The auditory brain in action: Intention determines predictive processing in the auditory system—A review of current paradigms and findings

According to the ideomotor theory, action may serve to produce desired sensory outcomes. Perception has been widely described in terms of sensory predictions arising due to top-down input from higher order cortical areas. Here, we demonstrate that the action intention results in reliable top-down predictions that modulate the auditory brain responses. We bring together several lines of research, including sensory attenuation, active oddball, and action-related omission studies: Together, the results suggest that the intention-based predictions modulate several steps in the sound processing hierarchy, from preattentive to evaluation-related processes, also when controlling for additional prediction sources (i.e., sound regularity). We propose an integrative theoretical framework—the extended auditory event representation system (AERS), a model compatible with the ideomotor theory, theory of event coding, and predictive coding. Initially introduced to describe regularity-based auditory predictions, we argue that the extended AERS explains the effects of action intention on auditory processing while additionally allowing studying the differences and commonalities between intention- and regularity-based predictions—we thus believe that this framework could guide future research on action and perception.

The ideomotor recycling theory for language

For language acquisition and processing, the ideomotor theory predicts that the comprehension and the production of language are functionally based on their expected perceptual effects (i.e., linguistic events). This anticipative mechanism is central for action–perception behaviors in human and nonhuman animals, but a recent ideomotor recycling theory has emphasized a language account throughout an evolutionary perspective.

More than associations: An ideomotor perspective on mirror neurons

In this commentary, we propose an extension of the associative approach of mirror neurons, namely, ideomotor theory. Ideomotor theory assumes that actions are controlled by anticipatory representations of their sensory consequences. As we outline below, this extension is necessary to clarify a number of empirical observations that are difficult to explain from a purely associative perspective.

The Functional and Neural Mechanism of Action Preparation: Roles of EBA and FFA in Voluntary Action Control

Ideomotor theory claims that actions are cognitively represented and accessed via representations of the sensory effects they evoke. Previous studies provide support for this claim by showing that the presentation of action effects primes activation in corresponding motor structures. However, whether people actually use action-effect representations to control their motor behavior is not yet clear. In our fMRI study, we had participants prepare for manual or facial actions on a trial-by-trial basis, and hypothesized that preparation would be mediated by the cortical areas that code for the perceptual effects of these actions. Preparing for manual action induced higher activation of hand-related areas of motor cortex (demonstrating actual preparation) and of the extrastriate body area, which is known to mediate the perception of body parts. In contrast, preparing for facial action induced higher activation of face-related motor areas and of the fusiform face area, known to mediate face perception. These observations provide further support for the ideomotor theory and suggest that visual imagery might play a role in voluntary action control.