scholarly journals Heterogeneity and Environmental Preferences Shape the Evolution of Cooperation in Supply Networks

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Dong Mu ◽  
Xiongping Yue
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
Supply Networks ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Environmental Preference ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Impact

Supply networks as complex systems are significant challenges for decision-makers in predicting the evolution of cooperation among firms. The impact of environmental heterogeneity on firms is critical. Environment-based preference selection plays a pivotal role in clarifying the existence and maintenance of cooperation in supply networks. This paper explores the implication of the heterogeneity of environment and environment-based preference on the evolution of cooperation in supply networks. Cellular automata are considered to examine the synchronized evolution of cooperation and defection across supply networks. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game reward schemes have been formed, and the heterogeneous environment and environmental preference have been applied. The results show that the heterogeneous environment’s degree leads to higher cooperation for both Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game. We also probe into the impact of the environmental preference on the evolution of cooperation, and the results of which confirm the usefulness of preference of environment. This work offers a valuable perspective to improve the level of cooperation among firms and understand the evolution of cooperation in supply networks.

scholarly journals Aspiration-based coevolution of link weight promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 180199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Shen ◽  
Chen Chu ◽  
Lei Shi ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Zhen Wang
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Link Weight ◽  
Aspiration Levels ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

In this article, we propose an aspiration-based coevolution of link weight, and explore how this set-up affects the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. In particular, an individual will increase the weight of its link to its neighbours only if the payoff received via this interaction exceeds a pre-defined aspiration. Conversely, if the received payoff is below this aspiration, the link weight with the corresponding neighbour will decrease. Our results show that an appropriate aspiration level leads to a high-cooperation plateau, whereas too high or too low aspiration will impede the evolution of cooperation. We explain these findings with a comprehensive analysis of transition points and with a systematic analysis of typical configuration patterns. The presented results provide further theoretical insights with regards to the impact of different aspiration levels on cooperation in human societies.

scholarly journals Conditional Neutral Reward Promotes Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunxuan Tang ◽  
Ming Jing ◽  
Yong Yu
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Effective Mechanism ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Reward Mechanism ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

Reward is an effective mechanism that promotes cooperation. However, an individual usually reward her opponents in certain cases. Inspired by this, a conditional neutral reward mechanism has been introduced. In detail, an individual will reward his or her neighbors with the same strategy when the payoff of the focal one is higher than that of his or her neighbors. And simulations are conducted to investigate the impact of our mechanism on the evolution of cooperation. Interestingly, cooperation can survive and dominate the system. Nominal antisocial reward that defectors reward each other is rarely because of the greed of defectors. By contrast, cooperators inside the cooperative clusters share the payoff with cooperators on the boundary so that the latter can form shields to protect cooperators.

AGE-RELATED PREFERENTIAL SELECTION CAN PROMOTE COOPERATION IN THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (02) ◽  
pp. 1250013 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZHEN WANG ◽  
ZHEN WANG ◽  
YUAN-HAN YANG ◽  
MING-XING YU ◽  
LI-GUO LIAO
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Preferential Selection ◽  
Age Related ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, we introduce an age-related preferential selection mechanism into the prisoner's dilemma game. Under this mechanism, players can select a source of strategy imitation from their neighbors in a biased way proportional to their ages. Tuned by a selection parameter α, the impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation can be very different. The numerical results show that the cooperation will be effectively promoted by adjusting the value of α. By examining the evolution process and spatial patterns for different values of α, it is found that larger α will effectively promote the formation of large scale of cooperator clusters. In addition, the impact of noise K on the spreading process of cooperation strategy is studied. We find that small K can make cooperation monotonously increase with α, while large K guarantees the optimal existence of cooperation for an intermediate α.

scholarly journals Is a PD game still a dilemma for Japanese rural villagers? A field and laboratory comparison of the impact of social group membership on cooperation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yohei Mitani
Keyword(s):  
Social Group ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Field Experiments ◽  
Group Membership ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Economic Life ◽  
Community Members ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Impact

AbstractLocal norms and shared beliefs in cohesive social groups regulate individual behavior in everyday economic life. I use a door-to-door field experiment where a hundred and twenty villagers recruited from twenty-three communities in a Japanese rural mountainous village play a simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma game. To examine whether a set of experiences shared through interactions among community members affect experimental behavior, I compare villagers’ behavior under in-community and out-community random matching protocols. I also report a counterpart laboratory experiment with seventy-two university student subjects to address the external validity of laboratory experiments. The findings are three-fold. First, almost full cooperation is achieved when villagers play a prisoner’s dilemma game with their anonymous community members. Second, cooperation is significantly higher within the in-group compared to the out-group treatment in both the laboratory and field experiments. Third, although a significant treatment effect of social group membership is preserved, a big difference in the average cooperation rates is observed between the laboratory and field.

The evolution of extortion strategy in the kagome lattice

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 2050162
Author(s):  
Qian Zhao ◽  
Yajun Mao ◽  
Zhihai Rong
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Living Environment ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Kagome Lattice ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Kagomé Lattice ◽  
Population Games ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The extortion strategy can let its surplus exceed its opponents by a fixed percentage, hence the influence of extortion strategy in a population games has drawn wide attention. In this paper, we study the evolution of extortion strategy with unconditional cooperation and unconditional defection strategies in the Kagome lattice with abundant triangles. Our investigation shows that the extortion strategy can act as catalysts to promote the evolution of cooperation in the networked Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Moreover, proper strength of extortion slope can improve the living environment of the cooperators, thus they enhance cooperation level in the network. Moreover, proper strength of extortion can not only enhance the cooperation level, but also delay the extinction of cooperation. The underlying overlapping triangles help individuals form cooperation cliques that play crucial roles for the evolution of cooperation in those lattices.

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