The Illusion

This chapter discusses how the idea of conscious will and the idea of psychological mechanisms have an oil and water relationship, having never been properly reconciled. One way to put them together is to say that the mechanistic approach is the explanation preferred for scientific purposes, but that the person's experience of conscious will is utterly convincing and important to the person and so must be understood scientifically as well. The chapter states that conscious will is an illusion in the sense that the experience of consciously willing an action is not a direct indication that the conscious thought has caused the action. It also shows that the mechanisms underlying the experience of will are themselves a fundamental topic of scientific study.

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 579-600 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Hochstein

The study of psychological mechanisms is an interdisciplinary endeavour, requiring insights from many different domains (from electrophysiology, to psychology, to theoretical neuroscience, to computer science). In this article, I argue that philosophy plays an essential role in this interdisciplinary project, and that effective scientific study of psychological mechanisms requires that working scientists be responsible metaphysicians. This means adopting deliberate metaphysical positions when studying mechanisms that go beyond what is empirically justified regarding the nature of the phenomenon being studied, the conditions of its occurrence, and its boundaries. Such metaphysical commitments are necessary in order to set up experimental protocols, determine which variables to manipulate under experimental conditions, and which conclusions to draw from different scientific models and theories. It is important for scientists to be aware of the metaphysical commitments they adopt, since they can easily be led astray if invoked carelessly.


2014 ◽  
Vol 222 (3) ◽  
pp. 140-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariane Sölle ◽  
Theresa Bartholomäus ◽  
Margitta Worm ◽  
Regine Klinger

Research in recent years, especially in the analgesic field, has intensively studied the placebo effect and its mechanisms. It has been shown that physical complaints can be efficiently reduced via learning and cognitive processes (conditioning and expectancies). However, despite evidence demonstrating a large variety of physiological similarities between pain and itch, the possible transfer of the analgesic placebo model to itch has not yet been widely discussed in research. This review therefore aims at highlighting potential transfers of placebo mechanisms to itch processes by demonstrating the therapeutic issues in pharmacological treatments for pruritus on a physiological basis and by discussing the impact of psychological mechanisms and psychological factors influencing itch sensations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason G. Randall ◽  
Anton J. Villado ◽  
Christina U. Zimmer

Abstract. The purpose of this study was to test for race and sex differences in general mental ability (GMA) retest performance and to identify the psychological mechanisms underlying these differences. An initial and retest administration of a GMA assessment separated by a six-week span was completed by 318 participants. Contrary to our predictions, we found that race, sex, and emotional stability failed to moderate GMA retest performance. However, GMA assessed via another ability test and conscientiousness both partially explained retest performance. Additionally, we found that retesting may reduce adverse impact ratios by lowering the hiring threshold. Ultimately, our findings reinforce the need for organizations to consider race, sex, ability, and personality when implementing retesting procedures.


1979 ◽  
Vol 24 (11) ◽  
pp. 947-947
Author(s):  
RICHARD A. KASSCHAU

2020 ◽  
Vol 134 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-157
Author(s):  
Martin Schmelz ◽  
Sebastian Grueneisen ◽  
Michael Tomasello

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