From Necessary Truth to Necessary Existence

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-30
Author(s):  
Joshua Rasmussen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Necessary Existence

Radical Contingentism, or; Why Not Even Numbers Exist Necessarily

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Simons
Keyword(s):  
Natural Numbers ◽  
Mathematical Objects ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Necessary Existence ◽  
Abstract Existence

Bob Hale championed the view that some objects exist of necessity, most prominently, mathematical objects like numbers. In contrast, this chapter upholds radical contingentism, the view that no object exists necessarily, and seeks to undermine the idea that the best possible candidates for necessary existence, the natural numbers, exist necessarily, despite there being in fact many contingent objects. Even the best neo-Fregean arguments for the existence of natural numbers depend on assumptions a nominalist may reject. A positive account of cardinalities as belonging to multitudes shows that every finite cardinality is exemplified only if there are two or more individuals, but that there are at least two individuals is not a necessary truth. Hence, even if numbers were admitted to abstract existence contingently upon their being exemplified—which the chapter denies—they would not exist necessarily.

Necessary Existence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss ◽  
Joshua L. Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Abstract Objects ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Necessary Existence ◽  
Concrete Entity ◽  
The Universe

A necessary being is a concrete entity that cannot fail to exist. An example of such a being might be the God of classical theism or the universe of necessitarians. Necessary Existence offers and carefully defends a number of novel arguments for the thesis that there exists at least one necessary being, while inviting the reader to a future investigation of what the neccessary being(s) is (are) like. The arguments include a defense of a classic contingency argument, a series of new modal arguments from possible causes, an argument from abstract objects, and a Gödelian argument from perfections. Furthermore, arguments against the possibility of a necessary being are critically examined. Among these arguments are old and new arguments from conceivability, a subtraction argument, problems with causation, and an argument from parsimony. Necessary Existence also includes a defense of the axioms of S5 modal logic, which is a framework for understanding several arguments for necessary existents.

Being and Reason

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence And Nonexistence ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Necessary Existence

In Being and Reason, Martin Lin offers a new interpretation of Spinoza’s core metaphysical doctrines with attention to how and why, in Spinoza, metaphysical notions are entangled with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. For example, according to Spinoza, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself, and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, appear to be defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Or between being and reason? Lin argues against idealist readings according to which the metaphysical is reducible to or grounded in something epistemic, logical, or psychological. He maintains that Spinoza sees the order of being and the order of reason as two independent structures that mirror one another. In the course of making this argument, he develops new interpretations of Spinoza’s notions of attribute and mode, and of Spinoza’s claim that all things strive for self-preservation. Lin also argues against prominent idealist readings of Spinoza according to which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is absolutely unrestricted for Spinoza and is the key to his system. He contends, rather, that Spinoza’s metaphysical rationalism is a diverse phenomenon and that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is limited to claims about existence and nonexistence which are applied only once by Spinoza to the case of the necessary existence of God.

TESTING FOR WEAK SEPARABILITY USING STOCHASTIC SEMI-NONPARAMETRIC TESTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON US DATA

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 1510-1534
Author(s):  
Ryan S. Mattson ◽  
Philippe de Peretti
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Nonparametric Tests ◽  
Extended Version ◽  
Monthly Data ◽  
Monetary Aggregates ◽  
Separability Criterion ◽  
Weak Separability ◽  
Existence Conditions ◽  
Necessary Existence

In this paper, we use the weak separability criterion to check for the existence of six different monetary aggregates reported by the Center of Financial Stability (CFS). We implement an extended version of the semi-nonparametric tests introduced by Barnett and de Peretti on US monthly data from January 1967 to December 2012. The test, first, checks for the necessary existence conditions of an overall utility function and a monetary subutility function, and then tests for the separability of the latter. On different subsamples, our results suggest that only the DM1 aggregate meets the separability criterion. Implemented on macroeconomic data, we have tested a joint assumption about separability and the existence of a representative agent. Thus, the rejection of the null could also be due to the rejection of stringent Gorman's conditions. More advanced tests for weak separability are clearly required to confirm the results found in this paper.

Tharp’s theorems of metaphysics and the notion of necessary truth

Synthese ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 194 (4) ◽  
pp. 1219-1231
Author(s):  
Jordan Stein
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Truth

II.—A DEFENCE OF ‘SYNTHETIC NECESSARY TRUTH’

Mind ◽  
1949 ◽  
Vol LVIII (230) ◽  
pp. 164-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN TOULMIN
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Truth

Metaphysics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McGinn
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
De Dicto

This chapter explores philosophical issues in metaphysics. It begins by distinguishing between de re and de dicto necessity. All necessity is uniformly de re; there is simply no such thing as de dicto necessity. Indeed, in the glory days of positivism, all necessity was understood as uniformly the same: a necessary truth was always an a priori truth, while contingent truths were always a posteriori. The chapter then assesses the concept of antirealism. Antirealism is always an error theory: there is some sort of mistake or distortion or sloppiness embedded in the usual discourse. The chapter also considers paradoxes, causation, conceptual analysis, scientific mysteries, the possible worlds theory of modality, the concept of a person, the nature of existence, and logic and propositions.

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