The Cold War, 1945-1991: [v.1:] Leaders and other important figures in the United States and Western Europe

1993 ◽  
Vol 30 (10) ◽  
pp. 30-5327-30-5327
1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 145-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY HAWTHORN

Many expected that after the Cold War, there would be peace, order, increasing prosperity in expanding markets and the extension and eventual consolidation of civil and political rights. There would be a new world order, and it would in these ways be liberal. In international politics, the United States would be supreme. It would through security treaties command the peace in western Europe and east Asia; through its economic power command it in eastern Europe and Russia; through clients and its own domination command it in the Middle East; through tacit understanding command it in Latin America; and, in so far as any state could, command it in Africa also. It could choose whether to cooperate in the United Nations, and if it did not wish to do so, be confident that it would not be disablingly opposed by illiberal states. In the international markets, it would be able to maintain holdings of its bonds. In the international financial institutions, it would continue to be decisive in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; it would be an important influence in the regional development banks; and it would be powerful in what it was to insist in 1994 should be called the World (rather than Multinational) Trade Organisation. Other transactions in the markets, it is true, would be beyond the control of any state. But they would not be likely to conflict with the interests of the United States (and western Europe) in finance, investment and trade, and would discipline other governments.


Author(s):  
Andreas Etges

This chapter explores the role and experience of Western Europe in the Cold War. It explains that Western Europe is not a precise political or geographical entity, and that its role in the Cold War can only be understood in the context of its changing internal dynamics and changing relationship with the United States, the Soviet Union, and countries of Eastern Europe. The chapter argues that Western Europe both shaped and was shaped by Cold War in a political, economic, military, cultural, and ideological sense, and also considers the German question, Franco-German rapprochement and European integration, and military aspects of the Western alliance.


Author(s):  
Michael Mandelbaum

In the wake of the Cold War, both the United States and Western Europe had an unprecedentedly peaceful relationship with Russia. That relationship eventually ended, however, to be replaced by conflict, for two reasons. First was the unwise Western decision to expand the Western alliance, also known as NATO, to Russia’s borders despite having promised not to do so. Second were aggressive Russian policies toward its neighbouring countries. These measures were undertaken by President Vladimir Putin as a way of winning popular support for his dictatorial rule, which had begun to lose favor across the state due to its economic shortcomings.


1993 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phil Williams ◽  
Paul Hammond ◽  
Michael Brenner

2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 36-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leopoldo Nuti

Drawing on newly declassified U.S. and Italian documentation, this article as-sesses U.S. policy toward Italy under the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and uses this test case to draw some general conclusions about the nature of U.S. -Italian relations during the Cold War. The first part of the article focuses on issues that have been neglected or misinterpreted in the existing literature on the subject, and the second part presents some of the lessons that can be learned from the study of U.S. -Italian relations in the 1950s and 1960s. The aim is to cast broader light on the current debate about the role and influence of the United States in Western Europe after World War II.


2018 ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka

This chapter chronicles how the United States designed and adjusted its alliance commitments in Western Europe and East Asia during the first three decades of the Cold War (1949-1980). The purpose of this chapter is not only to introduce historical events to readers, but also to highlight key variation decision-makers implemented changes in American strategic posture and, by extension, the security guarantees provided to American allies. It covers how the United States expanded its commitments around the world early in the Cold War before contracting them by the late 1960s amid changes to the nuclear balance between it and the Soviet Union.


Author(s):  
Olof Kronvall

Relations between the British colonies in North America and the three Scandinavian countries—Norway, Denmark, and Sweden—predate American independence. Government-level interaction was rather limited until WWII, but cultural links emerged through the extensive settlement of Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish immigrants in mid- and later nineteenth-century America, especially in the American Midwest. During WWII, the United States and Norway became allies in 1941, Denmark became a de facto Allied nation in 1944, and Sweden remained formally neutral while becoming a non-belligerent on the Allied side in 1944–1945. By the end of the war, the United States emerged as a superpower. After initial disinterest, America strived to integrate Scandinavia into the US–led Western security system. Norway and Denmark became US allies and joined NATO as founding members in 1949. Sweden remained non-aligned, but formed close military ties to the United States in 1949–1952. Throughout the Cold War, US–Scandinavian relations were characterized by ambivalence. America and Scandinavia shared the perception of the Soviet Union as a threat and cooperated militarily, but the Scandinavian countries limited the cooperation in important respects. For example, Sweden never joined NATO, and Denmark and Norway did not allow foreign bases or nuclear weapons on their territories in peacetime. America was often frustrated with these limitations but nevertheless accepted them. The Scandinavian restrictions were partially founded on a desire to reduce the risk of a Soviet attack, but there were also fears of being controlled or dominated by the American superpower. Broader ideological factors also played a role. Mainstream Scandinavian attitudes to America, both among policymakers and the general public, ranged from strongly pro-American to highly skeptical. Americans and Scandinavians shared democratic values, but they organized their societies differently in important respects. Scandinavians were exposed to American ideas and products, of which they rejected some and accepted some. After the Cold War, US–Scandinavian relations were increasingly defined by issues outside Western Europe. Denmark abandoned its Cold War reservations toward America and aligned itself closely with the United States when it came to participation in expeditionary military operations. Norway and Sweden have also participated, but to a more limited extent than Denmark. For Sweden, cooperating closely and openly with the United States and NATO nevertheless contrasted with its non-aligned tradition and often conflicted Cold War relations with the United States. After the Russian invasion of Crimea, questions about territorial defense again became more prominent in US–Scandinavian relations. Under the Trump administration, US–Scandinavian relations have been characterized by turbulence and great uncertainty, even though cooperation continues in many areas.


1997 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 575-585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Thumann

The decay of Yugoslavia since 1990 has put an end to the experiment of a state of Southern Slavs. At the same time it has destroyed the myth of a peaceful and strong Western Europe. The continent that had displayed an impressive performance of cooperation and skillful diplomatic maneuvering during the last years of the Cold War proved to be incapable of coping with the problems in its southeastern backyard. In the beginning of the conflict, the European Community assumed responsibility for negotiating cease-fires and a peace settlement for the embattled Yugoslav states. But all efforts were fruitless. In 1995, it was primarily the interference of the United States that brought about the peace treaty of Dayton for Bosnia-Hercegovina.


2018 ◽  
pp. 27-54
Author(s):  
Aaron T. Hale-Dorrell

Under Khrushchev, advances in farming technology were inspired by processes observed in other industrial countries, especially the United States. Soviet leaders’ ideals led them to adapt to domestic circumstances practices developed under capitalism and to seek to export their more egalitarian version of those practices to newly independent postcolonial countries, examples of what scholars call the transfer mentality. As high modernists, Soviet leaders considered technologies value neutral and therefore applicable under any social and economic system. Reimagining the Cold War as an economic competition he expected to win, Khrushchev often vowed that his country was soon to use corn and modern farming to “catch up to and surpass America” in output of meat and milk. Given that mid-century farmers in the United States, Western Europe, and beyond raised productivity rapidly, Khrushchev’s belief in a similar revolution in productivity at home seems more rational than critics, contemporaries, and scholars have previously imagined.


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