Sobre el fenomenologizar como cinestesia concretizante

Nos proponemos, en este artículo, sentar las bases necesarias para investigar la correlación entre algunas formas de epojé y las reducciones a las que dichas suspensiones abren, y que corresponden a una concreción cada vez más rica. Nuestra aproximación de la concreción fenomenológica se apoya, abiertamente, en la mereología (i.e. se atiene a los estrictos términos de la IIIª Investigación Lógica). Tras un breve repaso de algunos conceptos mereológicos aplicados al giro transcendental de la fenomenología, trataremos de apresar, mereológicamente, la especificidad de la problemática finkeana en su VIª Meditación Cartesiana. Habremos pues de diseccionar las partes de la correlación transcendental cruzándolas con el particular lugar que, en esa concreción (i.e. de la correlación transcendental), ocupa esa “parte” no concrescente (sino indirectamente concretizante) que es el yo fenomenologizante. Ella conformará la “parte” antecedente del “todo” (en sentido lato) de la cinestesia fenomenologizante que tratamos de elucidar, y cuyo consecuente será el todo (ahora sí en sentido estricto) de la correlación transcendental. Intentamos así contribuir al esclarecimiento del proceso de reducción fenomenológica, sentando las bases para una investigación sobre las articulaciones concretas entre epojé y reducción.The aim of this paper is to lay the ground for understanding the correlation between some forms of epochè and the reduction they open to, which corresponds, each time, to a richer type of concreteness. Our approach of phenomenological concreteness is mereological (i.e. within the very terms of the 3rd Logical Investigation). Therefore, after remembering some basic concepts of the husserlian mereology and their possible use within transcendental phenomenology, we try to grasp the specificity of the questions posed by Eugen Fink in his 6 th Cartesian Meditation. We shall expose the parts of the transcendental correlation and then account for the particular role played, “within” this concretion (i.e. that of the transcendental correlation), by this particular “part” which is the phenomenologizing ego (if not concrescent, yet indirectly concretizing). The phenomenologizing ego will be the antecedent “part” or term within this “whole” (lato sensu) consisting on the phenomenologizing kinesthesis. Thereafter, the consequent term of such a kinesthesis corresponds to the whole (this time stricto sensu) of the transcendental correlation. We thus intend to throw some light on the process of phenomenological reduction and set the basis for further investigations regarding the concrete articulation between epochè and reduction.

Philosophical Practice as Self-modification: An Essay on Michel Foucault’s Critical Engagement with Philosophy

This essay argues that what makes Michel Foucault’s oeuvre not only stand apart but also cohere is an assiduous philosophical practice taking the form of an ongoing yet concrete self-modification in the medium of thought. Part I gives an account of three essential aspects of Foucault’s conception of philosophical activity. Beginning with his famous characterization of philosophy in terms of ascēsis, it moves on to articulate his characterization of philosophical practice as a distinct form of meditation, differing from both Cartesian meditation and Hegelian meditation, as it aims to stand vigil for the day to come and operates as a preface to transgression. Part II begins the articulation of crucial traits left implicit in this understanding of philosophy by turning to Foucault’s in-depth investigation of philosophy in Antiquity during his lectures at the Collège de France in the 1980s. First, it develops how philosophy here begins to constitute and distinguish itself by establishing itself as an activity that has a privileged relationship to truth and truth-telling as an unremitting, existentially determining challenge for the philosopher. Further, it instantiates how Platonism elaborates the need for a sustained ‘auto-ascetic’ ethical non-compliant differentiation as the condition of possibility for accessing and stating truth, and then describes how the assertion of an ethical differentiation and attitude in Cynicism takes the form of an insistent combat for another world in this world. Finally, it underlines how the ethical-practical philosophical work upon oneself in Antiquity is developed in an ongoing critical and political exchange with others. Part III indicates how ethical differentiation according to Foucault remains an essential precondition for the practice of philosophy and is further developed in the modern age. This is particularly perspicuous in Kant’s determination of the Enlightenment, in the attitude of modernity exemplified by Baudelaire, and in the history of revolt since the beginning of early Modernity. On this background, Part IV develops how philosophy as an ongoing meditative practice of self-modification leads to an affirmative critique, confirming the virtuality of this world in order to investigate the potentiality in the examined. In this manner, the essay presents Foucault’s philosophical practice as well as an outline of the history of ideas of a seemingly alternate, yet still agenda-setting conception of philosophical practice today.

