scholarly journals FALÊNCIA SOBERANA: UMA HERESIA DESDE DENTRO

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Moreira Cunha

A recorrência das crises financeiras, especialmente a partir da crise asiática de 1997-1998, determinou a emergência de um amplo debate e de um conjunto de ações políticas visando à reforma da arquitetura do sistema financeiro internacional. O presente artigo enfoca, dentro deste marco mais geral, a questão da “falência soberana”. A proposta lançada por Anne Krueger de se discutir a conformação de um arcabouço institucional capaz de ordenar os processos de reestruturação das dívidas de países “potencialmente” em crise sugere que as reformas de “primeira geração” já estão sendo consideradas insuficientes no núcleo duro do establishment oficial. Abstract The recurrence of financial crises, particularly after the Asian meltdown (1997-1998), determined the emergence of an intense debate and new policies concerning the international financial architecture. In this context, this paper discuss the recent Anne Krueger’s approach to sovereign debt restructuring. We suggest that this new approach reveals that the “first generation” reforms seem to be already insufficient, even for the hardcore of the official establishment.

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 2135-2148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Jeanne

This paper presents a theory of the maturity of international sovereign debt, and derives its implications for the reform of the international financial architecture. The analysis is based on a model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries, but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises due to bad shocks. The paper presents a welfare analysis of several measures that have been discussed in recent debates, such as international lending-in-last-resort or the establishment of a mechanism for suspending payments on the external debt of crisis countries. (JEL F34, O19)


Author(s):  
José Antonio Ocampo

This chapter analyses the history and effectiveness of the two major mechanisms of resolution of balance-of-payments crises: IMF emergency financing and complementary mechanisms, and sovereign debt workouts. It argues that IMF lending has historically met its counter-cyclical objectives and has been improving in recent decades in terms of providing adequate lending facilities as well as focusing conditionality on macro-relevant areas. Swap arrangements among central banks constitute the most important complementary mechanism, but benefit mainly developed countries. In contrast to advances in IMF financing, the need to have a better framework for debt resolution remains one of the major gaps of the international financial architecture. In this regard, this chapter proposes a multilateral mechanism that would lie between the voluntary and statutory solutions that have been proposed in the global debate. This mechanism would offer a sequence of voluntary negotiations, mediation, and eventual arbitration that would take place with pre-established deadlines.


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