Algorithmenkompatibles Verwaltungsrecht?

Die Übersetzung von Recht in (Computer–)‌Code ist derzeit in aller Munde. Lawrence Lessigs berühmtes Diktum, „Code is Law“ wird neuerdings dahingehend reformuliert, dass „Law“ auch „Code“ sei, dass man bei der Rechtsetzung also zugleich seine rechentechnische Umsetzbarkeit mitzudenken habe. Einen Ansatzpunkt für eine derartige „Algorithmisierbarkeit“ von Recht bietet § 35a des Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetzes des Bundes, wonach „automatisierte“ Entscheidungen in bestimmten Fällen zugelassen werden. Ein aktuelles Papier des Fraunhofer FOKUS-Instituts unter dem Titel „Recht Digital“ denkt dieses weiter und suggeriert, man müsse nur die passenden, eindeutigen Ausdrücke finden, dann sei Recht gleichsam „programmierbar“. Aber genau hier stellt sich das Problem: Rechtssprache ist eine Multi-Adressaten-Sprache, also eine Sprache, die sich ebenso sehr an ein Fachpublikum wie an Laien (Bürgerinnen und Bürger) wendet. Sie ist zudem kontextabhängig. Der aktuelle Hype um den Begriff der „Algorithmisierung“ von Gesetzen verbirgt zudem, dass es sich hierbei um ein Grundproblem von Rechtssprache handelt, das in den 1960er bis 1980er Jahren unter den Paradigmata „Rechts-/Verwaltungsautomation“ oder Rechtskybernetik verhandelt wurde. Wie kann man sich also dem Problem der Kontextabhängigkeit von Recht unter dem neuen Paradigma der Algorithmisierung nähern? Im Beitrag über „Algorithmenkompatibles Verwaltungsrecht? Juristische und sprachwissenschaftliche Überlegungen zu einer ‚Standardisierung von Rechtsbegriffen‘“ werden verschiedene Zugänge zur Schaffung einer „algorithmenkonformen“ Rechtssprache vorgestellt. Letztlich aber vermögen es noch so ausgefeilte technische Methoden nicht, das Problem demokratischer Deliberation zu verdrängen – über die fundamentalen Fragen einer Algorithmisierung der Rechtssprache muss der unmittelbar demokratisch legitimierte Gesetzgeber entscheiden. „Kontext“ und „Text“ geraten insoweit in ein wechselseitiges Abhängigkeitsverhältnis. The translation of law into (computer) code seems to be currently on everyone’s lips. Lawrence Lessigs’ famous dictum “Code is Law” has recently been rephrased saying that “Law” was also “Code”. This means that the wording of laws should directly take their “computer implementability” into consideration. A starting point for those postulations can be seen in the (relatively) new section 35a of the (Federal) Administrative Prodecure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz), which allows “automatic” decisions in specific cases. A new paper of the Fraunhofer FOKUS institute takes this up and suggests that we have only to look for the appropriate, unambiguous term that corresponds with an unequivocal legal meaning. In doing so, law could be programmable. But this is exactly the point where the problem arises: laws have more than one addressee; they address lawyers as well as citizens (mostly laypeople). Furthermore, legal terminology is context dependent. The current hype regarding the “algorithmization” of legal terminology also hides the fact that this issue was – more or less – discussed once before under the paradigm “legal cybernetics” between 1960 and 1985. So how can we approach the problem of context-dependency of law under the new paradigm of algorithmization? In our contribution on “Algorithm-compatible administrative law? Legal and linguistic considerations concerning the ‘standardization’ of legal terminology”, we will introduce different approaches to safeguard the compatibility of law with computer technics. But how sophisticated a technical method can be: It is the democratically legitimised parliament that must make the fundamental decisions when it comes to an “algorithmization” of legal terminology, because there is no text without context.

Die Präventionswirkung des Staatshaftungsrechts

This contribution addresses the question of whether and to what extent state liability law has a preventive effect. The question focuses on whether the (mere) existence of claims under state liability law creates an incentive to prevent unlawful actions against citizens. Cases in which an incentive is created for an individual public official (individual preventive effect) are differentiated from those in which an incentive is created for the state as an organisation (organisational preventive effect). Based on an economic analysis of law, the article demonstrates – in abstract terms and detached from concrete bases for claims – that both effects can occur: On the one hand, liability claims can prevent public officials from deliberately making unlawful decisions and as well as increase the diligence and so the probability of a lawful decision. On the other hand, liability claims can influence an organisation in the state sector in such a way that those responsible strive to ensure lawful decisions by means of the improved structuring and scrutiny of the decision-making process. To establish the specific preventive effect of an individual claim under (German) state liability law, it is necessary to consider its specific structure. The allocation of liability and the possibility of an internal recourse determine whether the preventive effect achieved is (more) an individual or an organisational one. The decisive criteria for the intensity of the preventive effect include the type, extent, degree of collectivisation, and limitations of the liability claim as well as its enforceability. Regardless of the necessary differentiation, it may be concluded that the claims of German state liability law emphasise an organisational preventive effect. While they implement the preventive effect to some extent overall, they do not fully do so. There are viable reasons for this restraint, considering the at times contrary objective of an efficiently acting administration. As a result, as this contribution concludes, from a legal policy perspective, a preventive effect also depends on considering additions and alternatives to state liability law.

