Making conscious the unconscious in order to modify unconscious processing: Some mechanisms of therapeutic change

2004 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 1379-1400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugo Bleichmar
2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Norman

A series of vignette examples taken from psychological research on motivation, emotion, decision making, and attitudes illustrates how the influence of unconscious processes is often measured in a range of different behaviors. However, the selected studies share an apparent lack of explicit operational definition of what is meant by consciousness, and there seems to be substantial disagreement about the properties of conscious versus unconscious processing: Consciousness is sometimes equated with attention, sometimes with verbal report ability, and sometimes operationalized in terms of behavioral dissociations between different performance measures. Moreover, the examples all seem to share a dichotomous view of conscious and unconscious processes as being qualitatively different. It is suggested that cognitive research on consciousness can help resolve the apparent disagreement about how to define and measure unconscious processing, as is illustrated by a selection of operational definitions and empirical findings from modern cognitive psychology. These empirical findings also point to the existence of intermediate states of conscious awareness, not easily classifiable as either purely conscious or purely unconscious. Recent hypotheses from cognitive psychology, supplemented with models from social, developmental, and clinical psychology, are then presented all of which are compatible with the view of consciousness as a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. Such a view of consciousness would open up for explorations of intermediate states of awareness in addition to more purely conscious or purely unconscious states and thereby increase our understanding of the seemingly “unconscious” aspects of mental life.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Bola ◽  
Marta Paź ◽  
Łucja Doradzińska ◽  
Anna Nowicka

AbstractIt is well established that stimuli representing or associated with ourselves, like our own name or an image of our own face, benefit from preferential processing. However, two key questions concerning the self-prioritization mechanism remain to be addressed. First, does it operate in an automatic manner during the early processing, or rather in a more controlled fashion at later processing stages? Second, is it specific to the self-related stimuli, or can it be activated also by other stimuli that are familiar or salient? We conducted a dot-probe experiment to investigate the mechanism behind attentional prioritization of the selfface image and to tackle both questions. The former, by employing a backwards masking procedure to isolate the early and preconscious processing stages. The latter, by investigating whether a face that becomes visually familiar due to repeated presentations is able to capture attention in a similar manner as the self-face. Analysis of the N2pc ERP component revealed that the self-face image automatically captures attention, both when processed consciously and unconsciously. In contrast, the visually familiar face did not attract attention, neither in the conscious, nor in the unconscious condition. We conclude that the selfprioritization mechanism is early and automatic, and is not triggered by a mere visual familiarity. More generally, our results provide further evidence for efficient unconscious processing of faces, and for a dissociation between attention and consciousness.


2011 ◽  
Vol 213 (4) ◽  
pp. 383-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Güldenpenning ◽  
Dirk Koester ◽  
Wilfried Kunde ◽  
Matthias Weigelt ◽  
Thomas Schack

2010 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 578-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marieke de Vries ◽  
Cilia L. M. Witteman ◽  
Rob W. Holland ◽  
Ap Dijksterhuis

The unconscious thought effect refers to improved judgments and decisions after a period of distraction. The authors studied the unconscious thought effect in a complex and error-prone part of clinical decision making: diagnosis. Their aim was to test whether conscious versus unconscious processing influenced diagnosis of psychiatric cases. They used case descriptions from the DSM-IV casebook. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the conscious-processing-condition (i.e., consciously thinking about the information they read in the case description), the other half to the unconscious-processing condition (i.e., performing an unrelated distracter task). The main dependent measure was the total number of correct classifications. Compared to conscious processing, unconscious processing significantly increased the number of correct classifications. The results show the potential merits of unconscious processing in diagnostic decision making.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sunwoo Kwon ◽  
Krystel R. Huxlin ◽  
Jude F. Mitchell

AbstractVisual pathways that guide actions do not necessarily mediate conscious perception. Patients with primary visual cortex (V1) damage lose conscious perception but often retain unconscious abilities (e.g. blindsight). Here, we asked if saccade accuracy and post-saccadic following responses (PFRs) that automatically track target motion upon saccade landing are retained when conscious perception is lost. We contrasted these behaviors in the blind and intact fields of 8 chronic V1-stroke patients, and in 8 visually-intact controls. Saccade accuracy was relatively normal in all cases. Stroke patients also had normal PFR in their intact fields, but no PFR in their blind fields. Thus, V1 damage did not spare the unconscious visual processing necessary for automatic, post-saccadic smooth eye movements. Importantly, visual training that recovered motion perception in the blind field did not restore the PFR, suggesting a clear dissociation between pathways mediating perceptual restoration and automatic actions in the V1-damaged visual system.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikko Hurme ◽  
Mika Koivisto ◽  
Linda Henriksson ◽  
Henry Railo

AbstractSome of the neurological patients with primary visual cortex (V1) lesions can guide their behavior based on stimuli presented to their blind visual field. One example of this phenomenon is the ability to discriminate colors in the absence of awareness. These so-called patients with blindsight must have a neural pathway that bypasses the V1, explaining their ability to unconsciously process stimuli. To test if similar pathways function in neurologically healthy individuals or if unconscious processing depends on the V1, we disturbed the visibility of a chromatic stimulus with metacontrast masking (Experiment 1) or transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the V1 (Experiment 2). We measured unconscious processing using the redundant target effect (RTE), which is the speeding up of reaction times in response to dual stimuli compared with one stimulus, when the task is to respond to any number of stimuli. An unconscious chromatic RTE was found when the visibility of the redundant chromatic stimulus was suppressed with a visual mask. When TMS was applied to the V1 to disturb the perception of the redundant chromatic stimulus, the RTE was eliminated. Based on our results and converging evidence from previous studies, we conclude that the unconscious processing of chromatic information depends on the V1 in neurologically healthy participants.


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