Comments on Tim Lord’s “Eliminative Materialism, Historical Consciousness, and R. G. Collingwood’s Philosophy of Mind”

This article explores the relationship between universal grammar and the philosophy of mind. It first provides an overview of the philosophy of mind, focusing on its basic metaphysical orientation as well as its concern with mental states. It then considers some basic paradigms in the philosophy of mind and what generative grammar had to contribute to these paradigms, which include behaviourism, eliminative materialism, anomalous monism, instrumentalism, and functionalism. It also discusses what we might call the ‘philosophy of generative grammar,’ and especially foundational assumptions in generative grammar, and examines what the linguistic contribution to the philosophy of mind has been. The article concludes by reflecting on the future and outlining current visions for where and how linguistics might prove to have a transformative influence on philosophy.

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A Novel Refutation of Eliminative Materialism

On Evidence in Philosophy ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198829720.003.0003 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 37-47

Author(s):

William G. Lycan

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

Folk Psychology ◽

Theory Theory ◽

Halfway House ◽

Eliminative Materialism ◽

Empirical Proposition ◽

Linguistic Evidence

Moore’s method as developed in Chapter 1 is applied against the doctrine of Eliminative Materialism in the philosophy of mind. It resists all defenses of that view that are based on the “Theory” theory of mental discourse and the vulnerability of folk psychology. It also differs from all the standard objections to the doctrine. Two sophisticated replies are considered and rebutted: that there might be empirical linguistic evidence for an elimination-supporting entailment claim, and that my Moorean objection proves too much in that it makes an empirical proposition irrefutable. However, a possible halfway house is conceded: an everyday term sometimes divides its sense as between a scientifically naïve reading and a slightly neologized one compatible with a scientific account.

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The dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience: what does philosophy of mind say?

Trends in Psychiatry and Psychotherapy ◽

10.1590/2237-6089-2014-0010 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 36 (4) ◽

pp. 186-192 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Elie Cheniaux ◽

Carlos Eduardo de Sousa Lyra

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

Body Problem ◽

Current Knowledge ◽

Mental States ◽

Subjective Experiences ◽

Eliminative Materialism ◽

Brain States ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Mind ◽

The Brain

Objective: To briefly review how the main monist and dualist currents of philosophy of mind approach the mind-body problem and to describe their association with arguments for and against a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.Methods: The literature was reviewed for studies in the fields of psychology, psychoanalysis, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind.Results: Some currents are incompatible with a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neurosciences: interactionism and psychophysical parallelism, because they do not account for current knowledge about the brain; epiphenomenalism, which claims that the mind is a mere byproduct of the brain; and analytical behaviorism, eliminative materialism, reductive materialism and functionalism, because they ignore subjective experiences. In contrast, emergentism claims that mental states are dependent on brain states, but have properties that go beyond the field of neurobiology.Conclusions: Only emergentism is compatible with a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.

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BUDDHA AND HARD ELIMINATIVISM

Think ◽

10.1017/s1477175620000093 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 19 (55) ◽

pp. 95-109

Author(s):

O'Ryan Heideman

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

Prima Facie ◽

Ultimate Reality ◽

The Self ◽

The Other ◽

Accurate Description ◽

Good Basis ◽

Eliminative Materialism ◽

Alternative Position ◽

The Buddha

An appropriate description for the Buddha's philosophy of persons within the frame of materialist philosophy of mind, prima facie, would understandably be a kind of reductionism, given that the Buddha reduced the self to nothing but a collection of impersonal and impermanent psychophysical elements. In this article, I argue that this view is only appropriate for understanding the self within conventional reality, as is the term used by Buddhists, and does not tackle the other half, namely, ultimate reality. I claim that eliminative materialism provides a more accurate description of the Buddha's prescriptive practice, and although falling prey to the same problems that reductionism faces, creates a good basis for an alternative position of the Buddha as a Hard Eliminativist.

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