scholarly journals De la ‘libertad informática’ a la constitucionalización de nuevos derechos digitales (1978-2018) // From «computing freedom» towards the constitutionalization of new digital rights (1978-2018).

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artemi Rallo Lombarte
Keyword(s):  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Digital Age ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Contemporary Society ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Digital Rights ◽  
European Directive ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
New Framework

Resumen:La referencia a la informática en la Constitución de 1978 reconoció trascendencia constitucional a la necesidad de protección del individuo frente a los riegos derivados de los avances tecnológicos. Cuatro décadas después, la sociedad contemporánea afronta el reto de constitucionalizar nuevos derechos digitales. En España, sendas leyes (LORTAD y LOPD) desarrollaron el precepto constitucional que consagra la garantía de los derechos frente al uso de la informática. Para preservar a los individuos frente a los riesgos y amenazas de latecnología, el Tribunal Constitución dedujo del artículo 18.4 CE un derecho fundamental autónomo a la protección de datos personales. Las leyes españolas de protección de datos son el resultado de la obligación de cumplir compromisos internacionales (Convenio 108 del Consejo de Europa de 1981) y europeos (Directiva 95/46, artículo 8 de la CDFUE 41 y Reglamento UE 2016/679). Sin embargo, el reconocimiento constitucional o europeo, legal o constitucional, del derecho fundamental a la protección de datos no agota la necesidad de establecer un nuevo marco de protección de los ciudadanos en la era digitalen el que se reconozcan nuevos derechos digitales.SummaryI. Introduction. II. The misleading constitutionalization of «computing ». III. Convention 108 of the council of europe (1981). IV. Data protection right as an autonomous fundamental right. V. LORTAD (1992), LOPD (1999) and its reform. VI. The europeanization of data protection right: Directive 95/46, art. 8 CDFUE and regulation EU 2016/679. VII. Towards the constitutionalization of new digital rights.Abstract:The reference to computing in the Spanish Constitution (1978) recognized constitutional significance to the need for protection against the technological risks. Four decades later, the contemporary society faces the challenge of constitutionalising new digital rights. In Spain, two laws (LOPD and LORTAD) developed the constitutional article that enshrined the guarantee of rights against the use of computers. The Constitutional Court inferred from article 18.4 CE an autonomous fundamental right to the protection of personal data. Spanish data protection laws are the result of the obligation to comply withinternational (Convention 108 of the Council of Europe from 1981) and European (Directive 95/46, article 8 of the CDFUE and Regulation EU 2016/679) commitments. However, the European, legal or constitutional, recognition of the fundamental right to data protection does not exclude the need to establish a new framework for the protection of citizens in the digital age in which new digital rights should be recognized.

scholarly journals El reto de la ordenación del derecho fundamental a la protección de datos de carácter personal en un universo digital = A regulatory challenge to the fundamental right of the personal data protection in a digital universe

2018 ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
María del Pilar Zapatero Martín
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
European Regulation ◽  
Personal Data Protection ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
Regulatory Challenge

RESUMEN: En la era de las tecnologías digitales, el Derecho se enfrenta al objetivo de afrontar la protección de los datos personales en un universo global donde las fronteras se diluyen y el principio de territorialidad ha dejado de tener aplicación. Este trabajo pretende plantear el reto que supone, para el ordenamiento jurídico español, la adaptación a la nueva regulación europea en esta materia.ABSTRACT: At the digital´s technologies age, Law faces with the aim to address the personal data protection in a global universe where blurring the borders, and the territoriality principle has ceased to be applied. This paper aims to poset he challenge that supposes, to the Spanish legal system, the adaptation to the new European Union regulation on this matter.PALABRAS CLAVE: universo digital, protección de datos personales, reglamento europeo, constitución española, conflictos de competenciaKEYWORDS: digital universe, personal data protection, european regulation, spanish constitution, competence´s conflicts

scholarly journals Public administration’s challenges in order to guarantee the fundamental right of personal data protection in the post-COVID-19 era

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-192
Author(s):  
José Luis Dominguez Alvarez
Keyword(s):  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Health Data ◽  
Essential Elements ◽  
Economic Changes ◽  
Digital Rights ◽  
Personal Data Protection ◽  
Health Authorities ◽  
Technological Tools ◽  
Harmful Effects

The irruption of COVID-19 has led to a multitude of deep-seated transformations, which go beyond the purely sanitary sphere, leading to major socio-economic changes, among which the evolution of traditional forms of administrative intervention or the empowerment and/or acceleration of the advances derived from the digital (re)volution stand out for their extraordinary importance. Thereby, in recent months we have witnessed the implementation of numerous initiatives aimed to alleviate the harmful effects of the pandemic by developing technological tools based on processing categories of specially protected personal data, such as health data, which raises important questions from the perspective of privacy and digital rights. The aim of this study is to carry out a detailed analysis of some essential elements, necessary to achieve the difficult balance between the promotion of technological instruments that contribute to control the effects of COVID-19 increasing the resources available to health authorities, and safeguarding the fundamental right of personal data protection.

