scholarly journals A Study on the Influence of Institutional Investor Heterogeneity on the Executive Pay Stickiness——Based on the Perspective of Industrial Factor Intensity

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 168
Author(s):  
Qitong Yu ◽  
Shaoyang Fang ◽  
Jianjun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Inhibitory Effect ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Investor Heterogeneity ◽  
Pressure Sensitive ◽  
Pressure Resistance ◽  
Term Performance

Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012-2016, this paper empirically studies the influence of heterogeneous institutional investors on executive compensation stickiness of listed companies by using the method of multiple regression. The results show that the pay stickiness is very common in the listed companies. The overall institutional investor’s shareholding is promoting the executive compensation stickiness. The empirical results show that the institutional investors are divided into the pressure resistance institutional investors and the pressure sensitive institutional investors, according to whether the institutional investors have the commercial relationship with the listed companies. The empirical results show that they are compared to the pressure. Sensitive institutions, pressure resistance institutional investors can significantly inhibit the stickiness of executive compensation. However, different types of institutional investors have different preferences for the types of listed companies, and the enthusiasm of participating in corporate governance is different, and the pressure resistance institutional investors pay more attention to labor out of social responsibility. The long-term performance of a force intensive enterprise has a significant inhibitory effect on the stickiness of the executive compensation, while the pressure sensitive institutional investors actively manage and supervise the production and operation of the technology intensive enterprises for the consideration of the investment income, which has a restraining effect on the pay stickiness of the technology intensive enterprises.

scholarly journals How do executive pay and its gap with employee pay influence corporate performance? Evidence from Thailand tourism listed companies

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurence Ferry ◽  
Guanming He ◽  
Chang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Pay Gap ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThe authors investigate how executive pay and its gap with employee pay influence the performance of Thailand tourism listed companies.Design/methodology/approachThe authors manually collect data on the executives' and employees' remunerations for Thailand tourism listed companies and use the data for the authors’ OLS regression analysis. To check the robustness of the results to potential endogeneity issues, the authors employ the two-stage least-squares regression analysis and the impact threshold for a confounding variable approach.FindingsThe authors find that short-term executive compensation enhances firm performance, and that long-term executive compensation reduces the likelihood of unfavorable corporate performance. The authors also find that the gap in short-term pay between executives and employees has an inverted-U relation with firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis study suggests that higher executive pay relative to employee pay could encourage executives to work hard to improve corporate performance, but that too large a pay gap between executives and employees could impair employees' morale and harm firm performance.Practical implicationsIt is important for tourism companies to not only pay executives well but also avoid too large a pay gap between executives and employees.Social implicationsThis study implies the important role of compensation design in contributing to employee engagement and good performance for tourism firms.Originality/valueThis study sheds light on agency problems between executives and employees in tourism companies and provides new evidence and insights on compensation research in the tourism sector in emerging markets.

scholarly journals Executive salary stickiness, institutional investors and innovation investment -- Based on the empirical data of listed companies

2021 ◽  
Vol 292 ◽  
pp. 02013
Author(s):  
Ding xin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Empirical Data ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Private Enterprises ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Corporate Innovation ◽  
Enterprise Innovation ◽  
The Impact

This paper takes China’s A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2019 as the research object, and empirically tests the impact of executive compensation stickiness on enterprise innovation investment. It is found that executive compensation stickiness is positively correlated with the innovation investment of corporate and it is more significant in private enterprises. In addition, Institutional investors participate in corporate governance to play a positive governance effect, and strengthen the positive correlation between the stickiness of executive compensation and corporate innovation investment.

scholarly journals A Revisit of the Cross-Section of Overnight and Intraday Abnormal Returns: Evidence from the Japanese REIT Market

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jieting Chen ◽  
Yuichiro Kawaguchi
Keyword(s):  
Size Effect ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Real Estate Investment Trust ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Real Estate Investment ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Investor Heterogeneity ◽  
Foreign Institutional Investors ◽  
Returns On Investment

This study revisits an overnight-intraday reversal strategy that generates an abnormal excess return for a stock market. The study is the first to examine whether abnormal returns related to size effect and investment effect occur overnight or intraday in the Japanese Real Estate Investment Trust (J-REIT) market. Empirical results show that in the J-REIT market, significant positive abnormal returns on investment effect as well as size effect occur intraday, followed by reversals that negative abnormal returns occur overnight. Further empirical results reveal that foreign institutional investors and individual investors trade against domestic institutional investors, and strengthen the asymmetric intraday and overnight abnormal returns. Therefore, we support the hypothesis that investor heterogeneity can explain the overnight-intraday anomaly. Moreover, the J-REIT market responds quickly and significantly to announcements from the Bank of Japan (BOJ). The information surprise caused by BOJ’s announcements also intensifies the intraday and overnight abnormal returns in the J-REIT market.

scholarly journals REGULATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CHINA: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

2014 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Lin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
The United States ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Primary Role ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Chinese Listed Companies

Executive compensation is an essential element of a corporate governance system and an issue of public concern and academic debate. However, the existing literature on executive compensation has primarily focused on the United States, United Kingdom and continental European jurisdictions. This paper presents a comprehensive comparative study of the law and practices of executive pay in China. It critically examines the processes that produce compensation arrangements, as well as the various legal strategies and market forces that act on these processes in the context of China.Based on extensive empirical evidence, it finds that excessive pay in China is less prevalent than that in the United States. Nevertheless, Chinese executive compensation is not optimal in that there are both excessive executive pay and low levels of equity incentives for executives in Chinese listed companies. Meanwhile, executives of state-owned enterprises are largely compensated by on-duty consumption, grey income and political reward. The article argues that the fundamental problem of executive pay in Chinese listed companies lies in the internal defects of its unique governance institutions, as well as the prevalence of concentrated state ownership in listed companies. It concludes that the primary role of Chinese law in regulating executive compensation should not simply be to curb excessive executive pay, but it should be to improve the regulatory structure for setting executive pay in a fairer and more transparent way. To achieve this, regulatory strategies, especially heightened disclosure and strengthening the independence of the compensation committee, must be taken.

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

scholarly journals Which companies find it easier to obtain bank loans? Evidence from China

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenjuan Ruan ◽  
Erwei Xiang
Keyword(s):  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Bank Loans ◽  
Foreign Banks ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Chinese Listed Companies ◽  
Loan Financing

The study investigates the determinants of bank loan financing of Chinese listed companies from 1996 to 2009. The empirical results suggest that the channels through which companies obtain bank loans are different. Companies controlled by the state can more easily obtain loans from state-owned commercial banks and policy banks, while privately controlled companies have significantly larger access to loans from foreign banks. The empirical results also show that political connectedness and institutional development are the significant determinants of the bank loan financing of private companies. If companies locate in an area with higher level of institutional development, the proportion of their loans from state-owned banks is smaller than that of companies locate in areas with lower level of institutional development

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document