Bertrand Russell in Bollyworld

The chapter considers the scope of film to act as what is described as a ‘docu-drama-ment’ for conveying affective engagements with political history. It does so with a focus on unique incidents in the history of Indian popular cinema with the example of the film, Aman (Mohan Kumar, 1967). The discussion centers on the cameo appearance of a British philosopher, Bertrand Russell, in the film along with phantasmal invocations of Indian anti-nuclear weapons protagonists such as India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and reproductions of the 1945 atomic attack in Hiroshima and subsequent nuclear tests in the Pacific. The chapter considers how the film may be viewed in terms of a ‘corporeal compound lens’ on the political vicissitudes of the 1960s. With such an approach – on the one hand to do with the assemblage of a historical film, and on the other, to do with the way this intersects with compound lines of reflexive reception – the author shows how the ‘docu-drama-ment’ moves away from linear equations of the filmic signifier with the signified - or the film and the represented - to one that revels in affective residues and resonances that are a constitutive force in socio-political realities of the Cold War era.

The Accidental Global Peacekeeper

This chapter examines India’s important contributions to U.N. peacekeeping. It discusses peacekeeping operations and their objectives, outlines the United Nations’ peacekeeping principles, and reviews the role India played in historical events such as The Korean War, United Nations Emergency Force, and United Nations Operation in Congo. The chapter argues that as India and Jawaharlal Nehru held no political or economic interest, only a strong vision for peace and a manifestation of One World, they adhered to and encouraged U.N. peacekeeping.

Introduction

The introduction presents India’s role in the Cold War by providing a background of India’s prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Also briefly discussed are a summary of the United Nation and the role India played in political conversation, topics, and events such as human rights, India’s role as a peacemaker, involvement in the development nuclear science, and politics. The introduction then outlines India’s approach to the Cold War and explains the book’s thematic sections. Part I focuses on the interplay of a bifurcated subcontinent with the polarized superpowers. Part II accentuates India’s peacekeeping aspirations. Part III discusses the domestic economic and political developments that were deeply intertwined with external relations, ideologies, and interventionism during the Cold War. Lastly, in light of all three portions, the book assesses India’s multifaceted role in the Cold War.

Nuclear Ambiguity and International Status

India’s abstinence from nuclear weapons through the 1960s continues to puzzle political scientists who study the causes of nuclear proliferation and historians who study India’s specific path to nuclear weapons. This chapter argues that India’s nuclear interregnum of the 1960s is best explained by understanding the status benefits that nuclear ambiguity as a component of a non-aligned foreign policy bestowed upon India. India’s best response to an external nuclear threat and internal domestic pressure to build the bomb was not to actually go nuclear but rather to publicly keep the option open while simultaneously pushing for disarmament as a serious foreign policy goal. This strategy gave India a special position in the international community as a scientifically advanced and potentially powerful yet essentially peaceful nation. Nowhere was this clearer than in India’s contribution to debates in the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) convened by the United Nations between 1962 and 1969.

The Soviet Peace Offensive and Nehru’s India, 1953–1956

This chapter historicizes the intellectual changes that took place in the Indo-Soviet relationship between 1953 and 1956. An account of the view from New Delhi, the chapter's central argument is that this period should be studied as one of intense politicization of relations. The chapter has a discussion of the flurry of diplomatic activity that took place back and forth from Moscow during these year and comments on Nehru’s attempts at reciprocating the thaw, and to extend it from a purely bilateral relationship to a multilateral one, and indeed to institutionalize these relations by pushing forth his advocacy of the UN as being as accessible and amenable to the Soviet Union as much as it was to other powers.

Hindu Nationalists and the Cold War

It is widely believed that at the time of Independence there was in India a broad consensus on non-alignment. This consensus, crafted by India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, is depicted as having steadily weakened over subsequent decades, eventually collapsing when diplomatic isolation and near bankruptcy toward the end of the Cold War prompted India to revitalize relations with the West. The evidence does not support this narrative, however. Drawing on a variety of sources, including Constituent Assembly debates and prominent essays, this essay shows that there were throughout the Cold War voices—often Hindu nationalists otherwise suspicious of modernity—calling for closer relations with the West. Though these voices were subdued, recollecting them reveals that post-Cold War declarations of a “natural alliance” between India and America in particular are not a new development, but instead the fruition of a longer view of the West’s significance.

A Missed Opportunity?

This chapter examines the claim that the Nehru-Zhou summit of April 1960 was a missed opportunity for settlement of the boundary dispute. It argues that the summit must be viewed in the context of wider developments in the Cold War as well as Indian politics. Drawing on fresh sources, the chapter contends that perceptions of China's territorial ambitions, India's relative weakness and shifting geopolitics of the Cold War are crucial to understanding the stance adopted by the Nehru government and the outcome of the summit.

Journeys of Discovery

This chapter explores the geopolitical legacy of colonialism between India and Pakistan, and the United States, by investigating the influence over trade, military alliances, and international politics. The chapter covers India and Pakistan’s foreign policy and factors that lead up to the transfer of power. The chapter focuses on preexisting colonial ideas and strategies that optimized India’s, Pakistan’s, and the United States’ positions during the Cold War.

Indira Gandhi, the “Long 1970s,” and the Cold War

This chapter focuses on Indira Gandhi’s turn to populism and authoritarianism from the late 1960s and 1970s. It is argued that populism and authoritarianism had a long-term impact on Indian politics and political economy by creating the conditions that facilitated the emergence of long-term processes of political fragmentation – due to the decline of the Congress Party and the rise of various social forces and political formations – and economic reform. The chapter first shows how Cold War interventionism played a key role in Indira Gandhi’s shift toward agrarian populist policies and authoritarianism. It then details the ways in which the outcomes of populism and authoritarianism laid the path for the turn to pro-business and pro-market policies as well as political fragmentation and democratic deepening. Hence, the chapter makes the case for seeing the 1970s as a critical juncture in Indian history which laid the foundations for the major economic and political changes India has recently experienced. Within this period, the Cold War context was a crucial factor in the decisions and choices made by the Indian leadership.

Promoting Development without Struggle

This chapter’s focus on attitudes toward development contributes to new assessments of the causes of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, Sino-Indian relations in general, and the Sino-Soviet split. The chapter examines Nehru’s economic development model and provides insight on his perspective to unify Asia. However, China believed otherwise. Political conversation and movements led Beijing to grow wary of India and Nehru’s intentions surrounding development.