scholarly journals Partial Information Disclosure in a Contest

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Clark ◽  
Tapas Kundu
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Active Participation

Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate information disclosure to increase expected efforts in the contest, but base their analysis upon active participation in the contest by all types of the informed player. We extend their analysis to equilibria in which some informed types exert no effort in the contest, showing how this changes the type of information disclosure that arises.

scholarly journals Transparency, asymmetric information and cooperation

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-294
Author(s):  
Gianna Lotito ◽  
Matteo Migheli ◽  
Guido Ortona
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Relative Performance ◽  
The Other ◽  
Competitive Environment ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Per Se

Abstract We inquire experimentally whether asymmetric information in competitive settings and competition per se influence individual social behaviour. Participants perform a task and are remunerated according to two schemes, a non-competitive and a competitive one, then they play a standard public goods game. In the first scheme participants earn a flat remuneration, in the other they are ranked according to their performance and remunerated accordingly. Information about ranking and income before the game is played varies across three different treatments. We find that competition per se does not affect the amount of contribution. The time spent to choose how much to contribute is negatively correlated with the decision of cooperating fully. The main result is that full information about the relative performance in the competitive environment enhances the cooperation, while partial information reduces it.

Information Disclosure Model Under Supply Chain Competition with Asymmetric Demand Disruption

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (06) ◽  
pp. 1650043 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kebing Chen ◽  
Renxing Xu ◽  
Hanwei Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Information Rent

This paper develops the game models of two symmetric supply chains, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, while both retailers compete in the market with a linear function. The disclosure mechanism is designed when the information of the disrupted demand is asymmetric between supply side and retail side. We first study the model with the full information as a benchmark to explore the effect of asymmetric information on the system. In the case, each manufacturer maximizes her profit while the downstream retailer only obtains the reservation profit. For the case of asymmetric information, each manufacturer can obtain the real information of the disrupted demand by using a menu of contract bundles. For each information structure, there are always robust regions for each manufacturer’s original trading quantity scheme. That is, when the disrupted amount of the demand is sufficiently small, the trading quantity will be unchanged. However, some special measures, e.g., the higher unit wholesale price, should be taken to prevent the retailer from deviating the trading quantity scheme. The high-disruption retailer gets the higher profit due to the information rent. Compared with a single supply chain, Cournot competition results in the less retail price and the lower performance for the whole system.

scholarly journals Partial Information Disclosure in a Contest

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek J. Clark ◽  
Tapas Kundu
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Partial Information

scholarly journals Partial information disclosure in a contest

2021 ◽  
pp. 109915
Author(s):  
Derek J. Clark ◽  
Tapas Kundu
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Partial Information

scholarly journals How Effective Are Federally Mandated Information Disclosures?

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-349
Author(s):  
Arthur G. Fraas ◽  
Randall Lutter
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Best Practices ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Regulatory Review ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Government Mandates ◽  
Standard Response ◽  
Review Reports ◽  
Quantitative Assessments

Government mandates to disclose information are a standard response to problems of asymmetric information. We examine recent major U.S. regulations issued between 2008 and 2013 to identify disclosure mandates and look for quantitative assessments of their effectiveness in improving comprehension. We also reviewed the retrospective regulatory review reports of four federal agencies – prepared pursuant to Executive Orders 13563 and 13579 – for analyses of existing mandates. We find that although mandated disclosures underpin a number of major federal regulatory initiatives, agencies infrequently issue such mandates based on scientifically valid, controlled studies of the improvements in comprehension from such disclosure. We also conduct four case studies drawn from the relatively few instances where federal agencies have evaluated improvements in comprehension, to identify current best practices. Finally, we recommend reforms to improve federally mandated information disclosure.

scholarly journals Debt versus Equity—Open Innovation to Reduce Asymmetric Information

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 181
Author(s):  
Arief Yulianto ◽  
Rini Setyo Witiastuti ◽  
Widiyanto
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Open Innovation ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Life Cycle Stage ◽  
Mature Stage ◽  
Growth Opportunities ◽  
The Difference

The research aims to examine the difference between absence and presence life cycle stage in technology information digitalization (TID) as a form of open innovation in reducing information asymmetry. Furthermore, companies with asymmetric information prefer debt over equity. The study collects 3.343 pooled data observation units of companies listed in the Indonesian capital market period 2008 to 2019. We use OLS regression analysis to determine the difference between the absence and presence lifecycle stage in determining capital structure relations and exploiting growth opportunities. The study found information disclosure obligation of the capital market regulator has not been fully disclosed through TID. As a result, companies choose to pass in growth opportunities with debt or equity in the absence life cycle stage. Presence lifecycle stage, in the introduction stage, the company misses growth opportunities. Growth and mature stage, debt has a positive effect on the utilization of growth opportunities. The company prefers the issuance of debt with lower information sensitivity than equity. Presence culture, such as majority ownership, generates incentives for open innovation from capital market regulators, which still contain information asymmetry.

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