The current constitutional reform in Serbia, with reference to the legislative power

This article traces California's constitutional development from 1849 through 1911, examining how and why California's constitution developed into a quasi-legislative document that constitutionalized policies involving corporations, banks, railroads, taxes, and other economic relationships, thereby limiting the power of the legislature. I argue that drafters of California's constitutions deliberately curtailed legislative power and transformed class issues into constitutional ones. California's experience was consistent with state constitutional developments throughout the United States, especially in the West. Advocates of constitutional reform saw state legislatures as corrupt captives of "capitalists" and other "special interests" that could not to be trusted to serve the people's interests. These issues permeated debates over constitutional reform in California and other states from the 1840s through the initial decades of the twentieth century, leading to the adoption of the initiative and referendum.

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THE PROGRESSIVE ORIGINS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: WILSON, GOODNOW, AND LANDIS

Social Philosophy and Policy ◽

10.1017/s0265052507070021 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 24 (1) ◽

pp. 16-54 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

Ronald J. Pestritto

Keyword(s):

New Deal ◽

Separation Of Powers ◽

Constitutional Reform ◽

Administrative State ◽

Woodrow Wilson ◽

Legislative Power ◽

Bureaucratic Agencies ◽

Franklin Roosevelt ◽

The New Deal

The American administrative state is a feature of the new liberalism that is largely irreconcilable with the old, founding-era liberalism. At its core, the administrative state, with its delegation of legislative power to the bureaucracy, combination of functions within bureaucratic agencies, and weakening of presidential control over administration undercuts the separation-of-powers principle that is the base of the founders' Constitution. The animating idea behind the features of the administrative state is the separation of politics and administration, which was championed by James Landis, the New-Deal architect of the administrative state for President Franklin Roosevelt. The idea of separating politics and administration, and the faith such a separation requires in the objectivity of administrators, did not originate with Landis or the New Deal but, instead, with the Progressives who had come a generation earlier. Both Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow were pioneers in advocating the separation of politics and administration, and made it the centerpiece of their broad arguments for constitutional reform.

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The Legitimacy of Provisional General Budget Laws in the Jordanian Legal System

Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law Online ◽

10.1163/9789004283688_006 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 17 (1) ◽

pp. 141-195

Author(s):

Lena Shabeeb

Keyword(s):

Legal System ◽

Separation Of Powers ◽

Constitutional Reform ◽

Executive Power ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

Checks And Balances ◽

Legislative Power ◽

The Future

This study examines the legitimacy of the recurrent conduct, adopted by the Jordanian Executive Power, of issuing Provisional General Budget Laws, in the absence of the Legislative Power. This study proves the unconstitutionality of such conduct, and looks at the prospects of progress in the future. Issuing Provisional General Budget Laws is a culmination of several misconceptions of some important Constitutional Articles; especially the ones that reflect how the principle of separation of powers is adopted in the Jordanian Constitution, and how the different interlocking functions of both the Executive and the Legislative Powers should be interpreted and applied. Article 94, providing for the legislative function of the Executive Power in the absence of the Legislative Power, is interpreted and applied broadly. Issuing Provisional General Budget Laws mean that the Executive Power assumes the legislative Power and not a temporary legislative role, as provided in the Constitution. Hence, contradicting another two important systems provided therein: first, the financial check, as part of the checks and balances system, provided in Chapter Eight, especially Article 112. Second, the apportionment method, provided in Article 113, which should be applied in the absence of the Legislator. Unfortunately, the 2011 Constitutional Reform, although somewhat progressive, does not remove such well-rooted misconceptions; leaving the Constitutional Court as the last resort in rectifying the situation.

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Sieyès via Rousseau

Constituent Power and the Law ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198785989.003.0003 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 56-76

Author(s):

Joel Colón-Ríos

Keyword(s):

French Revolution ◽

Constitutional Reform ◽

General Will ◽

Constituent Power ◽

Legislative Power ◽

The Third ◽

The Creation ◽

Law Making ◽

Legal Force

This chapter traces the gradual emergence of the distinction between the constituted and the constituent power in the work of Sieyès, using Rousseau as the main source of comparison. It examines how Sieyès constructed constituent power as an extra-legal force and identifies the key juridical implications of his views. Part I briefly considers some uses of the term ‘constituent power’ before Sieyès and outside the context of the French Revolution. Part II examines Sieyès’ early pamphlets, where he puts forward his initial understanding of the power to be exercised by the nation’s representatives in the Estates-General. This approach, it will be seen in Part III, led him to propose the creation of a supreme constitution that ensured that the (representative) law-making power acted consistently with the general will. Part IV of the chapter focuses on Sieyès’ main published work, What is the Third Estate?, which contains a more developed formulation of the distinction between constituent and constituted power, as well as about the nature of representation. In that work, one can also see a transformation of Sieyès’ conception of the legislative power, one that brought him further than ever away from Rousseau. Finally, the chapter considers the role of extra-ordinary representatives in Sieyès’ conception of constitution-making and constitutional reform.

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ANSWER TO FOUR QUESTIONS ON THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS

E-Legis - Revista Eletrônica do Programa de Pós-Graduação da Câmara dos Deputados ◽

10.51206/e-legis.v13i33.619 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 13 (33) ◽

pp. 277-289

Author(s):

Thomas Paine

Keyword(s):

Constitutional Reform ◽

Constituent Power ◽

Thomas Paine ◽

Legislative Power ◽

Institutional Organization ◽

The Revolution

Thomas Paine, answering, supposedly, to Condorcet, about institutional definitions proposed to French Constitution, after the Revolution. He deals with themes as division and balance of powers; constitutional control; Legislature institutional organization; hereditary monarchy; constituent power and legislative power; constitutional reform.

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