scholarly journals Un résumé des lignes de force du système monétaire international actuel

2009 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-17
Author(s):  
Vély Leroy
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
Present Situation ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Special Drawing ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

In this paper the author outlines the forces underlying the present international monetary system. Since creation, in Bretton Woods, of the International Monetary Fund, two important amendments have been brought to the statutes of this institution. First, in July 1969, a Special Drawing mechanism was created; second, following the April 1978 amendment, the Special Drawing Right system is no longer based on gold. The fundamental reasons for this evolution and the problems raised by the present situation are emphasized.

The “Sanctions” of the International Monetary Fund

1972 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 737-762 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Gold
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Structure ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Special Drawing ◽  
Third Stage ◽  
Special Drawing Rights ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

Recent events in the international monetary system culminating in the decision of the United States, announced on August 15, 1971, to suspend the convertibility of the dollar induce the international lawyer to ask once again what contribution sanctions can make to respect for international law and the effectiveness of multilateral treaties. This question has been a practical problem at two stages in the development of the International Monetary Fund. It arose first during the negotiation and drafting of the original Articles of Agreement which were adopted at the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944. The second stage was the negotiation and drafting of the amendment of July 28, 1969, which dealt mainly with the legal structure of special drawing rights as a supplement to existing reserve assets. It is now apparent that there will be a third stage, in which a reform of the international monetary system, perhaps in some of its most fundamental aspects, will lead to a further amendment of the Fund's charter.

International monetary fund after the financial crises of the 1990s

2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiří Jonáš
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
Proper Role ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Policy Strategies ◽  
The International Monetary Fund ◽  
The Imf

In this article, I would first discuss briefly what we know about the causes of the recent financial crises, and whether the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could have done more to prevent them. I will explain what policy strategies the IMF recommended to resolve these crises, why it recommended these policies, and to what extent is the criticism of these recommendations justified. In the second part, I will discuss the lessons which the IMF has drawn from these crises. I will explain how the experience of recent years has changed the thinking about the proper role of the IMF in supporting stable international monetary system. I will focus on two broad areas of changes in the activity of the IMF. First, on measures that are being taken to make the repetition of financial crises less likely; second, on measures to be applied if the prevention fails and if a financial crisis strikes again.

scholarly journals The special drawing right: a formal critic to the dollar dominance in the international monetary system

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 401-416
Author(s):  
ALINE REGINA ALVES MARTINS
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
The United States ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Special Drawing ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT In the late-1960’s, international discussions over a possible reform of the international monetary system originated the Special Drawing Right (SDR). While they had been created initially to represent an additional asset to complement the existing reserves of U.S. dollars and gold, after the crisis of the Bretton Woods system the SDR was considered a possible substitute of the U.S. dollar. Relying on a consolidated literature, this article aims at demonstrating that the origins of the SDR were not the exclusive result of technical financial negotiations, but of the convergence of higher political interests against the United States and the dollar dominance.

Hollowing out Keynesian norms: how the search for a technical fix undermined the Bretton Woods regime

2004 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Best
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary System ◽  
Data Gathering ◽  
Reliable Data ◽  
Public Intervention ◽  
Financial Architecture ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Monetary Order ◽  
First Time ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

After a decade of financial crises, international economic leaders have begun to talk about the need for reform. Yet, while they speak in dramatic terms of a ‘new financial architecture’, in practice, they seem more interested in more limited renovations to the international monetary system. Arguing that ‘A lack of reliable data . . . was critical to [recent] crises’, the International Monetary Fund has, for example, emphasised the importance of better data-gathering systems and greater surveillance. By defining the cause of the crises as informational rather than systemic, Fund leaders thus justify a limited solution: in Michel Camdessus' words, what is needed is ‘no new machinery, no new heavy public intervention’, but rather a series of limited technical fixes. This is not the first time that international financial leaders have succumbed to the seduction of technique. Four decades ago, as the Bretton Woods system struggled through an escalating series of monetary crises, state and global policymakers chose a similar path of technical expediency, opting for limited reforms. As we now know, those strategies ultimately proved to be inadequate to the task of rescuing the postwar monetary order. In this article, I revisit that regime and its collapse, examining the roots of the contemporary search for technical fixes.

Hegemons, IOs, and markets: the case of the substitution account

1984 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 661-683 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanne Gowa
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary System ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Economy ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Special Drawing ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Special Drawing Rights ◽  
Hegemonic Stability ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

For eighteen months between 1978 and 1980, the International Monetary Fund and IMF members attempted to reform the international monetary system by establishing a substitution account. Designed to enhance the stability of the monetary system, the proposed substitution account would have accepted dollar deposits from foreign central banks, in return issuing certificates denominated in special drawing rights. The collapse of negotiations about the account in early 1980 confirms the hypothesis of hegemonic stability theorists that the distribution of systemic costs is problematic in the absence of a hegemonic power. The case thereby qualifies recent assertions that a small group of nations can supply stability to the international economy. However, two factors outside the realm of hegemonic theory also helped produce the outcome of the negotiations: the division of power within the United States between Congress and the Executive, and changes in international market conditions during 1979 and early 1980.

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