scholarly journals Peer Review #1 of "Motor expertise affects the unconscious processing of geometric forms (v0.2)"

2011 ◽  
Vol 213 (4) ◽  
pp. 383-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Güldenpenning ◽  
Dirk Koester ◽  
Wilfried Kunde ◽  
Matthias Weigelt ◽  
Thomas Schack

PeerJ ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. e9520
Author(s):  
Jiaxian Geng ◽  
Fanying Meng ◽  
Chao Wang ◽  
Hanna Haponenko ◽  
Anmin Li

Background The unconscious processing of information is an important skill used by competitive athletes to handle the rapidly changing movements of opponents and equipment. Previous studies have shown that unconscious information processing among athletes is better than that among non-athletes in the sports-specific domain. However, it is not yet clear whether athletes also show superior unconscious information processing in the general cognitive domain. Methods Twenty-five competitive table tennis players (athletes) and 26 aged-matched non-athletic college students (non-athlete controls) were recruited for this study. Participants first performed a masked priming task that used geometric shapes as primes and targets to examine unconscious information processing in the general cognitive domain. As a control, participants then completed a prime identification task to determine whether they could consciously detect the priming geometric forms. Reaction times and error rates were analyzed to examine whether motor expertise influenced unconscious information processing in the general domain. Nineteen athletes and 17 non-athletes from our present study, which used general stimuli, also participated in our previous study, which used sport-specific stimuli. The strength of the unconscious response priming effect was analyzed to examine whether the effect of motor expertise on unconscious processing could be transferred from a sports-specific domain to a general domain. Results Signal detection analyses indicated that neither athletes nor non-athletes could consciously perceive the priming stimuli. Two-way repeated-measures analyses of variance followed by simple main effects analyses of the masked priming performance, indicating that athletes responded faster and committed fewer errors when the priming stimulus was congruent with the target stimulus. These results suggested that athletes exhibited a significant unconscious response priming effect of geometric forms. By contrast, non-athletes did not respond faster or commit fewer errors for congruent vs. incongruent conditions. No significant difference was detected between athletes and non-athletes in error rates for congruent trials, but athletes committed significantly more errors than non-athletes on incongruent trials. The strength of the unconscious response priming effect that athletes exhibited was greater than that for non-athletes, both in the present study with general stimuli and in our previous study with sport-specific stimuli. Conclusion The results indicated that motor expertise facilitated the unconscious processing of geometric forms, suggesting that the influence of motor expertise on unconscious information processing occurs not only for the sports-specific domain but also transfers to the general cognitive domain.


2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Norman

A series of vignette examples taken from psychological research on motivation, emotion, decision making, and attitudes illustrates how the influence of unconscious processes is often measured in a range of different behaviors. However, the selected studies share an apparent lack of explicit operational definition of what is meant by consciousness, and there seems to be substantial disagreement about the properties of conscious versus unconscious processing: Consciousness is sometimes equated with attention, sometimes with verbal report ability, and sometimes operationalized in terms of behavioral dissociations between different performance measures. Moreover, the examples all seem to share a dichotomous view of conscious and unconscious processes as being qualitatively different. It is suggested that cognitive research on consciousness can help resolve the apparent disagreement about how to define and measure unconscious processing, as is illustrated by a selection of operational definitions and empirical findings from modern cognitive psychology. These empirical findings also point to the existence of intermediate states of conscious awareness, not easily classifiable as either purely conscious or purely unconscious. Recent hypotheses from cognitive psychology, supplemented with models from social, developmental, and clinical psychology, are then presented all of which are compatible with the view of consciousness as a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. Such a view of consciousness would open up for explorations of intermediate states of awareness in addition to more purely conscious or purely unconscious states and thereby increase our understanding of the seemingly “unconscious” aspects of mental life.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Bola ◽  
Marta Paź ◽  
Łucja Doradzińska ◽  
Anna Nowicka

AbstractIt is well established that stimuli representing or associated with ourselves, like our own name or an image of our own face, benefit from preferential processing. However, two key questions concerning the self-prioritization mechanism remain to be addressed. First, does it operate in an automatic manner during the early processing, or rather in a more controlled fashion at later processing stages? Second, is it specific to the self-related stimuli, or can it be activated also by other stimuli that are familiar or salient? We conducted a dot-probe experiment to investigate the mechanism behind attentional prioritization of the selfface image and to tackle both questions. The former, by employing a backwards masking procedure to isolate the early and preconscious processing stages. The latter, by investigating whether a face that becomes visually familiar due to repeated presentations is able to capture attention in a similar manner as the self-face. Analysis of the N2pc ERP component revealed that the self-face image automatically captures attention, both when processed consciously and unconsciously. In contrast, the visually familiar face did not attract attention, neither in the conscious, nor in the unconscious condition. We conclude that the selfprioritization mechanism is early and automatic, and is not triggered by a mere visual familiarity. More generally, our results provide further evidence for efficient unconscious processing of faces, and for a dissociation between attention and consciousness.


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