scholarly journals Decolonisation as Peacemaking

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-29
Author(s):  
Sam Grey

For decades now, Canada has been seen as a global exemplar of peacemaking and peacekeeping, yet the troubled relationship between its state and the Indigenous peoples within its borders doeslittle to support this image. There is, in fact, a strong case to be made that the ongoing crisis of Indigenous–settler state relations in Canada is best understood as a protracted war; or more succinctly, as a failure to achieve peace following the initial violence of conquest and colonisation. Accordingly, it makes sense to apply just war theory - a doctrine of military ethics - to the issue. Grounded in familiar moral and legal principles, the just war tradition is fully legible to the state, yetits principles also resonate with the Indigenous philosophy of 'decolonisation'. Because it articulatespowerful theories of justice while mapping a theoretical common ground between Indigenouspeoples and the settler state, just war theory emerges as a promising, and thus far neglected, framework for evolving a just peace in the wake of colonial conquest in Canada.

Author(s):  
Helen Frowe

We can distinguish between three moral approaches to war: pacifism, realism, and just war theory. There are various theoretical approaches to war within the just war tradition. One of the central disputes between these approaches concerns whether war is morally exceptional (as held by exceptionalists), or morally continuous with ordinary life (as held by reductive individualists). There are also significant debates concerning key substantive issues in the ethics of war, such as reductivist challenges to the thesis that combatants fighting an unjust war are the moral equals of those fighting a just war, and the challenge to reductivism that it undermines the principle of noncombatant immunity. There are also changing attitudes to wars of humanitarian intervention. One under-explored challenge to the permissibility of such wars lies in the better outcomes of alternative ways of alleviating suffering. The notion of unconventional warfare has also come to recent prominence, not least with respect to the moral status of human shields.


Author(s):  
Helen Frowe

This chapter examines the main theoretical approaches to war and the circumstances under which it is permissible to wage war. War is one of the most morally difficult, and morally pressing, aspects of human existence. It nearly always involves killing and maiming on a vast scale. Despite its destructive nature, and despite the rise of rights talk on the international stage and the spread of democracy across large parts of the world, war persists. The chapter first considers the just war tradition and alternatives to just war theory before discussing two theoretical approaches to the ethics of war: collectivism and individualism. It also explores three principles that govern the fighting of war: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. A case study on Afghanistan and the ‘war on terror’ is presented, along with Key Thinkers boxes featuring Michael Walzer and Jeff McMahan.


Horizons ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-108

In April 2016 Pax Christi International and the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace cosponsored the Nonviolence and Just Peace Conference at the Vatican. The conference issued an Appeal calling on the Catholic Church to make nonviolence and just peace central to its purpose, while also urging it to cease teaching or using just war theory. This roundtable consists of four perspectives from Catholic moral theologians who offer just-war responses to this Appeal.


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Evans

Recently, strong arguments have been offered for the inclusion ofjus post bellumin just war theory. If this addition is indeed justified, it is plain that, due to the variety in types of post-conflict situation, the content ofjus post bellumwill necessarily vary. One instance when it looks as if it should become “extended” in its scope, ranging well beyond (for example) issues of “just peace terms,” is when occupation of a defeated enemy is necessary. In this situation, this article argues that an engagement byjus post bellumwith the morality of post-conflict reconstruction is unavoidable. However, the resulting extension ofjus post bellum's stipulations threatens to generate conflict with another tenet that it would surely wish to endorse with respect to “just occupation,” namely, that sovereignty or self-determination should be restored to the occupied people as soon as is reasonably possible. Hence, the action-guiding objective of the theory could become significantly problematized. The article concludes by considering whether this problem supports the claim that the addition ofjus post bellumto just war theory is actually more problematic than its supporters have realized.


Author(s):  
Lauren Wilcox

The just war tradition is the most dominant framework for analyzing the morality of war. Just war theory is being challenged by proponents of two philosophical views: realism, which considers moral questions about war to be irrelevant, and pacifism, which rejects the idea that war can ever be moral. Realism and pacifism offer a useful starting point for thinking about the ethics of war and peace. Feminists have been engaged with the just war tradition, mainly by exposing the gendered biases of just war attempts to restrain and regulate war and studying the role that war and its regulation plays in defining masculinity. In particular, feminists claim that the two rules of just war, jus ad bellum and jus in bello, discriminate against women. In regard to contemporary warfare, such as post-Cold War humanitarian interventions and the War on Terror, feminists have questioned the appropriateness of just war concepts to deal with the specific ethical challenges that these conflicts produce. Instead of abstract moral reasoning, which they critique as being linked to the masculine ideals of autonomy and rationality, many feminist argue for certain varieties of an ethics of care. Further research is needed to elaborate the basis of an ethical response to violence that builds on philosophical work on feminist ethics. Key areas for future investigation include asking hard questions about whom we may kill, and how certain people become killable in war while others remain protected.


2002 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-575 ◽  
Author(s):  
IAN HOLLIDAY

The September 11 terrorist strikes prompted renewed interest in a debate about just cause that has been increasingly open since the demise of the Cold War and the shift to a more multilateral and interventionist world order. This article contributes to that debate by looking first into the just war tradition to argue for a conceptual revision that equates just cause with jus ad bellum (just recourse to war). It then seeks to specify the component parts of just cause understood in this way, holding that demonstrable injustice should take the place formerly occupied by just cause in just war theory. Towards the end it uses three real-world cases to develop a mechanism for validating just cause claims. The argument is that a cause is just only when its proponents can convince an international forum of intractable injustice, responsible intervention, and an appropriate balance of contingent factors. The article closes by considering how the current war on terrorism might be assessed in such a forum.


2003 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-545
Author(s):  
Mark Douglas

Despite the long tradition and complex theory underlying the just war tradition, contemporary just war reasoning narrowly focuses simply on the established criteria for war. Yet these criteria were codified by the fifteenth century and favor the kinds of wars that could be fought at that time. Historic changes—in politics, economics, technology, and religion, among other spheres—not only have changed the nature of warfare, but have limited the applicability of the original just war criteria. Contemporary just warriors ought to turn to the deeper Christian values and virtues that underlie traditional just war theory and use them to develop new just war criteria that function better in the twenty-first century.


2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eamon Aloyo

The last resort criterion has a hallowed place in the just war theory tradition. Many leading just war theory scholars accept it as a jus ad bellum requirement and some powerful politicians reference it. While there are several versions of last resort, many take it to mean that peaceful options that have a reasonable chance of achieving a just cause must be exhausted before the use of force is permissible. Its justification is straightforward and commonsensical: war is terrible, inevitably results in the deaths of numerous innocents and destruction of their property, and thus should be avoided whenever possible. I argue that last resort should be dropped from the just war tradition because its inclusion in the just war tradition can result in a greater number of harms to innocents than if the precept did not exist. What should matter morally is the severity and numbers of harms inflicted on innocents, not whether those harms are inflicted violently or nonviolently. I suggest that in the context of achieving a just cause, the only actions that are permissible are those that are likely to inflict the fewest morally weighted harms and that meet the other just war theory precepts (excluding last resort). Three accounts of last resort do not permit this, whereas while a fourth does, it is redundant with an important account of the jus ad bellum proportionality precept. Thus violent policies may be preferable in some rare circumstances to nonviolent alternatives such as non-targeted sanctions and negotiations because nonviolent policies sometimes are more likely to foreseeably and avoidably result in far greater harms to innocents than violent options.


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