product market competition and corporate governance, which is valued more by investors where investor protection is weak.


Humanomics ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Moradi ◽  
Mohammad Ali Bagherpour Velashani ◽  
Mahdi Omidfar

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of product market competition and corporate governance on firm’s management performance in the Tehran Stock Exchange market. According to the research literature, the governance mechanisms used in this study consist of ownership structure, structure of the board of directors and capital structure. In addition, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and market size were used to measure the product market competition. Design/methodology/approach This study used one selected sample among the firms in the capital market of Iran from 2004 to 2012. Findings The results of this study indicated that there is a significant relation among the major governance mechanisms (including ownership concentration, independence of the board of directors and debt ratio) and product market competition and management performance. The findings of this study also showed that product market competition is effective on the relation between corporate governance and the performance, and this is what has been ignored in most of the conducted studies. Originality/value In general, the results of this study supported the idea that product market competition is effective on implementation and efficiency of governance mechanisms.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Liu ◽  
Wen Qu ◽  
Janto Haman

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between firm performance and product market competition (PMC), and then examine the mitigation effect of corporate governance and/or state-ownership (SOEs) in the association between PMC and firm performance using Chinese listed firms. Design/methodology/approach The authors consider three determinants of the PMC that affect the nature of competition, and use market concentration, product substitutability and market size as proxies for PMC. The authors construct a corporate governance index which measures the extent of board independence, monitoring strength of supervisory board over board of directors, and monitoring strength of board of directors over CEO. The authors use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance. The authors use a sample of 20,706 firm-year observations listed on the Chinese stock market between 2001 and 2016 to empirically investigate the research questions proposed in the paper. Findings The authors find that higher PMC is associated with lower firm performance. The authors find that good corporate governance practices moderate the negative effect of higher PMC on firm performance. The association between higher PMC and lower performance is weaker for firms controlled by SOEs compared to non-SOEs. Further, the moderation effect of SOEs on the association between higher PMC and lower performance is more pronounced for firms with good corporate governance practices compared to firms with weak corporate governance practices. Originality/value Extant studies investigating the relationship between PMC and corporate governance suggest an either complementary or substitution relationship in developed economies. Our study highlights the interactive role played by SOEs and good corporate governance practices in firm performance in highly competitive product markets in an emerging economy. The findings provide insightful information to regulators of other emerging countries that SOEs with good corporate governance practices can play an important role in the economy by mitigating the negative effect of higher PMC on firm performance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (9) ◽  
pp. 1123-1143
Author(s):  
Omar Farooq ◽  
Zakir Pashayev

PurposeThis paper documents the impact of product market competition on the value of advertising expenditures.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use the data for non-financial firms from India and the pooled regression procedure to test their arguments during the period between 2009 and 2018.FindingsThe results show that advertising expenditures of firms operating in sectors with relatively high competition are more valuable than advertising expenditures of firms operating in sectors with relatively low competition. The results of the study are robust across various proxies of advertising expenditures and firm performance. Furthermore, the results also show that the positive impact of product market competition on the value of advertising expenditures is confined only to firms that already have lower agency problems.Originality/valueThe results of the study highlight the importance of product market competition on the value of advertising expenditure in the emerging market setting, where agency problems are supposed to be high.


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