Second Language Sentence Processing

Second language (L2) sentence processing research studies how adult L2 learners understand sentences in real time. I review how L2 sentence processing differs from monolingual first-language (L1) processing and outline major findings and approaches. Three interacting factors appear to mandate L1–L2 differences: ( a) capacity restrictions in the ability to integrate information in an L2; ( b) L1–L2 differences in the weighting of cues, the timing of their application, and the efficiency of their retrieval; and ( c) variation in the utility functions of predictive processing. Against this backdrop, I outline a novel paradigm of interlanguage processing, which examines bilingual features of L2 processing, such as bilingual language systems, nonselective access to all grammars, and processing to learn an L2. Interlanguage processing goes beyond the traditional framing of L2 sentence processing as an incomplete form of monolingual processing and reconnects the field with current approaches to grammar acquisition and the bilingual mental lexicon.

Scene Context Impairs Perception of Semantically Congruent Objects

Visual scene context is well-known to facilitate the recognition of scene-congruent objects. Interestingly, however, according to predictive-processing accounts of brain function, scene congruency may lead to reduced (rather than enhanced) processing of congruent objects, compared with incongruent ones, because congruent objects elicit reduced prediction-error responses. We tested this counterintuitive hypothesis in two online behavioral experiments with human participants ( N = 300). We found clear evidence for impaired perception of congruent objects, both in a change-detection task measuring response times and in a bias-free object-discrimination task measuring accuracy. Congruency costs were related to independent subjective congruency ratings. Finally, we show that the reported effects cannot be explained by low-level stimulus confounds, response biases, or top-down strategy. These results provide convincing evidence for perceptual congruency costs during scene viewing, in line with predictive-processing theory.

Predictive Neuronal Adaptation as a Basis for Consciousness

Being able to correctly predict the future and to adjust own actions accordingly can offer a great survival advantage. In fact, this could be the main reason why brains evolved. Consciousness, the most mysterious feature of brain activity, also seems to be related to predicting the future and detecting surprise: a mismatch between actual and predicted situation. Similarly at a single neuron level, predicting future activity and adapting synaptic inputs accordingly was shown to be the best strategy to maximize the metabolic energy for a neuron. Following on these ideas, here we examined if surprise minimization by single neurons could be a basis for consciousness. First, we showed in simulations that as a neural network learns a new task, then the surprise within neurons (defined as the difference between actual and expected activity) changes similarly to the consciousness of skills in humans. Moreover, implementing adaptation of neuronal activity to minimize surprise at fast time scales (tens of milliseconds) resulted in improved network performance. This improvement is likely because adapting activity based on the internal predictive model allows each neuron to make a more “educated” response to stimuli. Based on those results, we propose that the neuronal predictive adaptation to minimize surprise could be a basic building block of conscious processing. Such adaptation allows neurons to exchange information about own predictions and thus to build more complex predictive models. To be precise, we provide an equation to quantify consciousness as the amount of surprise minus the size of the adaptation error. Since neuronal adaptation can be studied experimentally, this can allow testing directly our hypothesis. Specifically, we postulate that any substance affecting neuronal adaptation will also affect consciousness. Interestingly, our predictive adaptation hypothesis is consistent with multiple ideas presented previously in diverse theories of consciousness, such as global workspace theory, integrated information, attention schema theory, and predictive processing framework. In summary, we present a theoretical, computational, and experimental support for the hypothesis that neuronal adaptation is a possible biological mechanism of conscious processing, and we discuss how this could provide a step toward a unified theory of consciousness.

Useful misrepresentation: perception as embodied proactive inference

According to the predictive processing framework, perception is geared to represent the environment in terms of embodied action opportunities as opposed to objective truth. Here, we argue that such an optimisation is reflected by biases in expectations (i.e., prior predictive information) that facilitate ‘useful’ inferences of external sensory causes. To support this, we highlight a body of literature suggesting that perception is systematically biased away from accurate estimates under conditions where utility and accuracy conflict with one another. We interpret this to reflect the brain’s attempt to adjudicate between conflicting sources of prediction error, as external accuracy is sacrificed to facilitate actions that proactively avoid physiologically surprising outcomes. This carries important theoretical implications and offers new insights into psychopathology.

The Seductive Allure of Cargo Cult Computationalism

Bruineberg and colleagues report a striking confusion, in which the formal Bayesian notion of a “Markov Blanket” has been frequently misunderstood and misapplied to phenomena of mind and life. I argue that misappropriation of formal concepts is pervasive in the “predictive processing” literature, and echo Richard Feynman in suggesting how we might resist the allure of cargo cult computationalism.

