The local governance of prostitution: regulatory drift and implementation capture

In this chapter we discuss the implementation of prostitution policy in Austria and the Netherlands. It introduces three key analytic concepts: policy implementation, policy design and policy instruments. Both Austria and the Netherlands initially had pragmatic, and in the case of the latter, progressive, national laws. Through analysis of the design and instruments by which these laws were put into effect at the local level, we observed a gradual change towards a more punitive, regressive approach. In the Netherlands this occurred through a process of regulatory drift, a gradual change in the focus and goals of a policy as the result of a succession of small decisions at the implementation level, without any formal decision at higher levels of political authority. In Vienna the mechanism was agency capture, the appropriation of the implementation process by one agency, the police, that imposes its own goals and operating procedures on the policy process. In both cases, the implementation process was driven by a logic of combatting trafficking that led to ever more intrusive measures to incapacitate and control an opponent that was perceived as powerful and devious.

A contingency framework on partnership risk

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze and compare the specific contingencies of partnership risk in shared equity public-private partnerships (PPPs) with the contingencies of privately held, loose related PPPs. Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on instrumental and relational accountability perspectives, the author formulates theoretical propositions on partnership risk. Findings – The author conclude that loose related PPPs are characterized by high expertise and a higher risk of contract incompleteness by reason of opportunism. Shared ownership PPPs are characterized by lower opportunism but stronger goal ambiguities and role conflicts. These relationships are threatened by political micromanagement, agency capture and bailout problems. Research limitations/implications – The study offers an analytical frame of propositions and provides avenues for further research on partnership risk. Practical implications – The author suggest risk mitigation strategies for tight and loose related PPPs. Originality/value – Identifying crucial contingencies from both an instrumental and a relational perspective, the study makes a contribution to cooperation research in PPPs.

When Lawyers Start Thinking Like Economists: The SEC in Response to Technological Change

Since its founding, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has employed a disclosure-enforcement framework, combined with a cooperative relationship with the securities industry, as the key means of ensuring market legitimacy and investor confidence. This article argues that not only is this framework deeply rooted within the SEC, but is equally ingrained in the public psyche. It is the deep belief of the public in this "prosecutorial orientation” that has sustained the SEC's disclosure-enforcement framework in the face of charges of obsolescence, inefficiency and agency capture. But as the SEC is increasingly called upon to concern itself with questions of efficiency and capital formation in the global economy, the stage may be set for a shift away from the disclosure-enforcement orientation and towards a more active, "promotional role" in the economy. In addition to external market forces, however, any qualitative shift in the SEC's regulatory mission will be affected only if there is a comparable shift in the public philosophy regarding the SEC's regulatory intent and a change in the internal orientation of the SEC. The author contends that seeds of these changes have long since been sowed.