Peer Review #2 of "Exploring the impact of positive and negative emotions on cooperative behaviour in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (v0.1)"

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
L Christov-Moore
Keyword(s):  
Peer Review ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Negative Emotions ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Positive And Negative Emotions

scholarly journals Is a PD game still a dilemma for Japanese rural villagers? A field and laboratory comparison of the impact of social group membership on cooperation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yohei Mitani
Keyword(s):  
Social Group ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Field Experiments ◽  
Group Membership ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Economic Life ◽  
Community Members ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Impact

AbstractLocal norms and shared beliefs in cohesive social groups regulate individual behavior in everyday economic life. I use a door-to-door field experiment where a hundred and twenty villagers recruited from twenty-three communities in a Japanese rural mountainous village play a simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma game. To examine whether a set of experiences shared through interactions among community members affect experimental behavior, I compare villagers’ behavior under in-community and out-community random matching protocols. I also report a counterpart laboratory experiment with seventy-two university student subjects to address the external validity of laboratory experiments. The findings are three-fold. First, almost full cooperation is achieved when villagers play a prisoner’s dilemma game with their anonymous community members. Second, cooperation is significantly higher within the in-group compared to the out-group treatment in both the laboratory and field experiments. Third, although a significant treatment effect of social group membership is preserved, a big difference in the average cooperation rates is observed between the laboratory and field.

scholarly journals Aspiration-based coevolution of link weight promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 180199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Shen ◽  
Chen Chu ◽  
Lei Shi ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Zhen Wang
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Link Weight ◽  
Aspiration Levels ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

In this article, we propose an aspiration-based coevolution of link weight, and explore how this set-up affects the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. In particular, an individual will increase the weight of its link to its neighbours only if the payoff received via this interaction exceeds a pre-defined aspiration. Conversely, if the received payoff is below this aspiration, the link weight with the corresponding neighbour will decrease. Our results show that an appropriate aspiration level leads to a high-cooperation plateau, whereas too high or too low aspiration will impede the evolution of cooperation. We explain these findings with a comprehensive analysis of transition points and with a systematic analysis of typical configuration patterns. The presented results provide further theoretical insights with regards to the impact of different aspiration levels on cooperation in human societies.

scholarly journals Heterogeneity and Environmental Preferences Shape the Evolution of Cooperation in Supply Networks

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Dong Mu ◽  
Xiongping Yue
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
Supply Networks ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Environmental Preference ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Impact

Supply networks as complex systems are significant challenges for decision-makers in predicting the evolution of cooperation among firms. The impact of environmental heterogeneity on firms is critical. Environment-based preference selection plays a pivotal role in clarifying the existence and maintenance of cooperation in supply networks. This paper explores the implication of the heterogeneity of environment and environment-based preference on the evolution of cooperation in supply networks. Cellular automata are considered to examine the synchronized evolution of cooperation and defection across supply networks. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game reward schemes have been formed, and the heterogeneous environment and environmental preference have been applied. The results show that the heterogeneous environment’s degree leads to higher cooperation for both Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game. We also probe into the impact of the environmental preference on the evolution of cooperation, and the results of which confirm the usefulness of preference of environment. This work offers a valuable perspective to improve the level of cooperation among firms and understand the evolution of cooperation in supply networks.

HETEROGENEOUS LINK WEIGHT PROMOTES THE COOPERATION IN SPATIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (11) ◽  
pp. 1257-1268 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZHI-QIN MA ◽  
CHENG-YI XIA ◽  
SHI-WEN SUN ◽  
LI WANG ◽  
HUAI-BIN WANG ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Power Law ◽  
Weight Distribution ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Interaction Strength ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Link Weight ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

The spatial structure has often been identified as a prominent mechanism that substantially promotes the cooperation level in prisoner's dilemma game. In this paper we introduce a weighting mechanism into the spatial prisoner's dilemma game to explore the cooperative behaviors on the square lattice. Here, three types of weight distributions: exponential, power-law and uniform distributions are considered, and the weight is assigned to links between players. Through large-scale numerical simulations we find, compared with the traditional spatial game, that this mechanism can largely enhance the frequency of cooperators. For most ranges of b, we find that the power-law distribution enables the highest promotion of cooperation and the uniform one leads to the lowest enhancement, whereas the exponential one lies often between them. The great improvement of cooperation can be caused by the fact that the distributional link weight yields inhomogeneous interaction strength among individuals, which can facilitate the formation of cooperative clusters to resist the defector's invasion. In addition, the impact of amplitude of the undulation of weight distribution and noise strength on cooperation is also investigated for three kinds of weight distribution. Current researches can aid in the further understanding of evolutionary cooperation in biological and social science.

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