Predictive Processing in Poetic Language: Event-Related Potentials Data on Rhythmic Omissions in Metered Speech

Predictions during language comprehension are currently discussed from many points of view. One area where predictive processing may play a particular role concerns poetic language that is regularized by meter and rhyme, thus allowing strong predictions regarding the timing and stress of individual syllables. While there is growing evidence that these prosodic regularities influence language processing, less is known about the potential influence of prosodic preferences (binary, strong-weak patterns) on neurophysiological processes. To this end, the present electroencephalogram (EEG) study examined whether the predictability of strong and weak syllables within metered speech would differ as a function of meter (trochee vs. iamb). Strong, i.e., accented positions within a foot should be more predictable than weak, i.e., unaccented positions. Our focus was on disyllabic pseudowords that solely differed between trochaic and iambic structure, with trochees providing the preferred foot in German. Methodologically, we focused on the omission Mismatch Negativity (oMMN) that is elicited when an anticipated auditory stimulus is omitted. The resulting electrophysiological brain response is particularly interesting because its elicitation does not depend on a physical stimulus. Omissions in deviant position of a passive oddball paradigm occurred at either first- or second-syllable position of the aforementioned pseudowords, resulting in a 2-by-2 design with the factors foot type and omission position. Analyses focused on the mean oMMN amplitude and latency differences across the four conditions. The result pattern was characterized by an interaction of the effects of foot type and omission position for both amplitudes and latencies. In first position, omissions resulted in larger and earlier oMMNs for trochees than for iambs. In second position, omissions resulted in larger oMMNs for iambs than for trochees, but the oMMN latency did not differ. The results suggest that omissions, particularly in initial position, are modulated by a trochaic preference in German. The preferred strong-weak pattern may have strengthened the prosodic prediction, especially for matching, trochaic stimuli, such that the violation of this prediction led to an earlier and stronger prediction error. Altogether, predictive processing seems to play a particular role in metered speech, especially if the meter is based on the preferred foot type.

Neuronal cell-type and circuit basis for visual predictive processing

Bayesian Brain theory suggests brain utilises predictive processing framework to interpret the noisy world. Predictive processing is essential to perception, action, cognition and psychiatric disease, but underlying neural circuit mechanisms remain undelineated. Here we show the neuronal cell-type and circuit basis for visual predictive processing in awake, head-fixed mice during self-initiated running. Preceding running, vasoactive intestinal peptide (VIP)-expressing inhibitory interneurons (INs) in primary visual cortex (V1) are robustly activated in absence of structured visual stimuli. This pre-running activation is mediated via distal top-down projections from frontal, parietal and retrosplenial areas known for motion planning, but not local excitatory inputs associated with the bottom-up pathway. Somatostatin (SST) INs show pre-running suppression and post-running activation, indicating a VIP-SST motif. Differential VIP-SST peri-running dynamics anisotropically suppress neighbouring pyramidal (Pyr) neurons, preadapting Pyr neurons to the incoming running. Our data delineate key neuron types and circuit elements of predictive processing brain employs in action and perception.

The Predictive Dynamics of Happiness and Well-Being

We offer an account of mental health and well-being using the predictive processing framework (PPF). According to this framework, the difference between mental health and psychopathology can be located in the goodness of the predictive model as a regulator of action. What is crucial for avoiding the rigid patterns of thinking, feeling and acting associated with psychopathology is the regulation of action based on the valence of affective states. In PPF, valence is modelled as error dynamics—the change in prediction errors over time . Our aim in this paper is to show how error dynamics can account for both momentary happiness and longer term well-being. What will emerge is a new neurocomputational framework for making sense of human flourishing.

The Renewal of Perception in Religious Faith and Biblical Narrative

Religious faith may manifest itself, among other things, as a mode of seeing the ordinary world, which invests that world imaginatively (or inspiredly) with an unseen depth of divine intention and spiritual significance. While such seeing may well be truthful, it is also unavoidably constructive, involving the imagination in its philosophical sense of the capacity to organize underdetermined or ambiguous sense date into a whole or gestalt. One of the characteristic ways in which biblical narratives inspire and teach is by renewing their characters’ and readers’ imagination. The texts do so not inexorably but in a similar way as (other) works of art. This paper therefore investigates the ways in which works of art engage and develop the imagination, and thereby enable renewed perceptual and cognitive engagement with the world. The paper introduces predictive processing as a helpful psychological theory for analyzing this dynamic, and outlines questions for further research.

The evolution of brain architectures for predictive coding and active inference

This article considers the evolution of brain architectures for predictive processing. We argue that brain mechanisms for predictive perception and action are not late evolutionary additions of advanced creatures like us. Rather, they emerged gradually from simpler predictive loops (e.g. autonomic and motor reflexes) that were a legacy from our earlier evolutionary ancestors—and were key to solving their fundamental problems of adaptive regulation. We characterize simpler-to-more-complex brains formally, in terms of generative models that include predictive loops of increasing hierarchical breadth and depth. These may start from a simple homeostatic motif and be elaborated during evolution in four main ways: these include the multimodal expansion of predictive control into an allostatic loop; its duplication to form multiple sensorimotor loops that expand an animal's behavioural repertoire; and the gradual endowment of generative models with hierarchical depth (to deal with aspects of the world that unfold at different spatial scales) and temporal depth (to select plans in a future-oriented manner). In turn, these elaborations underwrite the solution to biological regulation problems faced by increasingly sophisticated animals. Our proposal aligns neuroscientific theorising—about predictive processing—with evolutionary and comparative data on brain architectures in different animal species. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory’.