A DIAGNOSIS OF RUSSIA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY IN A SITUATION OF AN ESCALATION OF HOSTILITY IN UKRAINE AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SAFETY OF THE EASTERN NATO FLANK

The paper presents the results of research, whose main goal is to evaluate the aviation and rocket capability of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in terms of a possible launch of regular warfare. The authors primarily focus on changes in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, which have created legal determinants of the use of armed forces outside the country’s territory in defense of national minorities, illustrated by taking control of Crimea. The authors also stress Russia’s military plans, including the development directions of the potential of armed forces as well as a possible threat to the security of the eastern NATO’s flank in the event of a conflict in Ukraine. In this respect, the capabilities of the air defense of countries on the eastern NATO flank, particularly Poland’s capability, were analyzed.

Impact of Disruptive Technologies on Defence

Effective military capabilities can take decades to research, develop, procure, field and integrate. Technology affects various aspects of conflicts and is therefore a critical component of defence planning and they are influencing the other components of a military capability. New technologies have often shaped strategies and tactics, and inspired the development of defence innovations. Understanding all aspects of new Emerging Disruptive Technologies will help decision makers not only to put up an effective planning, but to reduce the time between need statement and delivery and to avoid collateral issues that could occur in using them.

Military force structures in small states: Providing for relevant and credible military capability

<p>Small states are perceived as lacking military power. Nevertheless, most maintain military forces. Given their shortfalls in power and capacity what choices do small states make about maintaining military forces and what utility do they gain from them? This issue is not well addressed in small state literature which considers the security of small states but focuses less on their defence planning or the military instruments they maintain. This thesis addresses that issue by examining how small states structure their military forces, why they do so, and whether they provide for relevant and credible military capabilities. This is achieved by examining the structural balance of small state military forces; developing and applying a methodology to describe the process and priorities within the military systems of small states; and developing expectations for military forces in small states from small state literature and military theory as testable propositions to provide a basis for comparison of their military capabilities. The results of this comparison are then analysed with regard to the utility that small states may gain from their military forces and related to wider themes within the field of small state studies to ascertain the benefit that they may gain from them. Four cases of small state military force structures are used. Ireland provides limited military capabilities to meet discrete tasks and roles within a benign strategic environment and its policy of military neutrality. New Zealand, like Ireland, does not face a direct military threat but it has a wide range of security interests. This is reflected in a broad force structure, albeit with modest capabilities based on utility and the benefits of its international partnerships. Norway, on the other hand, does perceive a direct military threat and functions within the NATO security alliance. It maintains forces that are able to operate throughout the conflict continuum as part of the NATO framework but, as a small member of the alliance, it faces the challenges of balancing defence concerns within the alliance framework. Singapore also perceives itself to be strategically and militarily vulnerable. However, unlike Norway, it does not participate in a military alliance and instead provides the most capable military forces of the four cases as it aims to be self-reliant in the face of perceived vulnerability. The four cases possess markedly different military force structures as a result of their varying assessments of strategic discretion and differences in their approaches to the various security environments they encounter. All four face challenges with economies of scale, critical mass and fixed costs in providing for their military capabilities. However, the extent of these challenges differs between each of the four cases and they gain different utility and benefit from maintaining their military instruments. Hence while small states have some common military characteristics they cannot be considered as a homogenous group. This should affect the manner in which they, other states and international organisations perceive them.</p>

Military force structures in small states: Providing for relevant and credible military capability

<p>Small states are perceived as lacking military power. Nevertheless, most maintain military forces. Given their shortfalls in power and capacity what choices do small states make about maintaining military forces and what utility do they gain from them? This issue is not well addressed in small state literature which considers the security of small states but focuses less on their defence planning or the military instruments they maintain. This thesis addresses that issue by examining how small states structure their military forces, why they do so, and whether they provide for relevant and credible military capabilities. This is achieved by examining the structural balance of small state military forces; developing and applying a methodology to describe the process and priorities within the military systems of small states; and developing expectations for military forces in small states from small state literature and military theory as testable propositions to provide a basis for comparison of their military capabilities. The results of this comparison are then analysed with regard to the utility that small states may gain from their military forces and related to wider themes within the field of small state studies to ascertain the benefit that they may gain from them. Four cases of small state military force structures are used. Ireland provides limited military capabilities to meet discrete tasks and roles within a benign strategic environment and its policy of military neutrality. New Zealand, like Ireland, does not face a direct military threat but it has a wide range of security interests. This is reflected in a broad force structure, albeit with modest capabilities based on utility and the benefits of its international partnerships. Norway, on the other hand, does perceive a direct military threat and functions within the NATO security alliance. It maintains forces that are able to operate throughout the conflict continuum as part of the NATO framework but, as a small member of the alliance, it faces the challenges of balancing defence concerns within the alliance framework. Singapore also perceives itself to be strategically and militarily vulnerable. However, unlike Norway, it does not participate in a military alliance and instead provides the most capable military forces of the four cases as it aims to be self-reliant in the face of perceived vulnerability. The four cases possess markedly different military force structures as a result of their varying assessments of strategic discretion and differences in their approaches to the various security environments they encounter. All four face challenges with economies of scale, critical mass and fixed costs in providing for their military capabilities. However, the extent of these challenges differs between each of the four cases and they gain different utility and benefit from maintaining their military instruments. Hence while small states have some common military characteristics they cannot be considered as a homogenous group. This should affect the manner in which they, other states and international organisations perceive them.</p>

