Being and Reason

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence And Nonexistence ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Necessary Existence

In Being and Reason, Martin Lin offers a new interpretation of Spinoza’s core metaphysical doctrines with attention to how and why, in Spinoza, metaphysical notions are entangled with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. For example, according to Spinoza, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself, and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, appear to be defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Or between being and reason? Lin argues against idealist readings according to which the metaphysical is reducible to or grounded in something epistemic, logical, or psychological. He maintains that Spinoza sees the order of being and the order of reason as two independent structures that mirror one another. In the course of making this argument, he develops new interpretations of Spinoza’s notions of attribute and mode, and of Spinoza’s claim that all things strive for self-preservation. Lin also argues against prominent idealist readings of Spinoza according to which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is absolutely unrestricted for Spinoza and is the key to his system. He contends, rather, that Spinoza’s metaphysical rationalism is a diverse phenomenon and that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is limited to claims about existence and nonexistence which are applied only once by Spinoza to the case of the necessary existence of God.

The Necessity of Sufficiency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce L. Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Quantum Physics ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Divine Action ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Quantum Phenomena

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of quantum physics and the philosophical deficiency of necessitarian conceptions of physical law, deserves to be given a clear formulation. The goal is to demonstrate, via a suitably articulated principle of sufficient reason, that divine action in an occasionalist mode is needed (and hence God’s existence is required) to bring causal closure to nature and render it ontologically functional. The best explanation for quantum phenomena and the most adequate understanding of general providence turns out to rest on an ontic structural realism in physics that is grounded in the immaterialist metaphysics of theistic idealism.

A restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason and the cosmological argument

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Quantum Mechanical ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Restricted Version ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen ◽  
Mechanical Phenomena

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that, necessarily, every contingently true proposition has an explanation. The PSR is the most controversial premise in the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is likely that one reason why a number of philosophers reject the PSR is that they think there are conceptual counter-examples to it. For instance, they may think, with Peter van Inwagen, that the conjunction of all contingent propositions cannot have an explanation, or they may believe that quantum mechanical phenomena cannot be explained. It may, however, be that these philosophers would be open to accepting a restricted version of the PSR as long as it was not ad hoc. I present a natural restricted version of the PSR that avoids all conceptual counter-examples, and yet that is strong enough to ground a cosmological argument. The restricted PSR says that all explainable true propositions have explanations.

scholarly journals Metaphysical Rationalism

2019 ◽  
pp. 164-181
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Identity Of Indiscernibles ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Limited Scope

This chapter explores the meaning of Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and the role it plays in his system. Some commentators have argued that Spinoza’s PSR applies to every truth and that Spinoza relies on it in deriving a great deal of his system. Against such interpretations, this chapter argues that Spinoza’s PSR is restricted to existential truths and is applied only once by Spinoza, to the case of the existence of God. In making this case, it considers Spinoza’s arguments for necessitarianism, causal and conceptual dependence, and the identity of indiscernibles, and it concludes that none of them rely on the PSR. It further argues that the limited scope of Spinoza’s PSR is a philosophical advantage because a fully unrestricted PSR is an unattractive doctrine that creates demands for explanation that cannot be met.

God

2019 ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
The Third ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Way

This chapter offers reconstructions of Spinoza’s four arguments for the existence of God. Among the lessons learned from these reconstructions is that, although Spinoza’s first argument is often described as ontological, it relies on many substantive premises that go beyond the definition of God and it is not vulnerable to standard objections to ontological arguments. Additionally, the second argument introduces Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, and seeing how Spinoza applies it to the existence of God sheds light on how he understands both the PSR and causation and explanation more generally. The chapter concludes by arguing that the third and fourth arguments pave the way for Spinoza’s claim that, besides God, no substance can be or be conceived and consideration of them shows why Spinoza’s argument for monism does not beg the question against the orthodox Cartesian.

A response to Oppy, and to Davey and Clifton

2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD M. GALE ◽  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
True Proposition ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Entailment Relation ◽  
Strong Principle

Our paper ‘A new cosmological argument’ gave an argument for the existence of God making use of the weak Principle of Sufficient Reason (W-PSR) which states that for every proposition p, if p is true, then it is possible that there is an explanation for p. Recently, Graham Oppy, as well as Kevin Davey and Rob Clifton, have criticized the argument. We reply to these criticisms. The most interesting kind of criticism in both papers alleges that the W-PSR can be justifiably denied by the atheist, and constitutes no improvement on the strong Principle of Sufficient Reason (S-PSR) which claims that every true proposition in fact has an explanation. The criticism is predicated on the fact that it can be shown that the W-PSR entails the S-PSR. We argue that the W-PSR's plausibility remains despite the criticisms. From this it can be seen to follow that the entailment relation between the W-PSR and the S-PSR gives one reason to believe the S-PSR.