Generalklauseln im Datenschutzrecht

2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Nikolaus Marsch ◽  
Timo Rademacher
Keyword(s):  
Data Processing ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Sensitive Data ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Public Purpose ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Data Protection Law ◽  
High Degree

German data protection laws all provide for provisions that allow public authorities to process personal data whenever this is ‘necessary’ for the respective authority to fulfil its tasks or, in the case of sensitive data in the meaning of art. 9 GDPR, if this is ‘absolutely necessary’. Therewith, in theory, data protection law provides for a high degree of administrative flexibility, e. g. to cope with unforeseen situations like the Coronavirus pandemic. However, these provisions, referred to in German doctrine as ‘Generalklauseln’ (general clauses or ‘catch-all’-provisions in English), are hardly used, as legal orthodoxy assumes that they are too vague to form a sufficiently clear legal basis for public purpose processing under the strict terms of the German fundamental right to informational self-determination (art. 2‍(1), 1‍(1) German Basic Law). As this orthodoxy appears to be supported by case law of the German Constitutional Court, legislators have dutifully reacted by creating a plethora of sector specific laws and provisions to enable data processing by public authorities. As a consequence, German administrative data protection law has become highly detailed and confusing, even for legal experts, therewith betraying the very purpose of legal clarity and foreseeability that scholars intended to foster by requiring ever more detailed legal bases. In our paper, we examine the reasons that underlie the German ‘ban’ on using the ‘Generalklauseln’. We conclude that the reasons do not justify the ban in general, but only in specific areas and/or processing situations such as security and criminal law. Finally, we list several arguments that do speak in favour of a more ‘daring’ approach when it comes to using the ‘Generalklauseln’ for public purpose data processing.

scholarly journals SEARCH ENGINES IN COLOMBIA

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Sarah Osma Peralta
Keyword(s):  
Data Protection ◽  
Search Engines ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Online Search ◽  
Local Data ◽  
Personal Data Protection

Purpose ”“ Considering the relevance of personal data protection, this article focuses on the identification of the criteria used by Colombian Courts regarding the rights to access, modification and erasure personal data within the context of information made available through search engines. This framework will expose the different cases ruled by the Colombian Constitutional Court as it attempts to highlight which were the criteria used by the courts that brought them to rule that search engines are mere intermediaries between the content makers and data subjects. Finally, this study aims to contribute not only to the data protection legal literature in Colombia, but also, to improve the possibilities to effectively implement user´s rights of online search engines in Colombia. Methodology ”“In order to achieve the purpose of this research project, the following methodological strategies will be employed: (i) Legal-analytical study, by way of reviewing the Colombian regulatory framework in order to map out main rules regarding the fundamental rights to access, modification and erasure of personal data, and determining which ones are the aspects hindering the effective implementation of the rights; (ii) Legal-theoretical study, where it reviews the issues identified by legal scholars as hampering the implementation of data protection rights in general; (iii) Legal-empirical study that aims to raise awareness regarding the incidence of the activities carried out by search engines in the life of data subjects. Findings ”“ The Colombian Constitutional Court has seen search engines as mere intermediaries, meaning they do not have to rectify, correct, eliminate or complete the information listed in the results they provide. This approach demands that the Judiciary enforces the existence of a right to request the erasure of links and the need of procedures provided by them to do it effectively without erasing or altering the content of the website. This delisting process should not be arbitrary based on conditions that allow data subjects to ask the erasure of links associated with their names. In the European Union, the conditions to get those results delisted are inadequacy, irrelevance, or excessiveness in relation to the processing purposes. The current position of the Constitutional Court about the search engines role and their responsibilities has not protected the user’s fundamental rights to privacy, reputation, and honor. Therefore, a more committed study on behalf of the Court is required. Practical Implications ”“ In the Muebles Caquetá Case, the Court must point out the importance of the activities carried out by online search engines, and force them to face the implications of being a “controller” of the processing of personal data that takes place within their services. I suggest that the Court itself should draft clear delisting guidelines considering the opinions of a group of impartial experts, civil society representatives and the local Data Protection Authority. Originality ”“ Considering the implications posed by personal data and data mining, this article identifies the legal and regulatory framework surrounding those activities and in way contribute to create a data protection culture in Latin America, raise awareness regarding the incidence of search engines in the life of data rights holders, identify possible disconnections between the existent regulatory framework for personal data rights, and facilitate the cooperation between Courts and stakeholders of the telecommunication and media sectors, based on the common goal of fulfilling the public interests of ensuring data protection rights.

scholarly journals ¿También los extranjeros son iguales ante la ley?