First Bull Run/Manassas

This chapter examines the First Battle of Bull Run, also known as the First Battle of Manassas, and argues that the Civil War’s first battle represented the last battle of antebellum military cultures of free and slave states. Before the Civil War, Americans refused to maintain a large U.S. Army. In the antebellum era, states organized local militia units based on their perception of internal and external threats; fear of slave revolt prompted slave states to maintain larger, more effective units, particularly cavalry units. Troopers who manned cavalry militia also staffed the slave patrols that brutally enforced the slave regime. In contrast, free states had no such fears, and their militias were moribund before the Civil War. When war came, slave states’ superior military capability led to Confederate victory at Bull Run/Manassas. Later, volunteer units from the free states achieved a level of competency that overcame this initial disadvantage.

Russia-Belarus wargames reinforce key messages

Significance In reality, the two armies remain separate because of Lukashenka's past opposition to hosting Russian troops permanently, though, as he noted, they are poised to collaborate in any conflict situation. This cooperation was showcased in the Zapad-2021 military exercises held on September 10-16 which combined training, demonstrations of military capability and political signalling. Impacts Conclusions drawn from Zapad-2021 will further expand Russian-Belarusian military cooperation, though not to the extent sought by Moscow. Lukashenka says Belarus will soon receive Russian fighter jets, helicopters and air defence systems. Zapad-2021 showcased Russia's desire to engage with foreign militaries: Indian troops participated while China and Pakistan sent observers.

Assessing the Communist Experience: Tragedy or Achievement?

Beyond matters of causal explanation, this chapter turns to an assessment of the communist experience: was it, on balance, an achievement or a tragedy? The answer depends in part on one’s values. Weighing the price paid in human life, suffering, and oppression against achievements in state-building, industrialization, military capability, public health, education, and social policies can lead an analyst in one or the other direction.

Food supply service of the Russian army in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763)

This article discusses the events of the Seven Years' War from the perspective of supplying the troops of the Russian army with food and adapting it to the European military campaign.&nbsp;An overview is given to the key battles of the Seven Years' War, reflecting the nutrition of troops and activity of certain individuals on maintaining military capability of the army.&nbsp;The author also touches upon the fate of A. V. Suvorov and the beginning of his service as a supply officer, which left an imprint on his future career.&nbsp;The article is based mostly on archival materials of the Russian State Archive of the Ancient Acts, as well as literary sources of scientific nature.&nbsp;The article describes the time of the dawn of the absolutist Russian State, being a powerful international force.&nbsp;The history of food service on the example of the Seven Years&rsquo; War of 1756&ndash; 1763 is dedicated to the history of food supply of the Russian army and population throughout the Seven Years' War (1756&ndash;1763), the main type of supply changed depending on the financial situation of the state.&nbsp;The history of food service in Russia is one of the most remarkable pages in military history.&nbsp;Food service, which established with the advent of the Russian regular army, has been one of the main vectors of activity of the military department for centuries.

Burden-sharing: the US, Australia and New Zealand alliances in the Pacific islands

One of President Joseph Biden's foreign policy priorities is to ‘renew’ and ‘strengthen’ the United States' alliances, as they were perceived to have been ‘undermined’ during the Trump administration, which regularly expressed concern that allies were free-riding on the United States' military capability. Yet the broad range of threats states face in the contemporary context suggests that security assistance from allies no longer only—or even primarily—comes in the form of military capability. We consider whether there is a need to rethink understandings of how alliance relationships are managed, particularly how the goals—or strategic burdens—of alliances are understood, how allies contribute to those burdens, and how influence is exercised within alliances. We do this by analysing how the United States–Australia and Australia–New Zealand alliances operate in the Pacific islands. Our focus on the Pacific islands reflects the United States' perception that the region plays a ‘critical’ role in helping to ‘preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific region’. We conclude that these understandings need to be rethought, particularly in the Pacific islands, where meeting non-traditional security challenges such as economic, social and environmental issues, is important to advancing the United States, Australia and New Zealand's shared strategic goal of remaining the region's primary security partners and ensuring that no power hostile to their interests establishes a strategic foothold.