A new cosmological argument

1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD M. GALE ◽  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Begging The Question ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Duns Scotus ◽  
Necessary Existence

We present a valid deductive cosmological argument for the necessary existence of a powerful and intelligent creator of the actual universe. Whereas traditional cosmological arguments had to employ a strong version of the principle of sufficient reason that held that every fact actually has an explanation, our argument can make do with the weak version of Duns Scotus according to which every fact possibly has an explanation. As a result, our argument is less vulnerable to the charge of begging the question than are these traditional cosmological arguments.

Kant, Hume, and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumber

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham Anderson
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
New View

Kant, Hume, and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumber offers an interpretation of Kant’s “confession,” in the Prolegomena, that “it was the objection of David Hume that first, many years ago, interrupted my dogmatic slumber.” It argues that Hume roused Kant not, as has often been thought, by challenging the principle “every event has a cause” that governs experience, but by attacking the principle of sufficient reason, the basis of rationalist metaphysics and of the cosmological proof of the existence of God. This proposal makes it possible to reconcile Kant’s declaration about Hume with his later assertion that it was the Antinomy of pure reason that first woke him from dogmatic slumber, because the Antinomy, like Hume’s challenge, is directed against the dogmatic use of the principle of sufficient reason. The proposal put forward here also makes it possible to understand why Kant speaks of “the objection of David Hume” after mentioning Hume’s attack on metaphysics; for the “objection” that Kant has in mind, it is argued here, is a challenge to metaphysics, rather than to the foundations of empirical knowledge. This work also leads to a new view of Hume himself—as primarily interested not in the foundations of experience but in the problem of metaphysics. It thereby lets us see both Kant and Hume as champions of the Enlightenment in its struggle with superstition.

Insufficient reason in the ‘new cosmological argument’

2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
KEVIN DAVEY ◽  
ROB CLIFTON
Keyword(s):  
Recent Article ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Insufficient Reason ◽  
The Way

In a recent article in this journal, Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss offer a new cosmological proof for the existence of God relying only on the Weak Principle of Sufficient Reason, W-PSR. We argue that their proof relies on applications of W-PSR that cannot be justified, and that our modal intuitions simply do not support W-PSR in the way Gale and Pruss take them to.

Spinoza’s “Ontological” Argument

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Garrett
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Definition Of

Proposition 11 of Part 1 of Spinoza’s Ethics states that God necessarily exists. Although his demonstration of the proposition is often said to constitute his ontological argument for the existence of God, and to report an essentially private “rational perception” of God’s existence, he provides four distinct “proofs” for the proposition. This chapter analyzes the four proofs and the relations among them. Like ontological arguments, they depend crucially on a definition of God that is intended, when grasped, to show that God necessarily exists; but like most cosmological arguments, they also depend crucially on a principle of sufficient reason. The last two proofs can be seen to address an objection, concerning the principle that substances cannot share attributes, that might otherwise be raised to the first two proofs.

Hume’s Attack on the Rationalist Principle of Sufficient Reason in the Enquiry

2020 ◽  
pp. 100-122
Author(s):  
Abraham Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Causal Principle ◽  
Causal Connections ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Ex Nihilo

Chapter 3 investigates more precisely where in the Enquiry Kant finds Hume showing that we cannot know causal connections via pure concepts, and thus that we cannot know the principle of sufficient reason. Hume’s rejection of the principle of sufficient reason comes to a head at 4.13, and Hume returns to it at 12.29 note (d). 12.29 note (d) is directed not, as Hume pretends, against Lucretius’s principle Ex nihilo, nihil fit, but against the causal principle that Descartes, Locke, and Clarke had used to prove the existence of God. This is confirmed by reading 12.29 note (d) against the background of Bayle’s “Spinoza.” Descartes’s Ex nihilo, nihil fit is equivalent, for our purposes, to the principle of sufficient reason found in Wolff, Baumgarten, and the early Kant. The chapter addresses Michael Della Rocca’s argument that Hume failed in his attack on the principle of sufficient reason.

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