Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights and The National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 381-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Spielmann
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Essential Question ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
The Right ◽  
Domestic Law

AbstractThe doctrine of the national margin of appreciation is well established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In applying this essentially judge-made doctrine, the Court imposes self-restraint on its power of review, accepting that domestic authorities are best placed to settle a dispute. The areas in which the doctrine has most often been applied will be presented here, looking at various examples from case law. After a brief overview of the doctrine’s origin, the analysis will focus on the situations in which the margin has been allowed or denied. Does it relate merely to factual and domestic-law aspects of a case? What is the scope of the margin of appreciation when it comes to interpreting provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights? What impact does an interference (whether disproportionate or not) with a guaranteed right have on the margin allowed? Is there a second-degree or ‘reverse’ margin of appreciation, whereby discretionary powers can be distributed between executive and judicial authorities at domestic level? Lastly it is noteworthy that Protocol No 14, now ratified by all Council of Europe Member States, enshrines in Article 12—at least to some extent—an obligation to apply a margin of appreciation. One essential question remains: by allowing any margin of a certain width, is the European Court simply waiving its power of review or is it attributing responsibility to the domestic courts in the interest of a healthy subsidiarity?

scholarly journals papel del artículo 8 CEDH en la construcción del margen de apreciación nacional y la doctrina de las obligaciones positivas del Estado

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Redondo Saceda
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Family Life ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Derechos Humanos ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
The Right

El artículo 8 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos –que protege los derechos al respeto la vida privada y familiar, el domicilio y la correspondencia– se ha configurado en estos setenta años de Convenio como uno de los escenarios habituales del desarrollo del margen de apreciación nacional y la doctrina de las obligaciones positivas del Estado. Esto parece justificarse en el contenido y estructura de este artículo y en las restricciones y limitaciones al ejercicio de estos derechos establecidas por su párrafo segundo. En este marco, el objetivo de este artículo es analizar cuál ha sido el papel del artículo 8 CEDH en el desarrollo de estos estándares interpretativos y cómo ha influido en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights –which protects the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence– has been configured as a traditional place for the development of the margin of appreciation and the doctrine of State’s positive obligations. The scope and structure of this article and its limitation clause in the second paragraph seem to justify these developments. In this context, the objective of this article is to analyse the role of Article 8 ECHR in the development of these interpretative standards and its influence in the European Court of Human Rights case-law.

scholarly journals Exceptions and Exclusions: The Right to Informed Consent for Medical Treatment of People with Psychosocial Disabilities in Europe

2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Waddington ◽  
Bernadette McSherry
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Informed Consent ◽  
Medical Treatment ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Persons With Disabilities ◽  
European Court ◽  
Consent To Treatment ◽  
The Right

This article examines the relevant international law relating to informed consent to treatment for individuals with psychosocial disabilities and reflects on the protection offered in this respect by the European Convention on Human Rights (echr) and the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. The article argues that while the un Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is beginning to influence case law of the European Court of Human Rights, only ‘weak’ protection has been afforded to people with psychosocial disabilities by the echr and the Court in relation to informed consent for medical treatment.

scholarly journals Right to freedom of religion and the principle of neutrality of the state in in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the decisions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Ukrainian Perspective and view to the future

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Pavlo Pushkar ◽  
Oleksii Ivanets
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Freedom Of Religion ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Effective Protection ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
The Right ◽  
Collective Dimension

This article suggests a review of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the practices of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe as sources of evaluation of the material and procedural requirements as to the right to freedom of expression. These practices, being synchronised and coherent, are aimed at ensuring implementation of the requirements of the Convention. The right to freedom of expression reflects several aspects of realisation of this right – its realisation as an individual and its collective dimension – together with other persons, or even refusal to exercise a right to freedom of religion. Also, most importantly, the article deals with the requirements of the procedural protection of this right, supplemented guarantees of preventive nature and procedural nature aimed at ensuring effective protection of the right domestically. Such measures include domestic administrative or judicial action. The right to freedom of religion is a right, which integrates some aspects of its subsidiary implementation. In particular, in determining existence of legitimate aim and proportionality of interference with the right to freedom of religion. The article also discusses the relevance of “margin of appreciation” and “proportionality” as elements that influence academic discussions and public criticism of some of the approaches taken by the European Court of Human Rights in assessing compliance of measures taken by the states to limit exercise of freedom of religion.

