scholarly journals Monetary Policy Capture and Political Stabilization

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 8
Author(s):  
Francesco Salsano
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Uncertainty ◽  
Central Banker

The paper is an extension of the Gabillon and Martimort model (2004), which studies how the independence of the institution in charge of monetary policy may stabilize inflationary fluctuations due to political uncertainty when the economy is characterized by lobbies that seek to promote their own interests to the detriment of the general interests of society. This extension strengthens the hypothesis that the independence of the CB is the best institutional design with which to protect the general interests of ‘society’. In fact, a Central Banker independent from the political principal that appoints it represents the best control by the minority with respect to decisions taken by the elected political majority.

scholarly journals Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy: Reflections on the Development over the last 150 Years

2013 ◽  
Vol 233 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Otmar Issing ◽  
Volker Wieland
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
The Political ◽  
Monetary Theory ◽  
Academic Discussion

SummaryIn this paper, we provide some reflections on the development of monetary theory and monetary policy over the last 150 years. Rather than presenting an encompassing overview, which would be overambitious, we simply concentrate on a few selected aspects that we view as milestones in the development of this subject.We also try to illustrate some of the interactions with the political and financial system, academic discussion and the views and actions of central banks.

scholarly journals The new political macroeconomics in modern macroeconomics and its appliance to transition processes in Serbia

2011 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-557
Author(s):  
Miomir Jaksic ◽  
Aleksandra Prascevic
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Transition Economies ◽  
Transition Economy ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Uncertainty ◽  
European Parties ◽  
New Democracy

This study deals with important issues related to the new political macroeconomics and its appliance to the economic movements in Serbia, which is a country of ?new democracy? as well as with transition economy. In political macroeconomics, it is a known fact that the economic policy instruments can be used for political purposes - simulated improvement of economic indicators to win the elections. These options assume specific features in transition economies, such as the Serbian economy. The political instability in Serbia, reflected in frequent elections, as well as in the diversity in political and economic goals of the key political parties leading to increasing political uncertainty in both the pre-election and post-election periods, weakened the economic system. Simultaneously, using the economic policy for political purposes to support the ?pro-democratic? and ?pro-European? parties proved to be paradoxically justified.

scholarly journals Causes of The Outbreak of the Eurozone Crises: The Role of the Usa and the European Central Bank Monetary Policy

e-Finanse ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-63
Author(s):  
Natalia Białek
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
European Central ◽  
Low Interest Rates ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The U.S

Abstract This paper argues that the loose monetary policy of two of the world’s most important financial institutions-the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank-were ultimately responsible for the outburst of global financial crisis of 2008-09. Unusually low interest rates in 2001- 05 compelled investors to engage in high risk endeavors. It also encouraged some governments to finance excessive domestic consumption with foreign loans. Emerging financial bubbles burst first in mortgage markets in the U.S. and subsequently spread to other countries. The paper also reviews other causes of the crisis as discussed in literature. Some of them relate directly to weaknesses inherent in the institutional design of the European Monetary Union (EMU) while others are unique to members of the EMU. It is rather striking that recommended remedies tend not to take into account the policies of the European Central Bank.

The political economy of inflation

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-343
Author(s):  
Frances Coppola
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Money Supply ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Output ◽  
Political Choices ◽  
Redistributive Effects ◽  
Fiscal And Monetary Policy ◽  
Political Decisions

For the last 40 years, macroeconomics has been dominated by Milton Friedman’s view that inflation occurs when the supply of money rises more quickly than economic output – ‘too much money chasing too few goods’, as the saying goes. If inflation is always due to an imbalance of money supply and output, central banks alone determine the path of inflation, and fiscal policy merely has a redistributive function. This paper draws on historical and empirical evidence as well as recent theoretical literature to show that this view is mistaken. Monetary policy has redistributive effects, and fiscal policy affects the money supply. It is therefore impossible to separate them in practice. Both fiscal and monetary policy have inflationary consequences, and because their distributional effects are different, monetary policy cannot fully offset fiscal decisions. Fiscal and monetary policy are influenced by political decisions and are themselves political in nature. Since inflation reflects spending and saving patterns which are affected by political choices, it is fundamentally a political phenomenon.

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