Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 2135-2148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Jeanne

This paper presents a theory of the maturity of international sovereign debt, and derives its implications for the reform of the international financial architecture. The analysis is based on a model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries, but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises due to bad shocks. The paper presents a welfare analysis of several measures that have been discussed in recent debates, such as international lending-in-last-resort or the establishment of a mechanism for suspending payments on the external debt of crisis countries. (JEL F34, O19)

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Moreira Cunha

A recorrência das crises financeiras, especialmente a partir da crise asiática de 1997-1998, determinou a emergência de um amplo debate e de um conjunto de ações políticas visando à reforma da arquitetura do sistema financeiro internacional. O presente artigo enfoca, dentro deste marco mais geral, a questão da “falência soberana”. A proposta lançada por Anne Krueger de se discutir a conformação de um arcabouço institucional capaz de ordenar os processos de reestruturação das dívidas de países “potencialmente” em crise sugere que as reformas de “primeira geração” já estão sendo consideradas insuficientes no núcleo duro do establishment oficial. Abstract The recurrence of financial crises, particularly after the Asian meltdown (1997-1998), determined the emergence of an intense debate and new policies concerning the international financial architecture. In this context, this paper discuss the recent Anne Krueger’s approach to sovereign debt restructuring. We suggest that this new approach reveals that the “first generation” reforms seem to be already insufficient, even for the hardcore of the official establishment.


Author(s):  
José Antonio Ocampo

This chapter analyses the history and effectiveness of the two major mechanisms of resolution of balance-of-payments crises: IMF emergency financing and complementary mechanisms, and sovereign debt workouts. It argues that IMF lending has historically met its counter-cyclical objectives and has been improving in recent decades in terms of providing adequate lending facilities as well as focusing conditionality on macro-relevant areas. Swap arrangements among central banks constitute the most important complementary mechanism, but benefit mainly developed countries. In contrast to advances in IMF financing, the need to have a better framework for debt resolution remains one of the major gaps of the international financial architecture. In this regard, this chapter proposes a multilateral mechanism that would lie between the voluntary and statutory solutions that have been proposed in the global debate. This mechanism would offer a sequence of voluntary negotiations, mediation, and eventual arbitration that would take place with pre-established deadlines.


2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (5) ◽  
pp. 1676-1706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen M Reinhart ◽  
Kenneth S Rogoff

Newly developed historical time series on public debt, along with data on external debts, allow a deeper analysis of the debt cycles underlying serial debt and banking crises. We test three related hypotheses at both “world” aggregate levels and on an individual country basis. First, external debt surges are an antecedent to banking crises. Second, banking crises (domestic and those in financial centers) often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises; we find they help predict them. Third, public borrowing surges ahead of external sovereign default, as governments have “hidden domestic debts” that exceed the better documented levels of external debt. (JEL E44, F34, F44, G01, H63, N20)


2021 ◽  
pp. 232-256
Author(s):  
Quentin Deforge ◽  
Benjamin Lemoine

In this article, we analyse how international crises and conflicts over sovereign debt have transformed the agenda of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Geneva-based organization founded in 1964 and whose history is closely linked to the G77 group of developing countries. We show how UNCTAD’s projects for structural reform of the international financial architecture were contested and ultimately rejected in the 1970s. Such defeats were a blow to the transformative goals that UNCTAD had initially set to achieve. In the 1980s, UNCTAD gradually became a technical agency and its mandate restricted to providing expert assistance and support to developing countries during their negotiations with the Paris Club. Meanwhile, the mandate to produce expertise at the macro level (the so-called ‘upstream’ area), was effectively transferred to the IMF and World Bank. With the development of the Debt Management Financial Analysis System (DMFAS), UNCTAD went from promoting systemic change in international financial architecture to sponsoring the micro-management of domestic policies as remedy to over-indebtedness. But we also show that UNCTAD did not always restrict itself to doing such ‘downstream’ work, i.e., improving debt issuing capacities and technologies of developing countries. While UNCTAD’s recent project on fair principles of lending and borrowing principles conforms to what’s expected from the group of advanced countries, another project involving the creation of an international mechanism of sovereign debt restructuring functioned as a disturbance to this fragile downstream–upstream division of labour between international organizations.


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