scholarly journals SOME PROBLEMS OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL IN THE DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Rozhina ◽  
T. Reshetneva
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Public Law ◽  
The Body ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
European Court ◽  
Fundamental Freedoms ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
The Right

Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is applicable to any dispute between people in the field of civil law, however, the supervisory bodies of the Council of Europe had to resolve many complex issues arising from the application of this article in the field of public law, when any disciplinary the body was empowered by law to take actions affecting the rights or interests of individuals. To a large extent, the Court's case-law is developed in just such cases.

Standardy należytego uzasadnienia w świetle orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego i Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka

2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
Judicial Reasoning ◽  
The Right

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.

Does the Injunction Gap Violate Implementers’ Fair Trial Rights Under the ECHR?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The Past ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
Federal Supreme ◽  
Validity Of A Patent

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.

Risk and the European Convention on Human Rights: Towards a New Approach

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 353-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hilson
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Nuclear Radiation ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
Public Concern ◽  
Initial Attempt ◽  
Liberal Conception ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.

Passive Proselytism

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 244-269
Author(s):  
Christine Carpenter
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Freedom Of Religion ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

Abstract Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to freedom of religion and conscience. The language of Article 9(1) has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as including protections for acts of proselytism, when properly committed and respectful of the rights and freedoms of others. This was the view taken in the foundational Article 9 case of the Court, Kokkinakis v. Greece. In the decades since Kokkinakis, however, the view of the Court on proselytism appears to have shifted, in particular in Article 9 cases involving religious garments. This article seeks to determine whether the Court is consistent in its views on proselytism between these religious garment cases and earlier examples of Article 9 case law.

When interpreting domestic legislation courts must, so far as it is possible, read and give effect to such legislation in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights; see s3(1). Hence domestic courts are given a degree of latitude – reference to the jurisprudence of Strasbourg is mandatory – but it need only be taken into account. Legislation must be construed in a manner compatible with the Convention but only so far as is possible. Three points are particularly worth noting: • When applying the European Convention on Human Rights a domestic court should be prepared to take a generous view as to whether an activity falls within the protection afforded by the Convention’s articles. • The Convention is to be regarded as a ‘living’ or ‘dynamic’ instrument to be interpreted in the light of current conditions. More recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights will be regarded as carrying more weight than earlier decisions. • Where an Article of the Convention permits some state interference with the enjoyment of a right, a court assessing the extent to which that interference is compatible with the Convention should consider (i) whether the interference is provided for by law; (ii) whether it serves a legitimate purpose; (iii) whether the interference is proportionate to the end to be achieved; (iv) whether it is necessary in a democratic society; (v) whether it is discriminatory in operation; and (vi) whether the state should be allowed a margin of appreciation in its compliance with the Convention – that is, be allowed to apply the Convention to suit national standards. The ‘quality of law test’

1996 ◽  
pp. 88-88
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
National Standards ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Domestic Court ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Domestic Legislation ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
State Interference

The European Court of Human Rights and Removal of Long-term Migrants

2021 ◽  
pp. 159-174
Author(s):  
Başak Çalı ◽  
Stewart Cunningham
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Migration Policy ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Unique Position ◽  
European Court ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The Right ◽  
Dual Commitment

This chapter analyses the general interpretative outlook of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the rights of long-term migrants facing deportation. It shows that this outlook is strongly marked by recognising the primacy of state discretion in the field of migration policy, while at the same time ensuring that long-term migrants are given access to the protection of the Convention. The chapter then surveys the case law of the ECtHR related to the deportation of long-term migrants, identifying the factors that the Court employs in balancing its dual commitment to states and long-term migrants. The central argument of the chapter is that the Court’s approach to the right to stay of long-term migrants falls short of adequately recognising the unique position of long-term migrants and is unable to differentiate between those who have lived for lengthy periods in host states and any other category of alien in those states. The Court’s recent emphasis on principled deference to domestic courts in balancing the rights of long-term migrants and host states further undercuts any future progressive developments in the field of right to stay for long-term migrants.

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