A Novel Refutation of Eliminative Materialism

Moore’s method as developed in Chapter 1 is applied against the doctrine of Eliminative Materialism in the philosophy of mind. It resists all defenses of that view that are based on the “Theory” theory of mental discourse and the vulnerability of folk psychology. It also differs from all the standard objections to the doctrine. Two sophisticated replies are considered and rebutted: that there might be empirical linguistic evidence for an elimination-supporting entailment claim, and that my Moorean objection proves too much in that it makes an empirical proposition irrefutable. However, a possible halfway house is conceded: an everyday term sometimes divides its sense as between a scientifically naïve reading and a slightly neologized one compatible with a scientific account.

The probability of return conditional on migration duration: evidence from Kosovo

The aim of this paper is to conceptualise the migration duration decision within the expected utility maximisation framework, and from that to derive and estimate an empirical proposition. For this purpose, the conceptual framework in Kotorri (2015) is extended where households decide to return to the home country conditional on their migration duration. In the empirical analysis, the Cox proportional hazards model is employed. This analysis is the first to investigate migration duration based on a random sample stemming from the Kosovo census of population conducted in 2011. The findings suggest rather mixed support for the household approach. The hazard to return decreases with income but not nonlinearly. The results indicate that household return migration behaviour is influenced by demographic characteristics, psychic income, and political factors.

A Genealogy of Rational Choice: Rationalism, Elitism, and Democracy

Unlike previous methodological debates in political science, the recent rational choice controversy has excluded consideration of normative questions altogether. These can be recovered, in part, through a genealogy of counter-utopian democratic theory which connects modern rational choice theory to the fin-de-siècle sociology of elites via the mediating figure of Schumpeter. The family resemblances include the aspiration toward a pure science of society, the search for a “realistic” theory of democratic politics, and the shading of an empirical proposition about elite domination into a normative celebration. Though democratic theorists have learned much from the counter-utopian tradition generally, both sides of the rational choice controversy have failed to take seriously the elitists' recognition of the ineluctable normative and ideological dimensions of social research.Résumé. Les débats récents sur le choix rationnel, à contre-pied d'autres disputes méthodologiques en science politique, ont exclu les questions normatives. Ces questions peuvent se rétablir, en partie, par l'intermédiaire d'une généalogie contre-utopiste de la théorie démocratique, qui lie la théorie moderne du choix rationnel au retour de la sociologie élitiste de fin de siècle, avec le personnage de Schumpeter comme médiateur. Les ressemblances familiales portent l'aspiration à une science pure de la société, la recherche d'une théorie «réaliste» de la démocratie et la transition d'une proposition empirique sur la domination des élites vers une célébration normative. Bien que les théoriciens démocratiques aient beaucoup appris de la tradition contre-utopiste, aucune des deux parties du débat sur le choix rationnel n'a pris en compte la reconnaissance élitiste des aspects idéologiques inévitables de la recherche sociale.

Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict

The research reported here develops an explanation for the often-noted absence of international war between democratic states. This explanation is derived from a theoretical rationale centered on universal democratic norms for reconciling competing values and interests. I argue that democratic states locked in disputes are better equipped than others with the means for diffusing conflict situations at an early stage before they have an opportunity to escalate to military violence. Not only is this explanatory logic consistent with the published findings on democracy and war, but it also entails the novel empirical proposition that disputes between democracies are more amenable than are other disputes to peaceful settlements, the hypothesis I examine here. Analyses of contemporary interstate disputes reveal that even when potentially confounding factors are controlled, democratic opponents are significantly more likely to reach peaceful settlements than other types of disputants.

Walrasian Marxism Once Again

John Roemer's comment (1992) succinctly summarizes the logical structure of his own theory of capitalist exploitation, but misunderstands the main points of our critique. He reduces his argument to two propositions. The first is an “empirical proposition”about the “root causes of exploitation”: X + Y →Z, where X is the existence of differential ownership of means of production (DOPA), Y is coercion in the labor process, and Z is the capitalist class structure and exploitation. The second is the strictly theoretical proposition X + not-Y -”Z, the truth of which he demonstrates, given most of the assumptions of a Walrasian economic model. He concludes that these two propositions, taken together, demonstrate the primacy of DOPA in explaining capitalist class relations. This much is true – subject to the various limitations we have indicated in our article – but only within the restricted confines of a Walrasian framework. This purely theoretical conclusion has no force as an empirical conclusion: this is the point at which Roemer's interpretation goes awry. For obviously, DOPA is a crucial element of empirical reality. But because Roemer's Walrasian framework precludes other equally crucial elements of empirical reality (which are also conceptually central to Marxian discourse), an irreducible distance remains therein between the theoretical and the empirical.

Out-Gunning Skepticism

Bredo C. Johnsen1 misconceives my strictures concerning acceptance of the following principle (where ‘p’ stands for any empirical proposition):(1) If A both knows that p and knows that p entails q, then A can come to know that q.Johnsen seems unaware that my criticism was intended to apply only after (1) is made to appear in its most plausible light; that is, only after its consequent is interpreted as: ’It is logically possible for A to know that q.’ Without this interpretation (1) might be dismissed simply on the grounds that A suffers from some physical or psychological disability that prevents him from drawing inferences from what he knows.Properly interpreted, (1) remains acceptable as long as the propositions substituted for p and q are such that it is at least logically possible for A to get evidence enough to make them known. Agreement on this point is itself enough to render Johnsen's own examples irrelevant. For instance, even though it may be physically impossible for A to get adequate evidence that in the constellation Andromeda there is a planet intermediate in size between Venus and Earth, the foregoing is still a fit substitution instance for q; but since such a q does not suffice to falsify the consequent of (1), it does nothing to generate any skeptical argument, either.

Is ‘There Are External Objects’ an Empirical Proposition?

Alice Ambrose once criticized Moore for treating the proposition ‘There are external objects’ as an empirical one. She said that those who denied that we could know this proposition to be true would not accept any evidence as going against their denial of it, and were not regarding the issue of its truth as empirical. She also maintained that one could not point out an external object in the way in which one could point out a dime or nickel and alleged on these grounds that saying that there are external objects is not the same sort of thing as saying that there are coins. The issue arose concerning Moore's paper, “Proof of an External World.“In “Reply to My Critics,” Moore pointed out that he had been concerned in “Proof of an External World” not to prove that we know that there are external objects, but rather to prove that there are external objects. But he applied Ambrose's remarks to that proposition. Moore rightly asserted that the fact that someone denies that there are external objects and treats all evidence as irrelevant to the issue does not show that the proposition he denies fails to be empirical.