Accidental Allies

Author(s):  
Phuong Tran Nguyen

Most accounts of the Vietnam War describe it as a war of choice, but this chapter argues that it was, in many ways, a war of necessity. Attempts to implement a purely pragmatic, minimalist Cold War strategy in Asia were doomed when the Korean War drew the United States into an unplanned but then-vital nation-building campaign with accidental allies in South Korea, Taiwan, and eventually South Vietnam. This chapter traces the origins of this moralistic component of Cold War policy and politics, particularly the Christian missionaries and their heirs, like publisher Henry Luce, who formed the China Lobby and Asia First bloc. By helping to frame the Cold War and America’s commitment to Asia as an epic struggle between good and evil, they set the stage for Indochinese refugee admissions based on moral, rather than legal, grounds, and as the very least America could do to atone for its failure to protect stalwart anti-communist allies.

Author(s):  
Craig L. Symonds

At the end of World War II, the U.S. Navy was more than twice as large as all the rest of the navies of the world combined. The inevitable contraction that followed was less draconian than after previous wars because of the almost immediate emergence of the Cold War. ‘Confronting the Soviets: the Cold War navy (1945–1975)’ explains that while deterring a Soviet missile strike remained a primary mission of all of America’s services throughout the Cold War, the United States also confronted a series of smaller wars around the world. These included the Korean War, unrest in the Middle East, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War, 1965–74.


Author(s):  
William O. III Walker

This book discusses how U.S. officials, influenced by publisher Henry R. Luce in an essay in Life magazine in 1941, strove to create an American Century at the close of World War II, and beyond. The United States, Luce held, must seek comprehensive leadership, that is, global hegemony. The advent of the Cold War hastened that undertaking. Communist victory in China’s civil war in 1949 and the start of the Korean War in June 1950 made the Cold War international. U.S. officials implemented the dual strategy of global containment and multilateralism in trade and finance in order to counter Soviet influence. By the late 1950s, however, a changing world, which the nonaligned movement epitomized, was questioning U.S. leadership and, thus, the appeal of the American Century. International crises and adverse balance of payments meant trouble for Luce’s project in the early 1960s. The debacle of 1968 for Lyndon Johnson, as seen in relations with allies, the Vietnam War, and a weak dollar, cost him his presidency and curtailed the growth of the American Century. Richard Nixon then attempted to revitalize U.S. leadership through détente with the Communist world. At most, there remains today a quasi-American Century, premised largely on military power.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Novita Mujiyati ◽  
Kuswono Kuswono ◽  
Sunarjo Sunarjo

United States and the Soviet Union is a country on the part of allies who emerged as the winner during World War II. However, after reaching the Allied victory in the situation soon changed, man has become an opponent. United States and the Soviet Union are competing to expand the influence and power. To compete the United States strive continuously strengthen itself both in the economic and military by establishing a defense pact and aid agencies in the field of economy. During the Cold War the two are not fighting directly in one of the countries of the former Soviet Union and the United States. However, if understood, teradinya the Korean War and the Vietnam War is a result of tensions between the two countries and is a direct warfare conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union. Cold War ended in conflict with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States emerged as the winner of the country.


2019 ◽  
pp. 27-49
Author(s):  
Michael Nacht ◽  
Patricia Schuster ◽  
Eva C. Uribe

This chapter assesses the role of cross-domain deterrence in recent American foreign policy. Cross-domain deterrence is not a new phenomenon, even if our consciousness of it may be. Prominent cases from the Cold War, such as the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, can be interpreted through the lens of cross-domain deterrence and fruitfully compared with more contemporary cases, such as the Stuxnet attack on Iran. These cases illustrate the variation across domains by the adversary and U.S. responses. Considered together, the United States generally responded to these crises by initially limiting itself to the domain where a crisis started and only later expanding into other domains. The United States has typically been cautious when shifting domains and has tried to escalate in ways that would not produce adversarial retaliation.