Kollegialentscheidungen unter Zeitdruck

Collegial bodies can react to time pressure either by speeding up their procedure or by transferring urgent decisions to a special organ which can decide very quickly. In Germany, the representative bodies of local government have both options. This article examines decisions of urgency taken by a special organ of local government. This article analyses the circumstances in which such decisions are taken based on the relevant literature as well as on self-collected data from cities in North Rhine Westphalia. The results can be put into five categories. Although the relevant Länder laws vary at the level of detail, they are united by a common structure. They determine that a decision is urgent only when the representative body – even applying an accelerated procedure – cannot decide in time. They set out which organ is legally competent to decide and require that the representative body of local government either approves the decision in retrospect or is, at least, informed of it. According to these regulations the decision of urgency is always concomitant with a decision on the legal competency of the special organ and on the administrative matter at hand. Their application raises numerous legal questions. In the majority of cases, decisions of urgency are taken in violation of the legal requirement, even though the representative body could have taken the decision by applying an accelerated procedure. From the perspective of those involved calling a special meeting takes too much time and effort to decide on an issue which is, in most cases, completely uncontested. Currently, a correction of this unlawful practice by legal means virtually impossible. It is, therefore, suggested that each member of the representative body should be given standing to bring a claim for judicial review. In terms of legal policy, urgent decisions should to be allowed also when the representative body cannot decide in time at the next regular meeting.

Urbane (Un–)Ordnung

Historically, the European city was mixed (in terms of its use) and dense (in terms of its building structure). With the rising popularity of the body metaphor, the idea of a spatial separation of uses spread. John of Salisbury famously postulated that, just like the body, the city should be separated according to its different functions. The different body parts were connected through veins and arteries, in which traffic, air and water circulated. This corporeal ideal of city planning through separation and circulation reached its zenith in the 1933 Athens Charter that was heavily influenced by Le Corbusier. According to his blueprint, living should be desuburbanised so as to enable a strict separation of living, working and leisure. The German Federal Land Utilisation Ordinance (Baunutzungsverordnung – BauNVO) from 1962 was based on this ideal of the separation of uses. As a second pillar, it aimed at the reduction of density. The specific land-use areas defined in the BauNVO established city spaces reserved to functionally defined uses such as living and working. This spatial model came under pressure almost with its implementation. From the very first amendment in 1968 onwards, the separation of uses was softened in favour of mixed-use areas. At the same time, density was increased. In four substantial amendments (1968, 1977, 1990 and 2017), the ideal of a functionally structured city was slowly abandoned; not by name (the BauNVO still distinguishes functionally specific land-use areas), but in fact, because the functional description of the areas was successively extended to comprehend ever more (different) uses. In 2017, a new mixed-use area was introduced into the BauNVO (the so-called urban area) and in 2021 another mixed-use area (the so-called rural living area) is projected to follow. This development has consequences, most notably regarding the system of legal protection. With the decreasing relevance of specific and specifiable land-use areas, the individual and the disturbances it is subjected to become the main focus of legal protection. Thus, the right to mutual consideration slowly replaces the right of the inhabitant of a functionally separated area that the area’s character be maintained.

Rechtsfragen beamtenrechtlicher Bewährungszeiten im Prozess moderner Personalentwicklung

Based on examples of current administrative court decisions, this paper examines the admissibility of civil-service qualifying periods as an integral element of personnel development within the meaning of Section 46 of the Federal Civil Service Career Regulation (BLV), as well as of comparable federal-state regulations. This involves a dogmatic distinction from common concepts in public service law such as waiting periods, fixed assignment durations or seniority. The legal bases underlying civil-service qualifying times, i. e. the principles of performance and career progression within the meaning of Article 33‍(2) and Article 5 of the German constitution (Basic Law), are examined in detail in terms of their subjective and objective essence and weighed against other constitutional rights. In conclusion, a case is made for a critical review of “arbitrary” time parameters determined by administrative courts regarding qualification in a civil-service career.

Buchbesprechungen

Krönke, Christoph, Öffentliches Digitalwirtschaftsrecht. Grundlagen – Herausforderungen und Konzepte – Perspektiven, Jus Publicum, Band 295, Tübingen 2020, Mohr Siebeck. XXVII und 733 S. (Kai von Lewinski, Passau) Herold, Viktoria, Demokratische Legitimation automatisiert erlassener Verwaltungsakte. Schriften zum Öffentlichen Recht, Band 1423. Berlin 2020, Duncker & Humblot. 312 S. (Ariane Berger, Berlin) Kjellsson, Rabea, Das Zwangsmittel der Ersatzvornahme. Vollstreckung, Kosten, Haftung. Schriften zum Öffentlichen Recht, Band 1414. Berlin 2019, Duncker & Humblot. 590 S. (Markus Thiel, Münster)