Evaluation of the Effect of Prime Stimulus on Sense of Agency in Stop Operation of the Object in Circular Motion

Human cognitive mechanisms have been studied for the design of user-friendly interfaces. One of the key issues is a sense of agency, which is defined as the sense that “I am the one who is causing this action.” The user interface is important; it can alter the feeling of sense of agency. In this research, we focus on a prime stimulus and evaluate the effect thereof by experiments with participants. A ball moves in a circle on a monitor at a constant speed and participants stop it by pushing a key. They were given both prime stimulus and feedback stimulus and indicated if they were the agent who stopped the ball, i.e., they felt a sense of agency. From the results of the experiment, we found that the prime stimulus can have both a positive and negative influence on the sense of agency when human prediction is unreliable.

The Feedback-related Negativity Codes Components of Abstract Inference during Reward-based Decision-making

Behavioral control is influenced not only by learning from the choices made and the rewards obtained but also by “what might have happened,” that is, inference about unchosen options and their fictive outcomes. Substantial progress has been made in understanding the neural signatures of direct learning from choices that are actually made and their associated rewards via reward prediction errors (RPEs). However, electrophysiological correlates of abstract inference in decision-making are less clear. One seminal theory suggests that the so-called feedback-related negativity (FRN), an ERP peaking 200–300 msec after a feedback stimulus at frontocentral sites of the scalp, codes RPEs. Hitherto, the FRN has been predominantly related to a so-called “model-free” RPE: The difference between the observed outcome and what had been expected. Here, by means of computational modeling of choice behavior, we show that individuals employ abstract, “double-update” inference on the task structure by concurrently tracking values of chosen stimuli (associated with observed outcomes) and unchosen stimuli (linked to fictive outcomes). In a parametric analysis, model-free RPEs as well as their modification because of abstract inference were regressed against single-trial FRN amplitudes. We demonstrate that components related to abstract inference uniquely explain variance in the FRN beyond model-free RPEs. These findings advance our understanding of the FRN and its role in behavioral adaptation. This might further the investigation of disturbed abstract inference, as proposed, for example, for psychiatric disorders, and its underlying neural correlates.

The build-up and transfer of sensorimotor temporal recalibration measured via a synchronization task

The timing relation between a motor action and the sensory consequences of that action can be adapted by exposing participants to artificially delayed feedback (temporal recalibration; Heron et al., 2009; Keetels and Vroomen, 2012; Stekelenburg et al., 2011; Stetson et al., 2006; Sugano et al., 2010). Here, we demonstrate that a sensorimotor synchronization task (i.e., tapping the index finger in synchrony with a pacing signal) can be used as a measure of temporal recalibration. Participants were first exposed to a constant delay (∼150 ms) between a voluntary action (a finger tap) and an external feedback stimulus of that action (a visual flash or auditory tone). A subjective ‘no-delay’ condition (∼50 ms) served as baseline. After a short exposure phase to delayed feedback participants performed the tapping task in which they tapped their finger in synchrony with a flash or tone. Temporal recalibration manifested itself in that taps were given ∼20 ms earlier after exposure to 150 ms delays than 50 ms delays. This effect built up quickly (within 60 taps) and was bigger for auditory than visual adapters. In Experiment 2, we tested whether temporal recalibration would transfer across modalities by switching the modality of the adapter and pacing signal. Temporal recalibration transferred from visual adapters to auditory pacers, but not from auditory adapters to visual pacers. This asymmetric transfer suggests that sensory-specific effects are at play.

Supplementary Motor Area Encodes Reward Expectancy in Eye-Movement Tasks

Neural activity signifying the expectation of reward has been found recently in many parts of the brain, including midbrain and cortical structures. These signals can facilitate goal-directed behavior or the learning of new skills based on reinforcements. Here we show that neurons in the supplementary motor area (SMA), an area concerned with movements of the body and limbs, also carry a reward expectancy signal in the postsaccadic period of oculomotor tasks. While the monkeys performed blocks of memory-guided and object-based saccades, the neurons discharged a burst after a ∼200-ms delay following the target-acquiring saccade in the memory task but often fired concurrently with the target-acquiring saccade in the object task. The hypothesis that this postsaccadic bursting activity reflects the expectation of a reward was tested with a series of manipulations to the memory-guided saccade task. It was found that although the timing of the bursting activity corresponds to a visual feedback stimulus, the visual feedback is not required for the neurons to discharge a burst. Second, blocks of no-reward trials reveal an extinction of the bursting activity as the monkeys come to understand that they would not be rewarded for properly generated saccades. Finally, the delivery of unexpected rewards confirmed that in many of the neurons, the activity is not related to a motor plan to acquire the reward (e.g., licking). Thus we conclude that reward expectancy is represented by the activity of SMA neurons, even in the context of an oculomotor task. These results suggest that the reward expectancy signal is broadcast over a large extent of motor cortex, and may facilitate the learning of new, coordinated behavior between different body parts.

The Relationship of Cortical Activity and Personality in a Reinforced Go-Nogo Paradigm

The reinforcement sensitivity theory proposes two biological systems for the regulation of emotion, motivation, and personality: the behavioral activation system (BAS), which responds to stimuli related to positive and negative reinforcement, and the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), which responds to conditioned stimuli of punishment and nonreward. Recent findings provided evidence for increased bilateral frontal cortical trait activity in high BAS subjects. We hypothesized that increased bilateral frontal cortical state activity might be found in high BAS subjects in response to stimuli related to positive and negative reinforcement. The cortical reaction of 38 subjects to a reinforced Go-Nogo task was analyzed. A trial consisted of three subsequent stimuli: a cue stimulus (indicating positive, negative, or no reinforcement), an imperative stimulus (Go or Nogo/Inhibition), and a feedback stimulus (success/failure). Alpha power was extracted as a measure of cortical activity. In addition, BAS and BIS were measured using questionnaires. There was an increased cortical activity in response to the cues for reinforcement. High BAS subjects showed an even higher bilateral frontal cortical activity in response to the cues for positive and negative reinforcement as compared to neutral trials. This finding further corroborates a relation of bilateral frontal cortical activity and the BAS, which has now been demonstrated for cortical trait and state activity.

The Effectiveness of Internally-Generated Feedback with an Instructional Expert System

An expert system was developed and included as a feedback stimulus component of an instructional unit that taught the production of graphics instructional materials. The expert system was used to help students generate their own feedback about the quality of their production projects. Implementation of the expert system raised questions about its effects on processing activities and learning. To investigate these questions, a total of forty-three students were assigned to either an internal (provided by expert system) or external (provided by an instructor) feedback condition. Internally-generated feedback, stimulated by the expert system, proved as effective as externally provided feedback in the learning of the production tasks and improved both the learning and application of evaluation criteria in a complex evaluation task. The internal feedback group were also more creative in their evaluations. Students who used the expert system held positive opinions about its use.