Disagreement and Deep Agnosticism

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-52
Author(s):  
Eric Gilbertson ◽  

One defense of the “steadfast” position in cases of peer disagreement appeals to the idea that it's rational for you to remain deeply agnostic about relevant propositions concerning your peer's judgment, that is, to assign no credence value at all to such propositions. Thus, according to this view, since you need not assign any value to the proposition that your peer's judgment is likely to be correct, you need not conciliate, since you can remain deeply agnostic on the question of how the likelihood of your peer's judgment bears on the likelihood of your own. This paper argues that the case for deep agnosticism as a response to peer disagreement fails. Deep agnosticism (as a general thesis) implies that it is sometimes permissible to withhold judgment about whether there is a non-zero chance of a proposition's being true. However, in cases of disagreement where deep agnosticism is supposed to support the steadfast position, such withholding isn't rational. This is because of constraints placed on rational credence by objective probability or chance, which ensure that rational credence adequately reflects strength of evidence.

Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed

Conciliationism is the view that says when an agent who believes P becomes aware of an epistemic peer who believes not-P, that she encounters a (partial) defeater for her belief that P. Strong versions of conciliationism pose a sceptical threat to many, if not most, religious beliefs since religion is rife with peer disagreement. Elsewhere (Removed) I argue that one way for a religious believer to avoid sceptical challenges posed by strong conciliationism is by appealing to the evidential import of religious experience. Not only can religious experience be used to establish a relevant evidential asymmetry between disagreeing parties, but reliable reports of such experiences also start to put pressure on the religious sceptic to conciliate toward her religious opponent. Recently, however, Asha Lancaster-Thomas poses a highly innovative challenge to the evidential import of religious experience. Namely, she argues that an evil God is just as likely to explain negative religious experiences as a good God is able to explain positive religious experiences. In light of this, religious believers need to explain why a good God exists instead of an evil God. I respond to Lancaster-Thomas by suggesting that, at least within the context of religious experience, (i) that the evil God hypothesis is only a challenge to certain versions of theism; and (ii) that the existence of an evil God and good God are compossible.


Author(s):  
Ted Poston

This chapter provides a Bayesian model of strength of evidence in cases in which there are multiple items of independent evidence. The author uses this Bayesian model to evaluate the strength of evidence for theism if, as Plantinga claims, there are two dozen or so arguments for theism. The model turns questions of the overall strength of multiple arguments into a simple summation problem. Moreover, it provides a clear framework for advancing questions about how relationships between the arguments bear on the overall strength of evidence for theism. The Bayesian model developed in this chapter has a wide-range of applications for modeling strength of evidence in cumulative case arguments.


Author(s):  
Jens Beckert ◽  
Richard Bronk

This chapter provides a theoretical framework for considering how imaginaries and narratives interact with calculative devices to structure expectations and beliefs in the economy. It analyses the nature of uncertainty in innovative market economies and examines how economic actors use imaginaries, narratives, models, and calculative practices to coordinate and legitimize action, determine value, and establish sufficient conviction to act despite the uncertainty they face. Placing the themes of the volume in the context of broader trends in economics and sociology, the chapter argues that, in conditions of widespread radical uncertainty, there is no uniquely rational set of expectations, and there are no optimal strategies or objective probability functions; instead, expectations are often structured by contingent narratives or socially constructed imaginaries. Moreover, since expectations are not anchored in a pre-existing future reality but have an important role in creating the future, they become legitimate objects of political debate and crucial instruments of power in markets and societies.


Author(s):  
Edward S. Hinchman

Which is more fundamental, assertion or testimony? Should we understand assertion as basic, treating testimony as what one gets when one adds an interpersonal addressee? Or should we understand testimony as basic, treating mere assertion—assertion without testimony—as what one gets when one subtracts that interpersonal relation? This article argues for the subtractive approach and for the more general thesis that its treatment of the interpersonal element in assertion makes understanding that interpersonal element the key to understanding how assertion expresses belief. This theory of belief expression in assertion treats it as internalizing the transmission of belief in testimony. How we understand that internalizing move depends on how we conceptualize the interpersonal element in testimony. Since what will be called the Command Model does not give one the conceptual resources to make this move, one should adopt an alternative that will be called the Custodial Model, on which a testifier aims not to convince her addressee but to reason with him—to give him reasons to believe what she tells him, where those reasons are grounded in her trustworthiness in thus attempting to influence him. The subtractive approach to assertion thus rests on a key distinction between the aims of reasoning and persuasion.


Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Joshua Blanchard

Abstract Many of us are unmoved when it is objected that some morally or intellectually suspect source agrees with our belief. While we may tend to find this kind of guilt by epistemic association unproblematic, I argue that this tendency is a mistake. We sometimes face what I call the problem of unwelcome epistemic company. This is the problem of encountering agreement about the content of your belief from a source whose faults give you reason to worry about the belief's truth, normative status, etiology, or implications. On the basis of an array of cases, I elaborate four distinct kinds of problems that unwelcome epistemic company poses. Two of these are distinctly epistemic, and two are moral. I canvass possible responses, ranging from stubbornness to an epistemic prudishness that avoids unwelcome company at all costs. Finally, I offer preliminary lessons of the problem and distinguish it from the problem of peer disagreement.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. e000920
Author(s):  
Dimitris Challoumas ◽  
Neal L Millar

ObjectiveTo critically appraise the quality of published systematic reviews (SRs) of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) in tendinopathy with regard to handling and reporting of results with special emphasis on strength of evidence assessment.Data sourcesMedline from inception to June 2020.Study eligibilityAll SRs of RCTs assessing the effectiveness of any intervention(s) on any location of tendinopathy.Data extraction and synthesisIncluded SRs were appraised with the use of a 12-item tool devised by the authors arising from the Preferred Reporting Items in Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses statement and other relevant guidance. Subgroup analyses were performed based on impact factor (IF) of publishing journals and date of publication.ResultsA total of 57 SRs were included published in 38 journals between 2006 and 2020. The most commonly used risk-of-bias (RoB) assessment tool and strength of evidence assessment tool were the Cochrane Collaboration RoB tool and the Cochrane Collaboration Back Review Group tool, respectively. The mean score on the appraisal tool was 46.5% (range 0%–100%). SRs published in higher IF journals (>4.7) were associated with a higher mean score than those in lower IF journals (mean difference 26.4%±8.8%, p=0.004). The mean score of the 10 most recently published SRs was similar to that of the first 10 published SRs (mean difference 8.3%±13.7%, p=0.54). Only 23 SRs (40%) used the results of their RoB assessment in data synthesis and more than half (n=30; 50%) did not assess the strength of evidence of their results. Only 12 SRs (21%) assessed their strength of evidence appropriately.ConclusionsIn light of the poor presentation of evidence identified by our review, we provide recommendations to increase transparency and reproducibility in future SRs.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. MacDonald ◽  
Ken M. Kunisaki ◽  
Timothy J. Wilt ◽  
Arianne K. Baldomero

Abstract Background Bilirubin is a potent antioxidant and higher serum bilirubin levels have been associated with improved COPD outcomes. We performed a systematic review to evaluate the association between serum bilirubin levels and lung function (FEV1), prevalence/incidence of COPD, acute exacerbations of COPD, respiratory health status, and mortality. Methods MEDLINE® and Embase were searched using Ovid® (search updated October 1st, 2019). We included studies that measured serum bilirubin levels and outcomes of interest in adults with or without underlying lung disease. We excluded studies of those with liver disease or drug-induced elevations in bilirubin. We used the Newcastle–Ottawa scale to assess individual study risk of bias (ROB) and the US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality—Evidence Based Practice tool to assess overall strength of evidence (SOE). Two authors independently determined eligibility, performed data abstraction, assessed ROB, and determined SOE. Results Thirteen studies (5 low risk of bias, 3 moderate and 5 high risk) were included. We found low strength of evidence for the association between higher bilirubin levels and lower risk of acute exacerbations of COPD (2 studies), mortality (3 studies), COPD diagnosis (4 studies), and lung function (FEV1) (8 studies). We found insufficient evidence on the relationship between serum bilirubin and respiratory health status/exercise capacity (1 study) and airflow obstruction (FEV1/FVC ratio) (4 studies). Conclusion Higher bilirubin levels may be associated with lower mortality and improved COPD outcomes. Randomized trials are needed to evaluate the effect of medications that raise serum bilirubin on COPD outcomes. PROSPERO registration: CRD42019145747.


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