A Missed Opportunity?

Author(s):  
Srinath Raghavan

This chapter examines the claim that the Nehru-Zhou summit of April 1960 was a missed opportunity for settlement of the boundary dispute. It argues that the summit must be viewed in the context of wider developments in the Cold War as well as Indian politics. Drawing on fresh sources, the chapter contends that perceptions of China's territorial ambitions, India's relative weakness and shifting geopolitics of the Cold War are crucial to understanding the stance adopted by the Nehru government and the outcome of the summit.

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aline Sierp

This article is part of the special section titled The Genealogies of Memory, guest edited by Ferenc Laczó and Joanna Wawrzyniak This article analyses the wider context of policy conflict concerning public memory of the 1989 events. It uses Pierre Nora’s concept of lieux de mémoire in trying to explain why 23 August 1939 has been turned into a European Remembrance Day whereas 9 November 1989 has not. By investigating closely the role that various memory actors played during debates at the European level, it advances the idea that the anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact has been more successful in establishing itself within the European remembrance landscape because it has allowed for the promotion of a unifying narrative of the European past. In doing so, the article questions the frequently advanced idea that memory clashes in the EU form around an East–West divide that in some cases overlaps with a Right–Left divide. The analysis digs deep into the complex dynamics lying at the heart of memory contests concerning the end of the Cold War within the EU and provides a more differentiated view of discussions preceding EU decisions on policies of memory.


2012 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Andrew Denson

This essay examines the depiction of Native Americans by the US Information Agency (USIA), the bureau charged with explaining American politics to the international public during the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, the USIA broadcast the message that Americans had begun to acknowledge their nation's history of conquest and were working to redress old wrongs through an activist government. That message echoed the agency's depiction of the African American Civil Rights Movement and allowed the USIA to recognize Indian resistance to assimilation. It offered little room for tribal nationhood, however, during these early years of the modern American Indian political revival.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-138
Author(s):  
Robert L. Jervis ◽  
Thomas Maddux ◽  
Bernd Greiner

This forum presents three different perspectives on the eighth volume in the Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series, The Cold War after Stalin's Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace? edited by Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood. The fifteen contributors to the book discuss changes and continuities in the international environment during the first few years after the death of Josif Stalin, seeking to focus on whether there was a chance during that period to end the Cold War. The book covers U.S.-Soviet relations in depth but also deals with numerous other European and Asian countries. Three distinguished scholars offer their assessments of The Cold War after Stalin's Death and explore some of the major issues raised by the contributors to the volume.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aditya Balasubramanian

Abstract Economic conservatism in India traces its roots in the fragmentation of political consensus following the success of the anti-colonial nationalist movement. Framed in the context of the Cold War, long before the 1991 liberalization reforms, this economic conservatism blended anti-communism, free-market advocacy, and the defence of property. This was expressed as the central agenda of the broadly secular Swatantra Party, an effort to consolidate two-party democracy that emerged by the late 1960s as the most serious challenger to the dominant Congress Party. Swatantra brought together diverse progenitors aligned with American development ideas for the Third World. This article reconstructs Indian economic conservatism’s transnational history through an interconnected study of three founding figures of the party and the network of urban associations and periodicals brewing alternative ideas beneath the layers of dominant opinion in which they were embedded. It recasts non-aligned India as a site of ideological contestation affected by the Cold War. Swatantra’s lasting critique of Indian political economy was indicative of a more widely held dissent on India’s development strategy, which has helped to drive the fragmentation of Indian politics. Demands for the party’s revival reveal a desire for a secular alternative to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party.


2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-82
Author(s):  
T. A. Vorobyova ◽  
V. T. Yungblud

The period of détente is usually associated with a decrease of confrontation in US-Soviet relations, the signing of agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons and anti-missile defense systems and the development of trade and economic relations, scientific and cultural exchanges. Strengthening security in Europe is considered another facet of détente. From this perspective détente is viewed as an alternative to the Cold War, and the end of détente is seen as a missed opportunity to develop international relations in the direction of a secure world with working mechanisms for harmonizing the interests of both the great powers and other countries.The article deals with the history of relations in the triangle USA – USSR – China in 1977– 1980. The evolution of Washington’s foreign policy strategy and the inclusion to it policies towards the USSR and China in these years came at the background of pronounced Soviet– Chinese antagonism. In the first months there was no clear plan in the actions of the Carter administration, there was a sharp rivalry for influence on the president between individual political figures (first of all – S. Vance and Zb. Brzezinski). They proposed different scenarios of the development of the US–Soviet and US – China relations. Throughout the Carter presidency, the US used as much as possible the tensions between Moscow and Beijing. In the framework of tripartite relations, each of the sides consistently pursued its own course aimed at achieving unilateral benefits. There were no attempts to establish a trilateral dialogue with an agreed agenda. The processes of détente practically did not affect the complex of international problems that existed within the American – Soviet – Chinese triangle. Moreover, Washington’s use of the «Chinese card» prevented the reduction of tensions in American–Soviet relations and strengthened the Cold War logic and methods in the planning and implementation of US foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Priya Chacko

This chapter focuses on Indira Gandhi’s turn to populism and authoritarianism from the late 1960s and 1970s. It is argued that populism and authoritarianism had a long-term impact on Indian politics and political economy by creating the conditions that facilitated the emergence of long-term processes of political fragmentation – due to the decline of the Congress Party and the rise of various social forces and political formations – and economic reform. The chapter first shows how Cold War interventionism played a key role in Indira Gandhi’s shift toward agrarian populist policies and authoritarianism. It then details the ways in which the outcomes of populism and authoritarianism laid the path for the turn to pro-business and pro-market policies as well as political fragmentation and democratic deepening. Hence, the chapter makes the case for seeing the 1970s as a critical juncture in Indian history which laid the foundations for the major economic and political changes India has recently experienced. Within this period, the Cold War context was a crucial factor in the decisions and choices made by the Indian leadership.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document