Epistemic Circularity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Macdonald
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Circularity ◽  
Pragmatic Account

<p>An instance of epistemically circular justification is one in which a justification source successfully justifies the claim that it is a justification source. It is generally thought that this is impossible. However, there is also reason to think that our fundamental evidential sources and theories of justification cannot be justified without circularity. In this thesis I investigate the problem of epistemic circularity in detail. First, I’ll examine a prominent argument for thinking that the justification of our fundamental evidential sources must be circular, and show that it is not decisive. My response employs a pragmatic account of justification, whereby your goals and preferences can make you justified in believing something even when you lack evidence for it. Second, I’ll offer a different argument for thinking that epistemically circular justification is possible.</p>

Epistemic Circularity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Macdonald
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Circularity ◽  
Pragmatic Account

<p>An instance of epistemically circular justification is one in which a justification source successfully justifies the claim that it is a justification source. It is generally thought that this is impossible. However, there is also reason to think that our fundamental evidential sources and theories of justification cannot be justified without circularity. In this thesis I investigate the problem of epistemic circularity in detail. First, I’ll examine a prominent argument for thinking that the justification of our fundamental evidential sources must be circular, and show that it is not decisive. My response employs a pragmatic account of justification, whereby your goals and preferences can make you justified in believing something even when you lack evidence for it. Second, I’ll offer a different argument for thinking that epistemically circular justification is possible.</p>

cognitive-pragmatic account of the English imperative-conditional construction

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-269
Author(s):  
Keding Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Linguistics ◽  
Processing Unit ◽  
Pragmatic Approach ◽  
The Third ◽  
Pragmatic Enrichment ◽  
Symbolic Structure ◽  
Speaker Intentions ◽  
Interactive Relationship ◽  
Pragmatic Account ◽  
Everyday Communication

The imperative-conditional construction (ICC) in English is a type of construction which consists of an ordinary imperative clause and an ordinary declarative clause connected by the connective and or or. This article deals with the speaker intentions of ICCs and their motivations from a cognitive-pragmatic approach. Based on the concept of construction in cognitive linguistics, an ICC can be called a complex symbolic structure which, though composed of two components, should be regarded as a single pragmatic processing unit. It is demonstrated that, in everyday communication, the ICC can usually convey three kinds of speaker intentions: a prohibitive intention, an inducing/forcing intention, and an advisory intention. The first refers to the intention of the speaker to prohibit the hearer from carrying out the act described by the imperative. The second is the intention of the speaker to induce or force the hearer to bring about the act described by the imperative. The third refers to the intention of the speaker to advise the hearer to carry out the act described by the imperative. These speaker intentions are highly motivated. The motivations include the constructional context, the conditional relation between the imperative and the declarative, the directive force of the imperative, the pragmatic enrichment of the declarative, and the complementary and interactive relationship between the imperative and declarative clauses, among which the constructional context serves as an overall motivation, and the rest may be seen as specific motivations.

Now and Cikum: A Pragmatic Account to Cikum

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-117
Author(s):  
Jae-Hak Yoon
Keyword(s):  
Pragmatic Account

scholarly journals Butler and Postanalytic Philosophy

Hypatia ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Paul Giladi
Keyword(s):  
Identity Politics ◽  
Cognitive Strategies ◽  
Judith Butler ◽  
Feminist Identity ◽  
Wilfrid Sellars ◽  
Poststructuralist Feminism ◽  
Pragmatic Account ◽  
Space Of Reasons ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract This article has two aims: (i) to bring Judith Butler and Wilfrid Sellars into conversation; and (ii) to argue that Butler's poststructuralist critique of feminist identity politics has metaphilosophical potential, given her pragmatic parallel with Sellars's critique of conceptual analyses of knowledge. With regard to (i), I argue that Butler's objections to the definitional practice constitutive of certain ways of construing feminism is comparable to Sellars's critique of the analytical project geared toward providing definitions of knowledge. Specifically, I propose that moving away from a definition of woman to what one may call poststructuralist sites of woman parallels moving away from a definition of knowledge to a pragmatic account of knowledge as a recognizable standing in the normative space of reasons. With regard to (ii), I argue that the important parallels between Butler's poststructuralist feminism and Sellars's antirepresentationalist normative pragmatism about knowledge enable one to think of her poststructuralist feminism as mapping out pragmatic cognitive strategies and visions for doing philosophy. This article starts a conversation between two philosophers whom the literature has yet to fully introduce to each other.

The Plain Inquirer’s Plain Evidence against the Global Skeptical Scenarios

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 208-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Leite
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Good Evidence ◽  
Epistemic Circularity ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
The World ◽  
Treatment Considerations ◽  
Limited Demand ◽  
Epistemic Asymmetry ◽  
Background Context ◽  
Rule Out

Penelope Maddy claims that we can have no evidence that we are not being globally deceived by an evil demon. However, Maddy’s Plain Inquirer holds that she has good evidence for a wide variety of claims about the world and her relation to it. She rejects the broadly Cartesian idea that she can’t be entitled to these claims, or have good evidence for them, or know them, unless she can provide a defense of them that starts from nowhere. She likewise rejects the more limited demand for a defense that makes use only of considerations that do not concern the world outside of her mind. She allows that some considerations about the world can be appealed to perfectly appropriately as fully adequate evidence in favor of other considerations about the world. So why can’t the Plain Inquirer rule out global skeptical hypotheses by producing evidence against them that depends upon other considerations about the world? Is there good reason for singling out global skeptical hypotheses such as I am not being deceived by an evil demon as requiring a different kind of treatment? Considerations about epistemic asymmetry and epistemic circularity, as well as Wittgensteinian considerations about the relation between evidence and the real-world and human background context, all lead to the conclusion that there is not.

Aspect interpretation in Russian – a pragmatic account

2008 ◽  
Vol 40 (12) ◽  
pp. 2077-2099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Sonnenhauser
Keyword(s):  
Pragmatic Account

Children's avoidance of lexical overlap: A pragmatic account.

2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 630-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gil Diesendruck ◽  
Lori Markson
Keyword(s):  
Pragmatic Account

Two-year-olds differentially disambiguate novel words and facts

2007 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 875-889 ◽  
Author(s):  
JASON SCOFIELD ◽  
DOUGLAS A. BEHREND
Keyword(s):  
Word Learning ◽  
Word Condition ◽  
Pragmatic Account ◽  
Learning Principles ◽  
Unfamiliar Object ◽  
Novel Words

ABSTRACTWhen presented with a pair of objects, one familiar and one unfamiliar, and asked to select the referent of a novel word, children reliably demonstrate the disambiguation effect and select the unfamiliar object. The current study investigated two competing word learning accounts of this effect: a pragmatic account and a word learning principles account. Two-, three- and four-year-olds were presented with four disambiguation conditions, a word/word, a word/fact, a fact/word and a fact/fact condition. A pragmatic account predicted disambiguation in all four conditions while a word learning principles account predicted disambiguation in the word/word and fact/word conditions. Results indicated that children disambiguated in word/word and fact/word conditions and two-year-olds disambiguated at above chance levels in the word/word condition but at below chance levels in the fact/fact condition. Because disambiguation varied both as a function of age and condition these findings are presented as challenges to a pragmatic account of the disambiguation effect.

Bootstrap and rollback: generalizing epistemic circularity

Synthese ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 189 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Kallestrup
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Circularity
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