Philosophical Practice as Self-modification: An Essay on Michel Foucault’s Critical Engagement with Philosophy

This essay argues that what makes Michel Foucault’s oeuvre not only stand apart but also cohere is an assiduous philosophical practice taking the form of an ongoing yet concrete self-modification in the medium of thought. Part I gives an account of three essential aspects of Foucault’s conception of philosophical activity. Beginning with his famous characterization of philosophy in terms of ascēsis, it moves on to articulate his characterization of philosophical practice as a distinct form of meditation, differing from both Cartesian meditation and Hegelian meditation, as it aims to stand vigil for the day to come and operates as a preface to transgression. Part II begins the articulation of crucial traits left implicit in this understanding of philosophy by turning to Foucault’s in-depth investigation of philosophy in Antiquity during his lectures at the Collège de France in the 1980s. First, it develops how philosophy here begins to constitute and distinguish itself by establishing itself as an activity that has a privileged relationship to truth and truth-telling as an unremitting, existentially determining challenge for the philosopher. Further, it instantiates how Platonism elaborates the need for a sustained ‘auto-ascetic’ ethical non-compliant differentiation as the condition of possibility for accessing and stating truth, and then describes how the assertion of an ethical differentiation and attitude in Cynicism takes the form of an insistent combat for another world in this world. Finally, it underlines how the ethical-practical philosophical work upon oneself in Antiquity is developed in an ongoing critical and political exchange with others. Part III indicates how ethical differentiation according to Foucault remains an essential precondition for the practice of philosophy and is further developed in the modern age. This is particularly perspicuous in Kant’s determination of the Enlightenment, in the attitude of modernity exemplified by Baudelaire, and in the history of revolt since the beginning of early Modernity. On this background, Part IV develops how philosophy as an ongoing meditative practice of self-modification leads to an affirmative critique, confirming the virtuality of this world in order to investigate the potentiality in the examined. In this manner, the essay presents Foucault’s philosophical practice as well as an outline of the history of ideas of a seemingly alternate, yet still agenda-setting conception of philosophical practice today.

Paul Ricœur’s Search for a Just Community. The Phenomenological Presupposition of a Life “with and for others”

The aim of this article is to examine how Ricœur’s critique of Husserl’s and Levinas’s notions of intersubjectivity informs his own alternative conceptualization of the intra- and interpersonal as a complex intertwining of moral selfhood and a just community. My first assumption is that law, as a prescriptive intervention in the social structure of our communal life, presupposes a phenomenology of our “being with others”. My second assumption is that Ricœur’s entire philosophical anthropology, and specifically his ideas on ethics, legality and justice, can be read as a prolonged response to Husserl’s solipsistic deadlock in the famous Fifth Cartesian Meditation. Taken together these two assumptions connect Ricœur’s early analysis of phenomenology with his complex reconceptualization of moral selfhood in Oneself as Another, culminating in the ethical maxim of “a good life with and for others in just institutions.”

Alfred Schutz as a critic of social ontological: robinsonades Revisiting his objections to Husserl’s 5th Cartesian meditation

***Alfred Schutz como um crítico de robinsonadas social-ontológicas :revisitando suas objeções à 5ª meditação cartesiana de Husserl***Alfred Schutz tende a ser equivocadamente considerado como um ilustre representante do individualismo ontológico social. Neste artigo, busco corrigir esta interpretação deturpada da sua obra por meio de uma revisão de sua crítica ao que eu chamo de “Robinsonadas” – tomando emprestado um termo marxiano – intrínsecas à 5ª Meditação Cartesiana de Husserl. Meu argumento é que a reconstrução sistemática desta crítica clássica permite esclarecer a verdadeira preocupação ontológica de Schutz, a saber: o intersubjetivismo ontológico social.

Eine genetische Analyse des Zugangs zum Anderen / A Genetic Analysis of the Access to the Other

Summary I start with an immanent critique of Husserls 5th Cartesian Meditation that reveals the weakness of the constitutional Analysis in this text, especially in the view of genetic phenomenology. First I argue for a methodically differentiation in concern to different privileged parts of our lived body. Hands and feet seems to be much more suitable for analogical apperception than facial expressions, because we do not know so much about our own mimics. My special interest is a specific genetic phenomenological analysis of our access to the other that is oriented on the function of the type. The type somehow carries all our experiences with others in it and I will argue that the layers of this history are also functioning in every apperception of an other.