Bayes's Theorem

Bayes' theorem is a tool for assessing how probable evidence makes some hypothesis. The papers in this book consider the worth and applicability of the theorem. The book sets out the philosophical issues: Elliott Sober argues that there are other criteria for assessing hypotheses; Colin Howson, Philip Dawid, and John Earman consider how the theorem can be used in statistical science, in weighing evidence in criminal trials, and in assessing evidence for the occurrence of miracles; and David Miller argues for the worth of the probability calculus as a tool for measuring propensities in nature rather than the strength of evidence. The book ends with the original paper containing the theorem, presented to the Royal Society in 1763.

Author(s):  
Janet L. Peacock ◽  
Philip J. Peacock

Analysis of variance See One-way analysis of variance (p. 280) and Two-way analysis of variance (p. 412) Bayes’s theorem A formula that allows the reversal of conditional probabilities (see Bayes’ theorem, p. 234) Bayesian statistics A statistical approach based on Bayes’ theorem, where prior information or beliefs are combined with new data to provide estimates of unknown parameters (see ...


Biometrika ◽  
1962 ◽  
Vol 49 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 419 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. E. P. Box ◽  
G. C. Tiao

2021 ◽  
pp. 249-264
Author(s):  
Andrew C. A. Elliott

Courts of law must weigh evidence to determine the likelihood of competing interpretations of past events, and different legal contexts require different standards of proof, but this falls short of a quantification of probability. Bayes’s theorem and the associated formula provide a way of combining multiple elements of evidence and using them to refine prior assessments of probability. The prosecutor’s fallacy involves an incorrect reversal of the logic of evidence. The ecological fallacy involves incorrectly attributing proportions derived from large groups to smaller groups or individuals.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Modis

1979 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 985-988 ◽  
Author(s):  
H J van der Helm ◽  
E A Hische

Abstract The diagnostic implication of a certain test result with regard to a certain condition can be expressed as a single number, L, the likelihood ratio of this result. This ratio allows Bayes's theorem to be written in a convenient form. We show that the practice of calculating predictive values for the results of quantitative tests by use of discrimination limits leads to incorrect predictive values. Including L values in laboratory reports seems a more logical approach to optimum interpretation of laboratory results than the use of discrimination values.


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