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosario Mora Alemañy
Keyword(s):  
Personal Data ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Data Section ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
The Law

«Los españoles son iguales ante la ley» (art. 14 CE). La recentísima STC 17/2013 señala que «los extranjeros gozan en España del derecho fundamental derivado del artículo 18.4 CE en las mismas condiciones que los españoles»; pero, como señala el voto particular del Magistrado Pérez Tremps, al que se unen otros tres magistrados, la regulación avalada por el Tribunal Constitucional en esta sentencia «pone de manifiesto una notable limitación del contenido esencial del derecho fundamental a la protección de los datos personales (art. 18.4) que, por afectar sólo a personas de origen extranjero, lleva a la conclusión de que los extranjeros ya no gozan en España del derecho fundamental derivado del artículo 18.4 CE en las mismas condiciones que los españoles». Esta sentencia, pues, invita a precisar el alcance con el que la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional reconoce la igualdad también para los extranjeros.«Spaniards are equal before the law» (section 14 of the Spanish Constitution). The latest Constitutional Court ruling states that «aliens in Spain have the fundamental right set by section 18.4 of the Spanish Constitution under the same conditions that Spanish citizens». But the dissenting vote of the senior judge Pérez Tremps, joined by other three judges, appoints that the guidelines backed up by the Constitutional Court in this ruling «show a great restriction of the essential subject of the fundamental right about the protection of personal data (section 18.4). Because only alien citizens are affected by this ruling, it is concluded that alien citizens in Spain enjoy no more the fundamental right set by section 18.4 under the same conditions that Spanish citizens». This ruling invites to specify the extent with which Constitutional Court case law acknowledges equality for aliens, too.

scholarly journals LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DATOS PERSONALES EN EL SISTEMA DE REPORTE DE CRÉDITOS PERUANO

2019 ◽  
pp. 73-94
Author(s):  
RAÚL VÁSQUEZ RODRÍGUEZ
Keyword(s):  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Personal Credit ◽  
Personal Data Protection ◽  
Credit Risks ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Private Center ◽  
The Law ◽  
Credit Data

Este trabajo analiza la interacción entre el tratamiento de información crediticia de las personas naturales a cargo de las centrales de riesgo, debido a su importancia para los agentes de mercado, y el derecho fundamental a la protección de los datos personales, profundizando en el trasfondo constitucional de los derechos involucrados, en las interpretaciones del Tribunal Constitucional y en la compatibilidad de objetivos respecto de la privacidad y la confidencialidad que existe entre la Ley N.° 27489, Ley que regula las Centrales Privadas de Información de Riesgos y de Protección al Titular de la Información y la Ley N.° 29733, Ley de Protección de Datos Personales y su reglamento; interacción analizada por la Autoridad Nacional de Protección de Datos Personales en sus resoluciones directorales. This work researchs the interaction between the personal credit data processing of natural people in charge of the Credit Risks Agencies, because of its relevance for stakeholders and the fundamental right for the personal data protection, deepening in the constitutional background of the involved rights, in the Constitutional Court statements and the compatibility whith the privacy and confidentiality targets that exists between the Law N.° 27489, which regulates the Credit Risk Information Private Center and the Data Holder Protection Act, and the Law N.° 29733, law for the Personal Data Protection and its rulement; which is analyzed by Personal Data Protection Agency in its directoral judgments.

DIGITAL RIGHTS — NEW GENERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS?

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 141-167
Author(s):  
NATALIA V. VARLAMOVA
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Right To Privacy ◽  
Digital Rights ◽  
Personal Data Protection ◽  
The Right To Privacy ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
The Right

Among the digital rights, besides the right for internet access that was the subject of consideration in the first part of the article, there are also a right to per-so nal data protection and a right to be forgotten (right to erasure).The right to personal data protection is usually enshrined at the supranational and national levels and is protected by the courts as an aspect of the right to privacy. As an independent fundamental right of a constitutional nature the right to personal data protection is enshrined in EU law. Nevertheless, all attempts to doctrinally justify the existence of certain aspects of this right, beyond the claims to the right to privacy, can not be considered successful. The Court of Justice of the EU, while dealing with the relevant cases in order to determine whether certain methods of processing personal data are legitimate, also refers to the right to privacy, considering these rights to be closely interrelated. The right to personal data protection provides additional (including procedural) guarantees of respect for privacy, human dignity and some other rights, but the purpose of these guarantees is precisely the content of the providing rights. The right to be forgotten (right to erasure) is one of the positive obligations with regard to the personal data protection. This right implies correction, deletion or termination of the processing of personal data at the request of their subject in the presence of a reason for this (when the relevant actions are carried out in violation of the principles of data processing or provisions of the legislation). Analogs of this right are the Latin American orders of habeas data, as well as the right of a person to demand the refutation of information discrediting his honor, dignity and business reputation, in case of their inconsistency with reality under civil law and the legislation on mass media. In digital age the importance of this right is increased by the fact that information posted on the Internet remains easily accessible for an indefinite, almost unlimited, time.This caused the extension of the right to be forgotten to information that is consistent to reality, but has lost its relevance and significance, however, continues to have an adverse impact on the reputation of the person concerned. At the same time, the realization of the right to be forgotten in respect of information posted online is connected with a number of technical problems that require legal solutions.In general, digitalization does not create new human rights of a fundamentally different legal nature. It only actualizes or smooths certain aspects of long-recognized rights, transfers their operation into the virtual space, creates new opportunities for their realization and generates new threats to them. Ensuring human rights in modern conditions involves the search for adequate legal solutions, taking into account the opportunities and limitations generated by digital technologies.

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