Sourcebook Criminal Law
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Southern Water Authority v Pegrum and Pegrum [1989] Crim LR 442 (DC) Facts: The respondents were charged with an offence contrary to s 31(1) of the Control of Pollution Act 1974, causing polluting matter (pig effluent) to enter a stream. The respondents reared pigs; effluent produced by the pigs was held initially in tanks and then transferred by gravity into a lagoon constructed for the purpose. The lagoon itself was emptied of liquid content for use as manure several times a year and of sediment annually. In the winter of 1987, after heavy rain, a blocked drain resulted in rain water flowing into the lagoon. A fissure developed at the top of one side of the lagoon and polluting liquid escaped, finding its way into a stream and eventually into a river. The magistrates found that the overflow from the lagoon was caused by an act of God – the ingress of rainwater – and that it was unnecessary to consider whether the respondents were negligent either in not inspecting the drain or discovering the overflow promptly enough or in not providing an adequate drain. They further found that the blocked drain causing the ingress of rainwater was an intervening event ‘breaking the chain of causation’. They dismissed the information and the prosecutor appealed by way of case stated. Held, allowing the appeal and remitting the case with a direction to convict, the following principles applied: (1) where the defendant conducts some active operation involving the storage, use or creation of material capable of polluting a river should it escape, then if it does escape and pollute, the defendant is liable if he ‘caused’ that escape; (2) the question of causation is to be decided in a common sense way; (3) a defendant may be found to have caused that escape even though he did not intend that escape and even though the escape happened without his negligence; (4) it is a defence to show that the cause of the escape was the intervening act of a third party or act of God or vis major which are the novus actus interveniens defences to strict civil liability referred to in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330; (5) in deciding whether the intervening cause affords a defence the test is whether it was of so powerful nature that the conduct of the defendant was not a cause at all, but was merely part of the surrounding circumstances. On the facts of the present case, the active operations or positive acts of the respondents were the storage and re-use of the effluent which resulted in the formation of the toxic sediment which polluted the stream. The magistrates erred in finding that the ingress of rainwater was an act of God; an act of God is an operation of natural forces so unpredictable as to excuse a defendant all liability for its consequences. The quantity of rain could not properly be regarded in itself as an act of God and in any event the ingress of rainwater into the lagoon was the result of the overflow from the blocked drain. Although unpredictable and unforeseeable operation of animate forces can amount to an act of God (see Carstairs v Taylor (1870) LR 6 Exch 217), there was no factual basis for such finding in the present case. The respondents submitted that the blocked drain was an effective intervening cause relegating the respondent’s effluent operation to a mere surrounding circumstance; it was sought to distinguish Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824 on the basis that in
would not allow him to do so till Saturday 31 December. He did not tell the receptionist at the surgery of the full circumstances of the illness and the doctor did not come. In the afternoon of the same day S phoned again. A locum called, but the deceased died of puerperal fever before he arrived. Medical evidence was that she could have been saved had a doctor been called before that Saturday. S was charged with (1) manslaughter of his wife on 31 December; (2) concealment of birth on 28 December. On the second count his defence was that they did not intend to conceal the birth permanently but would have told the police when they felt up to it. The judge directed the jury that this amounted to a defence to the charge. The judge in his summing-up directed that it had to be proved that in reckless disregard of his duty to care for the deceased’s health, S failed to get medical attention, and that as a direct result of that failure she died. ‘Reckless disregard’ meant that, fully appreciating that she was so ill that there was a real risk to her health if she did not get help, S did not do so, either because he was indifferent, or because he deliberately ran a wholly unjustified and unreasonable risk. It was accepted that he was not indifferent – the evidence was that they were a devoted couple and that he stayed with her all the time when she was ill. It was also accepted that she did not want a doctor called, and the jury had to balance the weight that it was right to give to this wish against her capacity to make rational decisions. In addition it had been proved that the ‘reckless disregard’ led to the death and that had S acted differently on 31 December, his wife’s life would have been saved. The jury convicted on the second count but could not agree on the charge of manslaughter and were discharged from giving a verdict. Airedale National Health Service Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 82 (HL) Anthony Bland was injured in the Hillsborough Stadium disaster. He suffered irreversible brain damage and was diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Expert medical evidence was to the effect that there was no hope of recovery. The Airedale NHS Trust, with the support of Bland’s parents, sought a declaration that the doctors treating Bland might lawfully discontinue all life-sustaining treatment and medical treatment except that required to enable Bland to die without unnecessary distress. The Official Solicitor appealed to the House of Lords against the granting of the declaration on the basis that the withdrawal of life support treatment would amount to murder.