2007 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 470-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Weiler

Despite widespread support for the postwar expansion of higher education, U.S. colleges and universities in the early 1950s were not isolated from broader social currents, and the deep social anxieties and political tensions of the Cold War found their way onto college campuses. In 1952, the University of California was still reeling from the loyalty oath controversy. In the late 1940s the University of California, like other universities nationwide, had been viewed with increasing suspicion by anti-Communist groups. The search for subversives in California institutions, spearheaded by the Tenney Committee of the California State Legislature, led the University of California's Board of Regents to add a disclaimer of membership in any organization advocating the overthrow of the United States to the oath of allegiance already required of faculty. In an atmosphere of rising hysteria about possible subversives and Communists in academia, on February 24, 1950, the Regents voted to fire anyone employed by the University of California who failed to sign the oath. This decision led to strong opposition from students and faculty. Despite these protests, and particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, the Regents held firm. On August 25, 1950, thirty-one members of the University of California faculty were dismissed because they refused to sign the loyalty oath. None of them was accused of being a Communist or subversive. After an appellate court ruled against the Regents, in October 1951 the Regents voted to rescind the oath, but maintained their stance that the university would not employ Communists. Although the California Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the appellate court and the non-signers were reinstated to the university, the mood at the university, as in the nation as a whole, continued to be one of anxiety and unease.


Secret Wars ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 142-186
Author(s):  
Austin Carson

This chapter shifts the focus to the early Cold War, as conflict between North and South Korea threatened to again plunge the wider international system into war. The Korean War, fought from 1950 to 1953, grew to include multiple outside interventions. Yet despite Soviet, American, and Chinese combat participation, the war was successfully limited to the Korean peninsula. As such, this chapter reviews primary materials on a poorly understood aspect of the Korean War: Soviet–American air-to-air combat over North Korea. Records released since the end of the Cold War document how Washington and Moscow engaged in a deadly multiyear struggle for air supremacy and used secrecy to contain its effects. The chapter includes new archival material on American intelligence showing anticipation, detection, and concealment of the Soviet covert entry. It also assesses the United States' initial decision to intervene overtly, its turn to covert action against mainland China, and China's complex role in the war. This chapter argues that China's initial ground intervention used secrecy to achieve surprise, following an operational security logic, but used an unacknowledged “volunteer” intervention to limit the war.


boundary 2 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-70
Author(s):  
Donald E. Pease

Toni Morrison’s 2012 novel Home is concerned primarily with the efforts undertaken by its protagonist, the black Korean War veteran Frank Money, to accommodate himself to civilian life. However, Home differs from other Korean War novels in that after Frank returns to the United States, he neither aligns his wartime experiences with the superpower rivalry nor conducts a critical meta-engagement with Cold War ideology. When Frank comes back to the United States in 1955 from a tour of duty as a combat infantryman in Chosin, Korea, he instead undergoes the unheimlich experience of becoming a fugitive within a carceral state. Morrison confronts readers with a comparably uncanny experience when she deletes from the narrative any trace of the Cold War ideology whose structures of feeling, epistemologies, and military architecture the Korean War was putatively fought to establish and that the so-called war on terror had eerily revived. When she disallowed Cold War ideology control over representations of Home’s characters, actions, and events, Morrison recast the Korean War as the Cold War’s uncanny Other that exposed readers to an ongoing settler-colonial war being waged within 1950s US domestic society.


Author(s):  
Richard Mason

The Korean War, which broke out very closely upon the heels of the Communist victory in China, immediately assumed global implications beyond the boundaries of the Korean Peninsula. Essentially a Korean civil war, it immediately became a major ‘hot war’ in the Cold War in Asia. This paper discusses the relations between the United States and Indonesia in the aftermath of the North Korean attack on South Korea, covering the period from the outbreak of the war in 1950 through to the end of the war in 1954. The paper explores the various ways in which the United States attempted to co-opt and coerce Indonesia into the Western camp in the Cold War, and Indonesia’s responses thereto. The central theme of the paper is the interplay between the United States’ policy of containment and the Indonesian policy of non-alignment in the Cold War. An examination of the United States’ policy toward Indonesia, a non-communist but non-aligned nation, vis-à-vis the Korean War, would serve to illustrate the dynamics and nature of the Cold War in Southeast Asia.  


Author(s):  
Robert J. McMahon

‘A global Cold War, 1950–8’ examines how the Cold War became increasingly global in scope. The Americans and the Soviets each identified crucial strategic, economic, and psychological interests in the developing nations of the Third World, and sought to gain resources, bases, allies, and influence there. Ironically, the Korean War set in motion forces that helped stabilize US–Soviet relations while institutionalizing the East–West division of Europe in a manner that decreased the likelihood of war between the superpowers. The very idea of a military conflict there became increasingly unpalatable to Soviet and American leaders. The nuclear armaments race between the United States and the Soviet Union was an important event in this period of the Cold War.


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