Social Security Disability Application Experiences of People With Multiple Sclerosis in the United States

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa I. Iezzoni ◽  
Long Ngo ◽  
R. Philip Kinkel

Studies suggest that more than half of working-age Americans with multiple sclerosis (MS) are unemployed because of their health. Many turn to public disability insurance for income support, applying through the Social Security Administration for either Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), which provides benefits to formerly employed people, or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which supports impoverished individuals. Anecdotal reports suggest that many patients with MS face considerable problems when applying for federal disability benefits. To gather more systematic information about these experiences, we surveyed 983 working-age people with MS nationwide from May through November 2005. Most (60.2%) were unemployed; 36.4% had federal disability insurance, with 27.8% having SSDI alone. Almost one third (31.3%) had their initial SSDI application denied, and 31.9% used legal assistance when applying for this benefit. Although the time elapsed between SSDI application and approval was <12 months for 60.4% of applicants, 12–23 months passed for 19.8% and 24+ months for another 19.8%. Among people without SSDI, 15.4% had applied for this benefit at some time. Failure to meet disability criteria caused 60.3% of rejections, and inadequate documentation contributed to 32.1%. Neurologists must fully document the breadth of MS-related impairments in their patients' disability applications.

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 179-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine E. Chambless ◽  
George Julnes ◽  
Sara T. McCormick ◽  
Anne Reither

Few SSDI (Social Security Disability Insurance) beneficiaries in the United States ever increase earnings to the point of leaving SSDI, a source of growing concern both because of the costs of the program and because some beneficiaries can feel trapped in relative poverty by the need to retain SSDI benefits. One barrier to exit is the “cash cliff,” the abrupt loss of monthly benefits once earnings rise beyond the limits for eligibility. A four-state random assignment policy experiment was funded by the Social Security Administration (SSA) to explore implementation of a gradual reduction of cash benefits as earnings rise (i.e., the “benefit offset”). The project in Utah, one of the four states, found positive impacts of the policy on employment outcomes for certain groups of participants. More important, however, were the lessons learned in Utah for implementing policy initiatives with vulnerable populations such as those with disabilities. These lessons learned are in the areas of partnering among service agencies, enhancing communication, and implementing policy innovations in complex policy environments.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Andrew G. Biggs

AbstractA quirk in the Social Security benefit formula interacting with the sharp economic downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic could cause certain groups of near-retirees to suffer significant and permanent reductions to their Social Security retirement benefits. A sudden decline in the Social Security Administration (SSA)'s measure of economywide average wages in the year a worker turns 60 causes the Social Security benefit formula to devalue all the worker's earnings prior to age 60, resulting in a lower measure of career-average earnings and a lower benefit in retirement. A middle-income worker aged 60 in 2020 could receive an annual Social Security benefit reduction of around 9%, with losses through retirement approaching $46,000. Individuals becoming eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits would be subject to similar reductions in percentage terms. Several methods are discussed to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of similar benefit ‘notches’ occurring in the future.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 88 (5) ◽  
pp. 1047-1051
Author(s):  
James M. Perrin ◽  
Ruth E. K. Stein

On February 20, 1990, in Sullivan v Zebley, the Supreme Court of the United States struck down the Social Security Administration's criteria for determining eligibility of children with disabilities for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). This dramatic decision held that the existing regulations for the program discriminated against children, because children were required to meet a stricter standard than adults who applied for SSI. This decision overturned the current rules and procedures for the determination of access to a major federal benefits program and, in most states, to additional benefits through assured Medicaid eligibility. The Court also mandated that the Social Security Administration make changes that will significantly alter and liberalize access for children. Because many pediatricians may be unaware of the issues and the potential advantages for children in their care, we summarize below some of the pertinent background and implications of this landmark decision. BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION The Supplemental Security Income Program of the Social Security Administration, enacted by Congress in 1972, provides an income supplement to lower income disabled Americans, both children and adults. Persons older than 18 years of age who have a health problem that causes major disability and prevents participation in substantial gainful activity may receive cash benefits as part of a social policy effort that began in the Roosevelt era of the 1930s, although specific disability programs did not begin until the 1960s. Children also may receive cash benefits under certain similar conditions. The SSI program was designed primarily as a social benefit program to improve the financial standing of aged, blind, and disabled individuals, but it also brings automatic eligibility for Medicaid for individuals who qualify for SSI in 31 states and the District of Columbia.


1984 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 501-515
Author(s):  
Mark S. Smith

AbstractThe Social Security Administration promulgated the medical-vocational guidelines (the grid) in 1978 in order to improve consistency and efficiency in disability claim adjudications. The grid takes administrative notice of the availability of jobs suited to claimants’ capabilities, eliminating the need to make such a determination on a case-by-case basis.In Heckler v. Campbell, the Supreme Court held that the grid is valid and that the Secretary of Health and Human Services cannot be required to give specific examples of jobs available in the national economy. In so doing, the Court reversed the Second Circuit, which had required the Secretary to give claimants examples of jobs suited to their individual characteristics to assure them adequate notice of the issues involved in their hearings.This Case Comment contends that the Supreme Court misperceived the Second Circuit's purpose in requiring the Secretary to provide specific examples of available jobs. Nonetheless, the Comment argues that the Supreme Court decision does not foreclose requiring such examples to assure adequate notice and to aid in resolving adjudicative factual issues. This Comment concludes that such a requirement would improve the efficiency, accuracy and consistency of Social Security disability determinations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
April Yanyuan Wu ◽  
Jody Schimmel Hyde

Older workers who develop significant limitations in health or functioning face declines in income and consumption and an increased likelihood of poverty in the years prior to retirement. We assess the extent to which those differences persist after reaching retirement age. We use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) linked to Social Security Administration (SSA) records to compare the postretirement financial well-being of workers who experienced disability onset during their working years with those who did not, based on their claiming behavior for Social Security disability and retirement benefits. We find that even after full retirement age, gaps that emerged prior to retirement persist; those who experienced disability prior to retirement had lower incomes, were more likely to be in poverty, and had significantly lower wealth. Workers with disabilities who claimed Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) fared better than those who were rejected for such benefits, yet both groups were worse off than those who delayed claiming benefits until they were eligible for Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) benefits. Our findings indicate that any changes to the Social Security benefit structure must be mindful of the short- and longer term implications for already-vulnerable groups of workers.


2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 71-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H Autor ◽  
Mark G Duggan

The U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program has grown dramatically over the last 20 years in size and expense. This growth poses significant risks to the finances of the DI program and the broader Social Security system, and raises troubling questions as to whether the program is being misused by claimants. This article first provides an overview of the Disability Insurance program, describing who qualifies for the program, how an individual applies for benefits and how the level of benefits is determined. Next, we summarize the factors responsible for the growth in the DI rolls and discuss how the characteristics of DI recipients have changed as a result. We then explore the extent of moral hazard in the DI program and the effectiveness of the screening process in distinguishing meritorious from nonmeritorious claims. Finally, we identify the challenges that the DI program creates for Social Security finances and Social Security reform, and discuss potential reforms to the DI program.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document